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# Indian Round Table Conference

12th November, 1930—19th January, 1931

PROCEEDINGS OF SUB-COMMITTEES

(Volume IX)

[SUB-COMMITTEE No. IX (Sind)]

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### **INTRODUCTORY NOTE.**

Proceedings of the Indian Round Table Conference in plenary session, and in Committee of the whole Conference, are contained in a separate volume, the Introductory Note to which explains, briefly, the procedure adopted by the Conference.

Proceedings of Sub-Committees are contained in nine volumes as below:—

Volume I.—Federal Structure.

„ II.—Provincial Constitution.

„ III.—Minorities.

„ IV.—Burma.

„ V.—North-West Frontier Province.

„ VI.—Franchise.

„ VII.—Defence.

„ VIII.—Services.

„ IX.—Sind.





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# INDIAN ROUND TABLE CONFERENCE.

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## SUB-COMMITTEE No. IX.

(Sind.)

The Sub-Committee was constituted as follows:—

The Earl Russell ( <i>Chairman</i> ).	Dr. Shata'at Ahmad Khan.
The Marquess of Zetland.	Sardar Sampuran Singh.
The Marquess of Reading.	Dr. B. S. Moonje.
H.H. The Aga Khan.	Mr. M. R. Jayakar.
Mr. M. A. Jinnah.	Raja Narendra Nath.
Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto.	Mr. C. Y. Chintamani.
Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah.	Mr. B. V. Jadhav.
Sir Abdul Qaiyum.	Sir Phiroze Sethna.
Sir Muhammad Shafi.	Mr. H. P. Mody.
	Sir Hubert Carr.

with the following terms of reference:—

“The question of constituting Sind as a separate Province.”

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### PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST MEETING OF SUB-COMMITTEE No. IX (SIND) HELD ON 12TH JANUARY, 1931.

*Chairman:* The reference to this Committee is to consider the question of constituting Sind as a separate Province. That means, therefore, that the main question of whether it is desirable that Sind should be separated or not has been referred to us, and has not been decided. I think it might be useful if I called the attention of the Committee to what exists already in the way of material on that subject in the various reports. Extracts from the important ones have been circulated this morning, so as to be available to all the members of the Committee.

In the first volume of the Simon Commission's Report, in paragraph 77, there is a description of Sind, with its area and population, and the statement that Karachi is, of course, its important port, that the population is about three-fourths Muslim, and that the present government is under the Bombay Presidency by a Commissioner in Sind, who is to a certain extent more independent and more free than the Commissioners in charge of the other divisions of the Province. They call attention to the fact

that the Bombay High Court has no jurisdiction in Sind, but, of course, there is no separation of finances, and they then call attention to one of the most important questions, and that is the Sukkur Barrage, which has cost £16,000,000, and on which there is still a further outlay to take place. In the second Volume of the Simon Commission's Report, in paragraph 38, they deal with the question of separation. These points are all, I think, in the papers before you, and they come down against separation and say they cannot recommend it immediately, but suggest something in the way of a Legislative Committee. Then in the Government of India Despatch, in paragraph 21, they say they can give no final advice without further enquiry, and a special committee, and they call attention to the administrative and financial aspects.

Then there is the memorandum of the Bombay Government to the Simon Commission, and there the Bombay Government are quite strong against the separation. They say that it is impracticable and undesirable and that it would be a great extravagance; and the further details you will find in the Report of the Bombay Government. Then the Bombay Legislative Council state that for financial reasons alone it was impracticable—

*Sir G. H. Hidayatullah* : The Provincial Committee.

*Chairman* : I thought it was the Legislative Council.

*Sir G. H. Hidayatullah* : No, Sir, it was the Provincial Committee.

*Chairman* : Then the Indian Central Committee recommended separation, but I understand only by a majority of 5 to 4. Then there were some minutes of dissent. There is a very long one by Syed Miran Muhammad Shah, which is on page 56 and onwards of the third volume of the Simon Report, and there he deals in a good deal of detail with the financial objections, and succeeds in proving, in the end, to his own satisfaction at any rate, that there would be no deficit at all after separation.

I am sorry to say that the official information we have on that is not very good. Apparently the last figures were 1924/1925, and we have telegraphed to the Government of Bombay to see if we can get any later figures, because 1924/1925 seems rather a long time ago. I hope we may get an answer, because it does not seem very satisfactory to have figures five years old. There is another minute by Dr. Ambedkar, who comes down against separation, but for different reasons. That really is the question that is before the Committee—to discuss whether it is desirable that the Province should be separated or not.

Now, I understand that Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah has only come out of a nursing home to attend this Committee, and therefore if the Committee do not mind I should like to call upon him very early. I do not know whether you wish to say something very short, Dr. Moonje.

*Dr. Moonje:* I just wanted to know why this question is taken up separately in this Round Table Conference, because there are several Provinces which have made a claim for separation and partition into separate Provinces—for instance, the Karnatak and other Provinces, which have been agitating for being converted into separate Provinces, and out of these many areas why should the Sind question alone be separated. I have not been able to understand that point.

*Chairman:* I am afraid I cannot say. The question was sent to us by the Business Committee.

*Mr. Foot:* I was on the Business Committee when this Committee was appointed.

*Chairman:* I am told that the appointment was the result of a discussion in the Minorities Committee when the Prime Minister presided.

*Sr. G. H. Hidayatullah:* The Boundary Committee will deal with those questions. There are questions of areas there to be determined, not as in the case of Sind, which, as is admitted on all hands, is a self-contained Province.

*Mr. Foot:* The point, I understand, was this. I was a member of the Minorities Committee, and the question of Sind was referred to, and the Prime Minister thought that the matter could best be dealt with separately rather than by the Minorities Committee, which, as members will know, is pressed for time, as most Committees are, and if we had got on to the question of Sind there would have been no time. There were so many questions to be dealt with that the Prime Minister decided that they should be dealt with separately. The Business Committee met, and our terms of reference were drawn, I suppose, with the Prime Minister's approval.

*Chairman:* I might have pointed out in opening that there is one argument of the Bombay Government which has rather gone by the board, and that is the argument with regard to size, because Sind is as large and as populous, apparently, as the North-West Frontier Province.

*Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah:* Mr. Chairman, I am one of the two members who dissent from the view of the Bombay Government in regard to the separation of Sind. I do not like to deal with the question of the separation of Sind on communal lines, as some parties are trying to deal with it; I want to deal with it on its merits.

It is in the interests of the inhabitants of Sind that Sind should be separated from Bombay. It is admitted by all that it is racially, geographically, and linguistically a separate Province, the experience, manners, culture and mode of life of Sind are quite different from those of the Bombay Presidency altogether. Not only is that so, but even the revenue system and the irrigation system are different from those of Bombay. It was only

by accident of conquest, because the garrison of Bombay conquered Sind, that it happened to be annexed to Bombay at that time, when the Punjab was not incorporated in British India. Had it been, we do not know what would have been the fate of Sind; it might have gone to the Punjab, where the manners, customs, mode of irrigation and revenue system are nearly the same.

Now, Sir, when this garrison of Bombay was marching to Afghanistan under Sir Charles Napier, we unsophisticated Sindhis welcomed your troops, and in their hospitality gave him supply and allowed him a free passage. Those troops marched against our co-religionists, the Afghans. When they returned disappointed, without any rhyme or reason, without any provocation, without any justification, they conquered us. That is the return we got for the hospitality shown by our people. You will excuse me for my frankness. Your own General Commanding, Sir Charles Napier, in his Despatch to the East India Company himself said: "Peccavi: I have Sind."

*Mr. Foot:* Yes; he called it a piece of rascality.

*Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah:* I do not call it that.

*Mr. Foot:* That is what he called it.

*Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah:* Now, Sir, everybody is asking for self-determination. You are applying the principle of self-determination to every part of India and the whole of India. Why should you not now support out righteous cause and make amends for your past sins, and I will show you personally that we have a very strong case for the separation of Sind. Now, Sir, I will first deal with this point. It is admitted on all hands that it is a separate Province. That is admitted by the Simon Commission. If you like I will read it out to you, but I do not want to waste your time by reading it. It is admitted by the Government of India that it is a separate Province. It is a self-contained Province.

Then the second question arises, whether there is a demand for separation from the people or not. There is a demand, Sir, not only from 75 per cent. of the Muhammadans, but from Hindu gentlemen also, though they are in smaller numbers. The most enlightened community, though they are a handful in Sind, the Parsees, have been urging the separation of Sind. I may quote the name of Mr. Jamshed Mehta, who is the President of the Karachi Municipality, and who is associated with every activity of Sind, social, political, commercial. He is in favour of the separation of Sind. Thus, Sir, I have shown you that there is a demand, a demand by an overwhelming majority.

Now, Sir, there is the question whether this demand has arisen of recent years or is a very old and insistent demand. I may call Sir Charles Napier the first Governor of Sind and the last Governor of Sind. After the dictatorship of Sir Charles Napier,

Sir Bartle Frere became the Commissioner in Sind; he recommended that the Sind Province as a separate Province should be turned into a Chief Commissionership, nothing to do with Bombay or any other Presidency. But no heed was paid to him. Then this question again was opened in 1817, but, owing to the second Afghan War, the question was prevented from being discussed at full length. Then Lord Curzon again made an attempt to reopen this question. Then my friend in his memorandum has shown that this question has been mooted from time to time and my Hindu friends were the first to be in favour of the separation of Sind.

Now, Sir, I have said that it is a separate Province, there is a demand and this is an old question, there has been an insistent demand for the separation of Sind from time to time. That clearly shows that the people want separation. Now I come to deal with some of the objections of my Government. They say it will be a small Province; but, as Your Lordship pointed out just now, the North-West Frontier Province is much smaller than Sind, and yet it has been made a separate Province. As to the area of Sind, Sind is of the same size as Great Britain without Wales.

Now, Sir, I come to the other difficulties that have been pointed out by my Government, the administrative difficulties as they call them. As a matter of fact, the administrative difficulties are in favour of the separation, as I will presently show you, rather than against it. Since 1843 the Bombay Government has found it difficult to administer Sind efficiently from a distance of 500 to 600 miles by sea and many thousands of miles by rail. Therefore they passed an Act delegating the powers of the Government of Bombay in respect of Sind to the Commissioner in Sind. Does that show that the administrative difficulties are against or in favour of the separation? The Bombay Government has condemned itself by passing this Act itself and subsequently Acts by which it delegated its powers to the Commissioner in Sind.

They cannot rule it from that distance. I should like to read to you what was said by my late friend Mr. Harchandrai, the greatest leader we have had in Sind, and a Hindu. He made a protest when he went as a member of a deputation to see the late Mr. Montagu. "The Government of Sind", he said, "has for the last seventy years been in effect an unqualified autocracy, with all the disadvantages and characteristics of that system. The Commissioner in Sind derives his numerous powers partly by inheritance from his ancient predecessor, Sir Charles Napier, the first and last Governor of Sind, and mainly by the frequent delegation to him of numerous powers of local government by the Governor of Bombay in Council, and recently by the specific preservation to him in later Acts of powers elsewhere reserved to the Governor in Council, and has to-day become in most respects a local government, without the check of an Executive Council".

*Mr. Foot:* What document is that?



*Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah:* This is the representation made by the leader of the Hindu community to the late Mr. Montagu, when Mr. Montagu came to Bombay in 1917.

*Mr. Foot:* Is the book from which you have read that available?

*Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah:* No, but that representation can be obtained from the Government of Bombay, and nobody can deny it.

Now, Sir, that position still obtained in spite of the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms and although we have dyarchy with Ministers and Members. Certain powers have been delegated to the Commissioner, but so far as the powers that have not been delegated to him are concerned, the various Commissioners from time to time have bitterly complained of inordinate delay in the disposal of matters by the Government of Bombay. I should like to quote to you part of a speech by one of the Commissioners who retired only four or five years ago from Sind, and who is here and whom the sub-Committee can examine. He says "The work is more and more being done through a Government which, however friendly, is situated several hundred miles away, and correspondence on education, engineering and other subjects takes a very long time before it is finally disposed of". In fact, the Government of Bombay and their officers have condemned themselves by their admissions that they cannot govern Sind from such a distance. You have the Act still in force and you have the complaint of the Commissioners in Sind that in regard to matters where no delegation of powers has been made there is inordinate delay. Are these administrative reasons in favour of separation or against it?

It is said that Sind will be a small province and will be deprived of the expert advice of specialist officers and the heads of departments, a plethora of which have been employed. I have to do my duty, though it is unpleasant. It will be said that we will not be able to afford to employ a consulting architect. Now, Sir, in the first place is Sind going to have a very big programme of building? What has Bombay done up to this time? Only recently, after all this agitation, they have given us a Chief Courts building worth 25 lakhs of rupees; otherwise the other buildings come to fifty thousand rupees or a lakh. Are we to employ a consulting architect for these smaller buildings? I will go without his expert advice. We have two Chief Engineers in Sind, and if they cannot design ordinary buildings costing two lakhs they are not worth the salary that they are getting. However, to reply to the argument of my Government I submit that there are any number of private architects in Karachi, and when we have plenty of money and want to build fine buildings we will get a private man to do the work of designing them, instead of burdening ourselves with a recurring expenditure of several thousand rupees every month. That disposes of one of their specialists.

Then comes the consulting surveyor, who deals with town planning. Under the Town Planning Act the initiative comes from the local bodies, what would be called Country Councils here. They want to introduce schemes, but I know what their resources are in my part of the country as well as in the whole Presidency; their resources are depleted and they cannot introduce any system of town planning at the present time. We have an Assistant Consulting Surveyor in Sind, but the Bombay Government says an Assistant Consulting Surveyor is not sufficient to advise us, and that we must have the advice of the Consulting Surveyor of Bombay. If that is the case, what is the good of employing an Assistant Consulting Surveyor in Sind? What is the good of employing such a man if he is not going to be competent to draw up a town planning scheme? Moreover, only two years ago the present Consulting Surveyor was my Assistant Consulting Surveyor in Karachi. Why should we need the services of the Consulting Surveyor of Bombay? It is an unnecessary financial burden. Let us suppose, to take an extreme case, that our local bodies have plenty of money and introduce a scheme. To satisfy the Government of Bombay about that scheme we can borrow the services of their Consulting Surveyor. I have been in charge of these departments for nine years, and I know we have been lending the services of these people on payment to the Indian States, leaving aside the other provinces. I can therefore meet their objection in that way, if the local bodies have plenty of money and it is thought that the advice of the Assistant Consulting Surveyor is not enough. That disposes of the second specialist officer.

The third is the Sanitary Engineer, dealing with sanitary schemes, waterworks and drainage. The policy of the Government of Bombay up to this time has been to assist the Bombay Corporation and the Karachi Municipality up to fifty per cent. of the cost of these schemes. You know how depleted are the resources of the Bombay Government itself. We have a deficit budget of one and a half crores this year. The resources of the local bodies are also depleted, and how can they launch waterworks and drainage schemes when they are without money? Even supposing they do so thereafter, we can ask for the services of the specialist of the Bombay Government on payment to design a scheme for us, and we have competent engineers working under the local bodies to execute such schemes, as is done all over the country.

Similar remarks apply to the other specialist officers. We come now to the heads of departments. Take the Revenue Department. You have the Commissioner in Sind, which is a prize post for the Revenue Department, with a Government house and so on, so that so far as the Revenue Department is concerned there will be no necessity for the advice of the Bombay head of the department. Then we have the Judicial Commissioner. Our Chief Court is self-contained in judicial matters, and is independent even of the High Court of Bombay, so that in revenue

and judicial matters we do not stand in need of any advice. The Members will disappear now; there will be only Ministers.

Then comes the Engineering Department. There is a self-contained Engineering Department in Sind already, and we have two Chief Engineers in Sind, one dealing with ordinary irrigation and the other with the Sukkur Barrage. Yet it is said we should go for advice to Bombay! I cannot understand it.

Then comes the Inspector General of Police. In the last ten years, how many times has the Inspector General of Police of Bombay visited Sind? I do not think more than twice, and perhaps only once. Yet we are bearing a portion of his cost. We have a Deputy Inspector General of Police there, an officer who has between 15 and 20 years' service. If he is not competent to give us advice in regard to our police matters, then I am afraid he is not worth the salary of £2,000 or £1,800 that he gets. Why should we have an Inspector General of Police, and do these heads of Departments go very often to Sind? Then I come to the Chief Conservator. We have a Conservator in Sind already, though there are no forests worth the name. If I had my way I would abolish that post altogether. There are no forests in Sind, and yet there is a Conservator and there are rangers of the forests, and I think on the top of it we ought to have the advice of the Chief Conservator of Forests. When did Bombay have that advice of the Chief Conservator of Forests? That post has come into existence. Once it came into existence and it was abolished. Again it has come into existence. I am afraid it is going to be abolished very soon. These are the administrative difficulties. Then, Sir, I come to the Director of Public Instruction. How many times have they visited Sind, and how many days are they in Sind to advise us? Yet we bear the cost of their establishment and their travelling allowances. Does he know Sindhi? Even some of my Inspectors of Education do not know Sindhi, the language of the place, though most of the Civilians are required to pass the examination. We have Inspectors of Education there who do not know the language.

*Mr. Jadhav:* That is the case with all the Government Inspectors.

*Sir G. H. Hidayatullah:* The higher education, the curricula, everything is determined by the university. I do not know what advice the Director of Public Instruction will come and give me, but without which Sind will not be governed properly. In the first place, he does not know the language of the place, he does not know the customs and manners of the people. We have at present a Director of Public Instruction imported from some other Presidency. They will excuse me for saying that we give them good hospitality and good shooting in the winter when they come round there.

*Mr. Jinnah:* That is why they come there.

*Mr. Jadhav:* They can collect objects of art.

*Sir G. H. Hidayatullah:* And my friend will know that you have appointed a Director of Agriculture, or he is being appointed.

*Mr. Jadhav:* A Chief Officer of Agriculture.

*Sir G. H. Hidayatullah:* So I do not know why Sind should not be separated. We have two Chief Engineers, a High Court, we have a Commissioner with a Government House; no other Commissioner has a Government House; in fact, we have all the important directors, heads, chief agricultural officer, and so on. I do not know what the administrative difficulties are; I cannot understand the administrative difficulties at all. The administrative difficulties are more in continuing with Bombay rather than in separation, as the Government of Bombay have themselves admitted in regard to the separation of Sind.

Then, Sir, another argument is that there will be a smaller cadre, and people will not like to serve in Sind; but the argument is not sound. There are others that have at present seven districts. If this separation takes place after two or three months Sind will sanction the money for everything; and, mind, when the Sukkur Barrage comes into operation . . . .

*Sir Abdul Qayyum:* There is the Delhi Province, of course.

*Sir G. H. Hidayatullah:* Yes, I had forgotten that.

*Sir Muhammad Shafi:* Consisting of a city and a town and a police station!

*Sir G. H. Hidayatullah:* Now, take the I.C.S. cadre. They can rise to the prize posts in Sind. Memberships are going now. Nobody will be appointed as a Member from the I.C.S. after the further reforms, so they can rise to the highest posts of Commissioner in the I.C.S., and they can become, if they join the Judicial Department, Judges of the Chief Court or of the Judicial Commissioner's Court, and there are three civilians. Is that not sufficient inducement for them to go to Sind, when there are four prize posts for them? In the Engineering Department they can rise to be Chief Engineers. Then, Sir, as regards the Police, they can become D.I.Gs. After all, there is only one I.G.'s post in the Presidency. All young men who enter into the Police Department have not retired as I.Gs. Most of them have retired not even D.I.Gs. Besides, there is an attraction in Sind. You may ask those gentlemen who have served in Sind. They do not like to leave it. There is a special Sind allowance for them, and there is the hospitality that we show them.

*Sir Muhammad Shafi:* When Sind becomes a Province in itself the D.I.G. will cease to be a D.I.G.; he will become an I.G.

*Sir G. H. Hidayatullah:* So the objection about a small cadre does not hold good. Now I come to the Simon Commission's objection. They merely express their sympathy with us: "We have great sympathy with the claim, but there are grave administrative objections to isolating Sind and depriving it of the powerful backing of Bombay before the future of the Sukkur Barrage is

assured and the major readjustments which it will entail have been effected."

Now, I have dealt with the administrative objections that appeared to the seven Simon Commissioners. To me it appears, and to every reasonable man it will appear, that the administrative difficulties are with the continuance with Bombay rather than against it.

Now I come to some instances of the "powerful backing of Bombay" in Sind. My friends from Bombay will excuse me. I have been reading that in all civilised countries the prosperity of the country depends on its communications. You will be surprised to hear that there are not more than a hundred miles of Government Provincial roads in Sind, and not more than 30 miles of pukka roads on which you can run a motor-car. This is the "powerful backing of Bombay" that we have got up to this stage, Sir. If any civilised country does not have good communications, how can there be prosperity in a country? That is one example of the "strong backing".

*Chairman:* Are not they just giving you a broad gauge railway?

*Sir G. H. Hidayatullah:* Only now we are getting a small gauge one. A friend of mine here once had a motor ride in Sind, and he might have mentioned his experience of the jolting he got.

*Mr. Jinnah:* Only a few months ago I had an experience there. I rode 35 miles in a car.

*Sir G. H. Hidayatullah:* So this is the "powerful backing" as regards communications. Now, with regard to education, in two other divisions of the Bombay Presidency and the city of Bombay they have Government colleges of all kinds, engineering, medical and others. Poor Sind has not got one Government college. Now, as regards primary education, my friend the President of one of the District Local Boards will tell you that we poor people, in order to educate ourselves, have increased our local rate from 1 anna to 2 annas to introduce compulsory education, and the poor Bombay Government says we have no money to contribute our share so that you will be able to introduce compulsory education within your radius. This is another instance of the "powerful backing of Bombay". A third example is medical relief. You can call for the figures and find out how many thousands—not lakhs—are spent in Sind on Medical relief. This is the "powerful backing of Bombay".

Now I come to the Sukkur barrage. I had the honour to be in charge, and it is the only legacy we have got from them. As to the Sukkur barrage, no doubt we have borrowed this money on the credit of the Government of Bombay from the Government of India. The scheme was prepared by the experts of the Bombay Government. It was sanctioned and carefully scrutinised by the Government of Bombay. There was a great deal of controversy, even in England, about the scheme. After being convinced, the

Secretary of State sanctioned the scheme, and they assured us poor Sindhis, "that is a productive scheme". If it is a productive scheme, as they say, and as they have laid down certain estimates, what fear is there of the loan? We will pay it.

*Chairman:* Well, but it is conceivable that, at present commodity prices, it may not be very productive.

*Sir G. H. Hidayatullah:* Then how is Bombay going to pay you a deficit of a crore and a half? That is my reply. But these prices will not continue for ever.

*Chairman:* I hope not.

*Sir G. H. Hidayatullah:* If they continue for ever, then Bombay cannot pay, with the heavy loans that they have incurred already—that I will deal with later on—and a deficit budget of a crore and a half. I do not think the depression is continuing for ever. There will be hopeful signs. So as regards the debt of the Sukkur barrage, it is to be paid. In the estimates they are doubling the assessment.

*Chairman:* Do you mean that Sind will be prepared to take over the whole burden?

*Sir G. H. Hidayatullah:* Yes, I understand so. That is so is it not?

*Sir S. N. Bhutto:* I will speak later.

*Mr. Jinnah:* I do not think Bombay would give up the advantage. You see, under the scheme Bombay having guaranteed the loan, as I understand it, Bombay stands to gain if things go on well.

*Chairman:* If the thing goes right, Bombay looks to taking the profits, you mean?

*Mr. Jinnah:* Yes. Therefore I do not think you will get Bombay easily to say, "We will give up the prospects", having guaranteed the loan. You see what I mean?

*Chairman:* Yes.

*Mr. Jinnah:* But that is a matter of adjustment.

*Chairman:* Yes. I should have thought that cut both ways, because if Bombay is prepared to do that, they will have to bear the burden whether Sind is separated or not, will they not?

*Mr. Jinnah:* Yes, so far as the Sukkur barrage is concerned.

*Chairman:* Yes; I mean, they cannot have it both ways so far as the Sukkur Barrage is concerned.

*Mr. Jinnah:* Yes, subject to adjustment, that may be right.

*Sir G. H. Hidayatullah:* Then, Sir, the Simon Commission says, "There are grave administrative objections to isolating Sind and depriving it of the powerful backing of Bombay before the future of the Sukkur Barrage is assured." I cannot understand the language—whether the Sukkur Barrage is technically to be a success, or financially, or how. Technically I can tell you

that it will operate in 1932, January; so the future of the Sukkur Barrage is assured as an engineering scheme.

*Sir Muhammad Shafi*: It is practically complete.

*Chairman*: Yes, what you might call the engineering part of it is complete.

*Sir G. H. Hidayatu 'llah*: Yes; so there is no fear of the future of the barrage or anything now. Now, Sir, I will put to you one argument. They say financially we are a deficit Province. Yet why do they want Sind when they have their own financial difficulties—the Bombay Government? I cannot understand that. I have failed to understand that up to this time.

*Chairman*: Just keep for one moment to the barrage, you remember that the first volume of the Simon Report said that a considerable further outlay would be required.

*Sir G. H. Hidayatullah*: That is for the development of roads and railways.

*Chairman*: I thought it was for canals.

*Sir G. H. Hidayatullah*: The barrage we are completing within 20 crores. That is for the further development.

*Sir S. N. Blutto*: That is only a pious hope, Sir. Where is the Bombay Government going to find the money?

*Sir G. H. Hidayatullah*: Now, Sir, how has Sind been made a deficit Province? I had the honour of leading a deputation on behalf of the Sind Muhammadan Committee to the late Mr. Montagu in December, 1917, and we there pressed the question of the separation of Sind. We had sent an estimate ahead. It was very carefully scrutinized by the Government of Bombay and its financial advisers, and what has the late Mr. Montagu written in his diary? That Sind pays more than what it gets.

*Mr. Foot*: Is this an exhibit in the case, this book?

*Sir G. H. Hidayatullah*: I am giving it as an exhibit. It is undoubtedly true that Sind gives more funds to Bombay than Bombay gives to Sind. That is an authoritative announcement by a responsible officer, the Secretary of State. Now, it will be a mystery to you all as to how it became in 1922 a deficit Province, and I am going to help you in solving that mystery.

Now, Sir, after 1917 there was a good deal of agitation in Sind that Sind pays more than what it gets, and all communities, Hindus, Muhammadans, Europeans, Parsis, everybody joined and made representations to the Government of Bombay—that is to say that if they were not properly dealt with they would ask for a separation; and actually in 1922, if I rightly remember the year, a deputation consisting of Parsis, Europeans, Muhammadans and Hindus waited on the Governor of Bombay, and to the surprise of those gentlemen, members of the deputation were told for the first time in their lives, "You are a deficit Province," and these were the figures quoted. In 1922 revenue was 1 crore 95 lakhs

and expenditure, 2 crores 9 lakhs. This was the first time we had heard this news. As I have told you, Sir, since 1918 there was a good deal of agitation in Sind. Therefore the Government of Bombay tried to spend some money on Civil work. Up to 1922 they built a few roads and spent 10 or 15 lakhs of rupees on those.

Then they entered into a bargain with the Military authorities as to the purchase of Artillery Maidan, which is a very large area in the city of Karachi. In lieu of getting that area, the Government of Bombay built barracks for them in Quetta; they perhaps spent about 30 lakhs there for them. Then, Sir, there were a few buildings, the Chief Court and other buildings, during this interval, and a few lakhs have been spent on irrigation. Perhaps since 1918 up to this day, if I rightly remember, a capital expenditure of about  $1\frac{1}{2}$  or 2 crores has been incurred by the Government of Bombay. Now, Sir, in the old times this was our method of budgeting. I remember it with regard to the Karachi Courts over which we have spent 25 lakhs. Before plans and estimates were ready, 10 lakhs were provided in the Budget, and they lapsed at the end of the year; but, all the same, in the Budget it appeared as 10 lakhs for Sind Civil Courts. Similarly with regard to civil works of the Public Works Department there have been large lapses, but, all the same, the money is shown there as having been spent on Sind. Now they will include all these monies when they say what they have spent on the civil works, on the purchase of the Artillery Maidan, on building the Chief Court. No doubt if you include these capital expenses in it, it becomes a deficit budget. But no new district has been opened since 1918, and we paid more in 1922 and yet ours became a deficit budget. That is because of the inclusion of the capital expenditure.

Now what are the assets against it? Mr. Martin will bear me out when I say we have been told with regard to the Artillery Maidan that it is a fine bargain; it is a land for which we have paid 25 or 30 lakhs of rupees, and it is worth more than a crore or a crore and a half. So that we can set off that crore and a half, and there will be no deficit at all. But, Sir, take the old building of the Chief Court. Now the new Chief Court over which we have spent 25 or 30 lakhs has been built on government land which we had acquired from the military; that is a portion of the Artillery Maidan; but the old Chief Court building is in a very busy place which my friend must have seen; if we sell it it will fetch say some 15 or 20 lakhs. So we have an asset to set against this, two or one and a half crores of rupees that has been put against us.

Sir, I can make any budget a deficit budget if you make me the Finance Member for two months.

*Chairman* : We can do that in this country.

*Mr. Foot* : We can do it in this country without any difficulty.



*Sir G. Hussain Hidayatullah:* Now, Sir, another method which has been adopted is this. We are burdened with what are called the Supervision Charges. There are the Governor's salary, his allowances, and some other hospitality allowances. Few of us have had the honour of sharing his hospitality because we are at a long distance. Some of the critics have been debiting us with one-third, and others with a quarter, of those Supervision Charges. Then there is the Secretariat and the expenses of the Secretariat. There is a plethora of special officers and Heads of Departments. All their charges come to many lakhs, and they debit us with a quarter. One of the critics says: "No, Sind should pay one-third, not even one quarter." The expenditure is 16 crores, and on poor Sind only two crores are spent. Yet, though there has been no supervision over Sind, as I told you, they debit us with one-third or one quarter of the Supervision Charges. In fairness the Supervision Charges put against us ought to be one-eighth, because they spend 16 crores on the Presidency proper and two crores on us; but they burden us with Supervision Charges to the extent of one-third or one quarter, and so they make a deficit.

*Chairman:* Just while you are on that, if Sind were separated, what would you suggest that your government should be:—a Governor and two Ministers?

*Sir G. Hussain Hidayatullah:* No, I would make it three Ministers. I can make it two Governors and three Ministers out of the Supervision Charges.

*Chairman:* Then you would certainly be a popular Province.

*Sir G. Hussain Hidayatullah:* I would have three Ministers. I will deal with this later on: in Sind you cannot get on unless our Hindu friends form a Ministry there. We will have three Ministers. If, Sir, you take the total of these Supervision Charges, it comes to many lakhs. Now some of the critics try to burden us with the interest charges on the loans of the Government of Bombay which have not been contracted for the benefit of Sind, but have been sunk in the Back Bay, others on unproductive Deccan Irrigation and some other parts. They say: "you must pay one-third or one quarter of the interest." Now, Sir, I am sorry I was sent away here at very short notice; otherwise I would have brought all the figures and shown you. I do not remember: Mr. Mody might correct me; is it 18 crores Back Bay and the Suburban, or 20 crores?

*Mr. Mody:* 22, I think.

*Sir G. Hussain Hidayatullah:* Yes; I am near it. I am speaking from memory. Now 22 crores sunk there are assessable to Bombay, but the critics say Sind must pay a portion. About 18 or 20 crores have been paid by the Bombay Government on unproductive irrigation in the Deccan, and they say we must pay. They want to make it a deficit budget. The brush is in their hands and they can draw any picture they like.

Then there is the boast of the Government of Bombay; every Finance Member from time to time has been telling the whole world that the Bombay Government's assets in the shape of roads or buildings are 60 to 70 crores of rupees. Now, Sir, we have only got 20 or 25 lakhs' worth of roads in Sind; the rest are all in the Bombay Presidency, as are also the buildings. There are only two or three buildings of which we can boast, of which the Chief Court is one, on which they have spent 25 lakhs. I do not think the whole property of the Government of Sind or of the buildings would be worth more than  $1\frac{1}{2}$  or 2 crores of rupees, and that is a very liberal estimate. That means that these 60 or 70 crores of rupees are these assets only in the shape of roads and buildings with the Government of Bombay; that money they have spent in the Presidency proper and in the city of Bombay; and yet they ask us to pay interest on all those things. The mere repair of these assets of the Government of Bombay costs them nearly a crore of rupees. 66 lakhs they spend on the repairs; and then the establishment is about 34 lakhs on some things. I can challenge anybody that not more than 4 or 5 lakhs has been for Sind. The critics say: Pay all; you are a partner; all the debts of the Bombay Presidency should be pooled together; pay one-third or a quarter. Thereby they make ours a deficit budget. My reply to them is: Then share all the assets with us. If they share the assets with us, according to their own admission, roads and buildings, the Back Bay lands, and several interests of the Bombay Government, I think we shall come off very well. They spend only 2 crores here and yet they want us to pay to the extent of a quarter or a third interest on the money which has been sunk in the Bombay Presidency. Is that fair? Well, if that is so, let us then pool all the debts of Bombay, including the Sukkur Barrage. Let us hear only one-eighth, because they spend only 2 crores on us, and seven-eighths should be borne by Bombay. And let us share the assets. So, Sir, it is that the critics are trying to make us a deficit Province.

*Mr. Jadhav:* Does this 2 crores include the expenditure on the Sukkur Barrage?

*Sir G. Hussain Hidayatullah:* No, excluding that.

*Mr. Jadhav:* And 16 crores includes all these debts?

*Sir G. Hussain Hidayatullah:* No, that is not so, that is recurring expenditure.

*Mr. Jadhav:* I think including capital.

*Sir G. Hussain Hidayatullah:* No, no. I am not talking of the Sukkur Barrage; that is not included. Now, Sir, I come to the position of my Hindu friends. I have a very large number of Hindu friends—very dear friends. To my mind their apprehensions are groundless. They are the brains of my Province. They are highly educated. There is one community, the Amil community, of 25,000 souls, men, women and children, almost every one of them educated. I am proud of them; I have learnt

very much from them by staying with them and by my long association with them in Hyderabad City. They have produced more lawyers and graduates in proportion to their population than any other country in the world. For instance, one family has 4 civilians, the rest of them being engineers, doctors and lawyers. Sir, in no country is it numbers that rule; it is brains that rule. My Amil friends always boast that when we had the Muhammadan rule, even then they were our ministers and were high officials. That shows, Sir, that the Sindhi Muhammadans have been treating them very well. No Amil will dare to deny that they were ministers in the days of the Muhammadans, and that they then occupied high social positions. Their only fear, as Government servants, is for their monopoly; they think that as the Muhammadans are in a majority, in democratic institutions, the Muhammadans might oust them. But they must remember we are going to appoint a Public Service Commission, so that there will be no favouritism. I am proud of myself in this respect because I have been 10 years in the Government of Bombay, and I challenge any Hindu to say I had shown favouritism to any Muhammadan in preference to a Hindu. On the contrary, if anything, I have done much more for the Hindus than for the Muhammadans. My Hindu friends in Sind know that to be the fact.

Now, Sir, they are afraid for their vested interests, and I might say something very unpleasant. Ours is an official-ridden country. My friend, if he holds some land, knows it. It is not only the influence which the officials enjoy but also—I will not call it the corruption but perquisites. I will select a good name that carries izzat. My friend is a zemindar and he must know it. I know it and my friend knows it because he is a zemindar. There are officials in Karachi who draw a salary of two pounds a month; that is 26 or 30 rupees; but you will find that his sons are educated in England; he will have a son in England and two or three sons at the Colleges. He will have a nice red brick house. So, Sir, it is their vested interests for which they are afraid; they fear democracy in that respect.

*Mr. Jadhav*: Is Sind an exception to the rule?

*Sardar Sampuran Singh*: It is an exception, yes.

*Sir G. Hussain Hidayatullah*: It is an exception. I pay this money, being a member of the Government of Bombay. I am now letting out a secret. My agent, without my notice, pays away this money; otherwise a thousand and one difficulties will be created in my way. One might ask why has Government Service such a charm? It is not only the emoluments and the influence, but there is a third thing which I have just now mentioned. I say they are afraid for that. They are only looking at it from one point of view. They are not thinking of the material development of Sind, with which I will deal later on.

Then, Sir, our Hindu friends are not a meagre minority there; they are more than 25 per cent., and they are a great economic

ract in the life of every Sindhi. I do not know, my friend may be free, but otherwise almost every Muhammadan is indebted to them.

*Sir S. N. Bhutto*: They manage our affairs; they manage the affairs of almost every Muslim zemindar.

*Sir G. Hussain Hidayatullah*: I am speaking with all responsibility when I say the first man who is consulted by a Muhammadan is a Hindu lawyer or a Hindu official rather than a Muhammadan. The Hindus are not a meagre minority; they are the brains; they are highly educated; they can hold their own against the white Brahmin of the Deccan. I have consulted some of my officials; they say: Your Amil is more astute even than the white Brahmin of the Deccan; he is cleverer; he is more decent; he dresses well and lives well. I am proud of him, Sir. So, there is education. He is in numbers 25 per cent., and he owns to-day 40 per cent. of the land in Sind. As I told you, Sir, 30 per cent. is already mortgaged with him, so that we, the majority, have only 30 per cent. So that he is not a meagre minority; he is a very rich man; he is an economic factor. In fact, we follow his advice. His fears are groundless. I think the late development of these communal views have spoilt them. They it was who were originally for the separation of Sind, and not we Muhammadans.

Now, Sir, I come to the potentialities of the City of Karachi and the Port of Karachi. There is a great future for both, but so long as the Port of Karachi is under Bombay I am sorry to say it must take up a subordinate position to the Port of Bombay. Bombay cannot develop both the ports. There is rivalry between the two. We have now at present the Air Service direct to Karachi; the English mail from Aden can come to Karachi 48 hours before it reaches Bombay, and yet it goes first to Bombay because we are under the Government of Bombay.

Then, Sir, if Sind is separated we can press for a fast mail from Karachi to Delhi and capture all the trade of central India. With the developments in the Punjab in the way of irrigation and so on, and with the Sukkur Barrage scheme, I am sure that if Sind is separated Karachi will become *the* exporting and importing port of India, and I am afraid that then Bombay will lose most of the middlemen's profits. I think that is also one of the considerations.

*Sir M. Shafi*: That is why Bombay says Sind should not be separated.

*Chairman*: May I interrupt for a moment? Did not the Karachi Chamber of Commerce say that Karachi had not suffered from association with Bombay?

*Sir G. Hussain Hidayatullah*: They say that now, but in 1922 they were the first to cry for it. The Chamber of Commerce take that view because their main offices are in Bombay; there are only branches in Karachi. Other Chambers take different view. Mr. J. Mehta is Chairman of the Chamber of Buyers and Shippers,

and he is in favour of the separation of Sind. Most of these people have only branch offices in Karachi; their main offices are in Bombay, and so it does not affect them at all.

*Mr. Jinnah:* They will soon establish their main offices in Karachi.

*Sir G. Hussain Hidayatullah:* But that will take them some time.

*Sir M. Shafi:* Mr. Jinnah means, when Sind is separated. Then they will have more independent offices in Karachi and be grateful for the separation of Sind.

*Chairman:* It was Mr. Graham, the President of the Chamber, who said his information was that Karachi had not suffered by reason of its association with Bombay.

*Sir G. Hussain Hidayatullah:* But why should we consider individual opinions? It is natural. Now we are subordinate to Bombay, and would Bombay like Karachi to develop and become a rival to the port of Bombay?

*Mr. Jinnah:* They are rival interests.

*Sir G. Hussain Hidayatullah:* Yes, they are rival interests. Now, Sir, I have one more point, and then I have finished. Bombay has got very heavy debts to pay. It has a deficit budget of 1½ crores this year. Why should we have another deficit province added to Bombay? If Sind is deficit province and is of no benefit to Bombay, why should Bombay want to have it? I cannot understand it; the sooner they get rid of it, the better it will be for them. Instead of opposing separation, they should welcome it. We are ready to submit to all the financial adjustments which may be necessary, provided we have men of our own choice, or at least one man who understands finance. It is generally said that we Muhammadans have no head for mathematics and finance, but the few that have should be on the Committee dealing with the matter.

With these remarks I have done.

*Lord Zetland:* You have made out a very good case.

*Dr. Moonje:* I now understand that the separation of Sind is being considered as a part of the minority problem.

*Chairman:* No.

*Dr. Moonje:* That question was raised in the Minorities Committee, and the Minorities sub-Committee sent instructions to the Business Committee . . . .

*Sir S. N. Bhutto:* In the statement I put in I said that this demand should be considered as a demand of the Sindhis, and not as a communal question. When this question was taken up by the Muslim League, in my public speech at Hyderabad, presiding over ten thousand people, I protested and said it was not fair to us at all. It is we Sindhis who want this question considered, and we want it considered on its own merits. It is a demand of the

Sindhis, including Hindus, Muhammadans, Parsees and Europeans—everybody. I therefore protested to the Prime Minister that this ought not to be considered as one of the demands made by the Muhammadans, because it is not a minority demand; it is a demand made by the Sindhis.

*Dr. Moonje*: Did not you raise the point in the Minorities sub-Committee?

*Chairman*: This sub-Committee had better consider the question now on its merits.

*Dr. Moonje*: I agree. I do not want to go into that matter in this sub-Committee. This subject is being considered by the Minorities sub-Committee.

*Chairman*: It must be considered here on its merits.

*Mr. Chintamani*: Is any reference to minorities in the terms of reference of this question to this sub-Committee?

*Sir M. Shaf*: None whatever.

*Chairman*: The terms of reference are "The question of constituting Sind as a separate province." I look at the matter from an administrative and financial point of view, and I think we will be wise if we keep to those aspects of the question.

*Dr. Moonje*: From that point of view I am under a handicap, because there is no one amongst the Hindus here who is thoroughly informed with regard to the details of the administration in Sind. In this connection I may say that as soon as the names of delegates to the Round Table Conference were announced by the Viceroy I sent a telegram to the Viceroy saying that very likely the question of Sind would be raised, and therefore it was necessary that, as members of the Muslim community had been appointed delegates to this Conference, a Hindu member acquainted with Sind should also be appointed, so that he might be able to deal with the details of the administration in that connection. I myself am not in a position to deal with the details that have been brought forward here, but I do know that as far as the details of administration are concerned there has been a difference of opinion amongst the several agencies which have considered this question.

For instance, the Government of India themselves feel that there is a difficulty about Sind being made a separate province in regard to its meeting its day to day expenditure. The same view has been taken by the Bombay Government and has also been endorsed by the Report of the Central Committee. There is a difference of opinion amongst the Hindus and Muhammadans with regard to the province being able to maintain its day to day administration from its own funds, and on that point the Government of India and the Bombay Government have said that the question requires fuller consideration from that point of view.

From the general point of view, therefore, I am opposed to the principle of creating provinces in India with a view to giving the majority to one community or another. If our object is to weld all India into one nation, I think we should discourage this

principle of creating provinces in order to create majorities for one community or another community here and there. If Sind could be considered as a problem of the redistribution of the provinces in India from the administrative point of view, I should have absolutely no objection. A Boundaries Commission might be appointed, as suggested by the Government of India, and that Commission would deal with the question of the redistribution of the provinces, and in that way the question of Sind would also be considered; and whatever the recommendations of the Boundaries Commission might be they would be agreed to by all the parties concerned. But if Sind alone is to be picked out and the question of Sind alone considered, it assumes an aspect which has become communal, and up to now it has been put before all of us as a communal question.

*Sir G. Hussain Hidayatullah* : Not at all.

*Dr. Moonje* : It has been put before us as a question to be considered in the interest of the minority, and therefore I am opposed to the question being considered, on the principle that we cannot subscribe to the idea of creating provinces with the object of creating majorities for one community or another community. If it had been considered as a part of the larger subject of the general re-distribution of provinces I should have no objection, and I therefore propose that this question be disposed of by our recommending the appointment of a Boundaries Commission, which will consider the question of Sind just as it will consider the question of Orissa and the question of the demand of the Karnatak and several other demands of a similar nature.

*Mr. Foot* : Which was the last question you mentioned?

*Dr. Moonje* : There is an insistent demand that Orissa should be separated and there is also a demand from the Karnatak. That demand was very insistent in the Congress, but the Congress has vetoed this Round Table Conference and therefore those people are not here. Mr. Jinnah will know how insistent was the demand in the Congress that the Karnatak should be formed into a separate province.

All these questions could be considered if we were to recommend the appointment of a Boundary Commission, which might consider the question of Karnatak and the questions of Orissa and Sind, together with any other such questions as might come up included in the question of the re-consideration of Provincial Boundaries. That Commission could enquire into the details and settle the question finally one way or another as to whether the province of Sind, if separated, could be self-supporting from the financial point of view, and whether it should be joined to some other provinces, or any other recommendations which the Commission might make from the point of view of administrative convenience.

My concrete proposal therefore is that this proposal should be disposed of by saying that a Boundaries Commission should be appointed to consider all these questions.

*Chairman* : I should like to remind the sub-Committee of what the Government of India says. In paragraph 21 of their Despatch they say:—"The two particular cases to which the Commission themselves give their attention are Orissa and Sind." Leaving out Orissa for a moment, they say, "The claim of Sind to be a self-contained unit has become increasingly prominent in recent years. The preponderance of the local population is Muslim, and their claim to separation from the Bombay Presidency has been ardently advocated. Neither on Orissa nor on Sind are we yet in a position to tender final advice." I do not think Orissa is a communal question?

*Dr. Moonje* : No.

*Chairman* : You see, they are treating them both alike. They go on "but we urge that enquiries be set on foot at the earliest possible date. We should not contemplate entrusting the task to a single Boundaries Commission. The two problems are not connected, and we would suggest investigation by two separate committees. We wish to emphasise the need for expedition in reaching conclusions on these two outstanding cases . . . . We conceive that the Sind Committee will be concerned primarily with the administrative and financial aspects of separation, for the question is not one of boundaries." That is what the Government of India say about it, and I think that probably most of us in this sub-Committee would agree that, however good the arguments are that we hear about financial credit and being able to be self-supporting, it would be impossible for us, with the information before us here, to come to any conclusion about that; that would obviously need enquiry by a special committee.

*Sir Abdul Qaiyum* : It is not a question, Sir, of separating Sind from Bombay, because it is already a separate unit. Its administration is separate and it has a separate existence as unit, unlike the other tracts which have to be considered by the Boundaries Commission. A separate administration already exists in the country.

*Chairman* : It is the same sort of claim as that of Burma; that is to say, that it is geographically distinct from Bombay province and distinct in its language and its customs.

*Mr. Jinnah* : May I say a few words? I quite agree with the observations which have just fallen from you, Sir, when you were reading the Despatch of the Government of India, namely that some competent authority will have to make the financial adjustments. To that extent I entirely agree with you.

*Chairman* : Or even to consider whether it is possible for the province to be self-supporting?

*Mr. Jinnah* : No, Sir, if you will allow me to say so. The position is this. Let us take one proposition after another. The first proposition is that Sind has an administration which, generally speaking, is quite separate from that of Bombay.

*Chairman* : Largely separate.



*Mr. Jinnah:* For all practical purposes it is separate except in this, that they send their representatives to the Bombay Legislature, and perhaps once in a blue moon some question crops up with regard to Sind which is discussed or debated in the Legislature—some matter of general importance. But for all practical purposes Sind is separately administered, as has been pointed out by Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah, who himself was a Minister for many years and who now holds the portfolio of an Executive Member of the Government of Bombay. Sind is also completely independent—I do not say practically independent but completely independent—so far as judicial administration is concerned. It has got a Chief Court, and the Judicial Commissioner's Court is the highest Tribunal, the appeal from there lying to the Privy Council direct.

*Chairman:* I agree; I think it is a very striking fact that it is not under the Bombay High Court.

*Mr. Jinnah:* Therefore those two propositions stand out very clearly before us. The only question is whether after the separation has been effected, and after the financial adjustments have been determined, Sind will be self-supporting. That is the question on which I should like to say a few words.

Now, Sir Ghulam has pointed out to you how it is that Sind has been shown as a deficit province. Some of us know a good deal about the history of it and are fairly well acquainted with it, and we have clearly shown you how these figures can be manipulated and have been manipulated. I do not say it has been done dishonestly, but for various reasons certain adjustments have been arrived at which are manifestly unfavourable to Sind—manifestly unfavourable. That being so, on paper Sind is shown as a deficit province, but in fact Sind is not a deficit province. If I may speak for a moment on behalf of Bombay, if Sind is permanently a deficit province may I know why the Government of India should bless us with that province for ever? I think the turn of somebody else might come now. We have borne this for a long time if it is true. It is not true; I do not believe it; but if it is true, why have you chosen Bombay to bear this burden in perpetuity? I think it is high time somebody else should relieve Bombay of this white elephant.

But it is not so, and I want this sub-Committee to realise that. I therefore desire to propose a formula for this sub-Committee, and this formula has been discussed at very great length by some of the foremost men in our country. Even the Nehru Report, which considered the question of Sind very carefully, recommended that Sind ought to be separated. I can say this speaking with a knowledge of the Indian National Congress extending over many years. I do not see eye to eye with the Congress now, and I have ceased to see eye to eye with the Congress since 1919, but before that I was a very active member of that great body, and I can tell you from my own knowledge what their view is; and I would refer you particularly to the statement of the late Mr.

Harchandrai, which was quoted by Sir Ghulam. Mr. Harchandrai was a most prominent Hindu leader in Sind for very many years, and he was a prominent Congressman, and he really was a very able leader. As far as I remember the Hindus of Sind were the first to see the urgency of this question. They felt that Sind was nothing but a Cinderella of the Bombay Presidency, and they protested against the position of a Cinderella which Sind occupied. She was only brought in for a moment when it was necessary and was then dismissed from the picture of the Bombay Presidency.

He protested against that over and over again in resolutions passed by the Indian National Congress urging upon the Government to separate Sind.

*Mr. Chintamani:* Where?

*Mr. Jinnah:* In the National Congress.

*Mr. Chintamani:* A resolution on Sind?

*Sir S. N. Bhutto:* Yes, at Karachi in 1913.

*Mr. Jinnah:* I am speaking of the time of Mr. Harchandrai Vishandas, when Mr. Harchandrai Vishandas moved the resolution at Karachi. But I was going to point out something more than that, that for the purpose of the constitution of the Indian National Congress the representatives of Sind insisted that in our constitution Sind should be treated as an independent and separate province and not as a part of the Bombay Presidency; and if you will look at the constitution of the National Congress you will find that Sind is treated as a separate province.

*Mr. Chintamani:* But the Congress recognised provinces on a linguistic basis, and therefore they recognised various places separately.

*Mr. Jinnah:* No, I beg your pardon, if you will allow me. For the purpose of voting, the number of representatives who are allowed to vote on education, Bombay Presidency was taken as one and Sind as another item for the purpose of voting.

*Dr. Moonje:* When was that, Mr. Jinnah?

*Mr. Jinnah:* That was many years ago.

*Dr. Moonje:* I shall require to be reminded of that.

*Mr. Jinnah:* I know, because you know nothing about Sind. You said that yourself.

*Dr. Moonje:* I said I knew nothing about the details. The Congress is a matter with which I am quite familiar.

*Mr. Jinnah:* You may take it from me Dr. Moonje, that the statement I am making is quite correct, and if you like I can easily verify it. I think your own office, Sir, probably has a copy of the old constitution of Congress, and if you will ask the office to enquire into it you will find that my statement is perfectly correct, that Sind was treated as separate from Bombay Presidency in the Indian National Congress Constitution. But, of course, that is not the last word on the subject; it is only a matter of

argument. Therefore I would definitely propose this formula, that Sind should be separated from the Bombay Presidency, and a Committee should be set up to give effect to the separation of Sind as a separate Province simultaneously with the coming into force of a new constitution. Sind, after such separation, shall bear its own administrative expenditure; that is, after it is separated. The Sind Committee shall also determine what financial and administrative adjustments are necessary and equitable consequent on such separation. Therefore the Committee will have to decide this, the question of financial adjustments, including, of course, the question of the financial burden arising out of the Sukkur Barrage scheme. Once that adjustment is determined by a Committee, on equitable lines both to Sind and to the Bombay Presidency—because although I am strongly supporting the separation of Sind I am not forgetting the interests of Bombay also, and therefore the adjustment must be on an equitable basis—subject to that, when Sind is separated, then it must bear its own expenditure on administration. I do not want to take up the time of the sub-Committee any more, but Sir Ghulam has, I think, satisfied any reasonable man that if Sind is separated and if Sind is allowed to conduct its own administration it will not be a deficit Province, but will more than meet all its administrative expenditure in the future. That is all I have to say.

*Chairman:* Would you mind dealing, Mr. Jinnah, with the difficulty that rather oppresses my own mind. We have the rather important authority of the Simon Commission against separation, chiefly on financial grounds, and we have the very strong expression of opinion from the Bombay Government that it must be a deficit Province of about 60 lakhs. Now, is it not rather difficult for us here, merely on a statement, however reasonable it sounded—and it sounded very reasonable—that Sir Ghulam Hussain has just made, to turn that down completely and say we do not believe it and are satisfied that the Province need not be a deficit Province; and if we are not satisfied that it is not going to be a deficit Province, is it reasonable that we should put that burden of 60 lakhs on the Central Government of India? That is the difficulty. You appreciate that, I am sure.

*Mr. Jinnah:* I quite see your point, Sir. To that I have given my answer already. I said that there is not sufficient data given really. When you examine the figures of the Bombay Government you will find that they will not stand, and that is the data. After all, what is the data. It is all very well to say that Sind will be a deficit Province to the extent of 60 lakhs. The answer to that is, why do you say that? That is the next question, and if you examine the data—well, it disappears. What more do you want, what further commission do you want. My answer is that; but I go a little further. If I cannot convince you, and if you still say, "Well, somebody says it is going to be a deficit Province notwithstanding all these figures which are before us, notwithstanding all these facts that are before us, because somebody has

said it will be a deficit Province, therefore I cannot make up my mind"—well, then, I cannot carry it any further, except this—

*Chairman*: I do not say it is going to be a deficit Province, but you and I, I think, probably both have sufficient experience at discussion about figures to know that it is very difficult to know what the real result will be until something like a financial committee, with financial understanding and a lot of details, gets to grips with the thing. It is very difficult to make up your mind on general statements, one side or the other, on a question of figures.

*Mr. Jinnah*: At present I am not satisfied—I frankly say this—I am really not satisfied with any data of any reliable character which will make me say that it will be a deficit Province after it is separated. I am not satisfied; on the contrary—I mean, this is my view—I am absolutely satisfied, from the knowledge that I have of these figures and the way in which they are put, and so on, that Sind will be self-supporting. This is my view.

*Chairman*: Yes. You know much more about it than I do; but am I justified in saying that I am prepared to sweep away these figures of the Bombay Government.

*Mr. Jinnah*: No, Sir, I do not say sweep them away; I say let us examine them. Surely, after all, if this sub-Committee is going to do any work of any importance you must apply your mind to it more definitely than that—merely saying that so and so says No, and we can do nothing.

*Chairman*: I am quite prepared to apply my mind to it, but have we got information here that will enable us to come to a conclusion?

*Sir S. N. Bhutto*: We have done our very best for the last 10 years continuously to get correct figures from the Bombay Government but we have failed to do so; we have not been able to get them. Whether there are any real difficulties in the way of the Bombay Government, or whether they have got no mind to supply us with exact and correct figures, I do not know; but it is very difficult for us non-officials to work out these separate figures without having access to Government records.

*Mr. Chintamani*: Then how did they arrive at the conclusion?

*Mr. Jinnah*: Unless you want to supplement what I have said, may I finish. I have not given the answer to your question yet. I want to complete my answer. I said, therefore, supposing I cannot persuade this sub-Committee to take the view I am taking, and supposing this point still stands out, that there may be a deficit of 50 or 60 lakhs—well, my answer to that would be that I would beg of this sub-Committee even to take that risk. "Very well, then," I say, speaking for Bombay, "please relieve us of the 60 lakhs of rupees, and let the Central Government bear it until such time as it may no longer be necessary."

*Chairman*: I am perfectly willing to apply my mind to it, but you and I, as lawyers, know that if we were to go into this

we should have to have the Government of Bombay's accountant before us and examine and cross-examine him on the figures, should we not?

*Mr. Jinnah:* Then there is one more thing I want to say. I think you, Sir, have sufficient experience of the world and of life to remember that in matters of this kind there are some interested parties; there are vested interests; there may be commercial interests. All over the world it is so. They naturally only look at it from their point of view as a class. There may be a commercial class; there may be a Service class; there may be certain people who think that probably if there is a change in the constitution they may suffer in respect of their jobs or may lose their jobs. In this world we have always got these vested interests who are thinking of themselves and nothing else. After all, they are concerned with their own immediate lives and they do not want to be disturbed in the comfortable position in which they find themselves in Sind. But I would beg of this sub-Committee to look at the question not from the point of view of a particular class or section, or interest; I would beg of this sub-Committee to look at it from the point of view of the good and the happiness and the interests of the people of Sind.

*Dr. Moonje:* Yes, quite.

*Sir Muhammad Shafi:* Mr. Chairman, may I just say a few words? The argument last addressed to you by my friend Mr. Jinnah is the real argument in the case. If the sub-Committee is satisfied that in the interests of the people of Sind or their welfare it is essential that Sind be separated from Bombay, then the mere fact that some authority has said that Sind is a deficit Province to the tune of something like 60 laks is, I venture to think, no ground whatever for refusing to separate Sind from Bombay Presidency.

And in this particular case I would like to put it to you, Sir: What will be the result when from 1932 the Sukkur Barrage scheme is in actual working order? The Barrage has been completed; I have seen it with my own eyes only a few months ago. I happened to be in Sind for over three months in connection with a very important case in Sind; I made certain enquiries, and I am personally going to tell you something about the results of those enquiries. But at present let me deal with this particular point. You know what happens when a scheme of that kind is actually started. Sind will no doubt take a leaf out of the book of the Punjab in that respect. In the Punjab whenever the constructive portion of a scheme of that sort is completed, what happens? There are hundreds of thousands of acres of land lying barren. Some of these lands belong to Government. The Government sells its own land by auction, and, as a result of the proceeds of the auction sales, it reimburses itself the expenditure which it has incurred in the construction of that scheme, if not wholly, certainly in part, with the result that interest on the original loan which has been taken

from the Government, immediately after these auction sales is cut down by payment of the loan in whole or in part. But the result when the scheme is set into operation is this: Hundreds of thousands of acres of barren land having become subject to irrigation, the annual revenues of the Government at once go up, and go up by a sudden jump. I am a zemindar and have had something to do with the work. For years and years I was a member of the Punjab Legislative Council before the introduction of the Minto-Morley Reforms, and therefore I know the whole history of the Punjab Irrigation scheme. I have visited the Punjab colonies myself and I have seen things with my own eyes, and the results of those things.

Let me tell you one thing. Lyallpur district alone now yields to the Government a crore and a half rupees in land revenue. The District Board of Lyallpur, now, as a result of this Irrigation scheme, has an income of 25 lakhs a year. That is the District Board alone. The results of the Sukkur Barrage scheme within a few years, within at the most 6 or 7 years, will be that Sind will become, bearing its area in mind, one of the richest Provinces, proportionately speaking, in India. In fact, Sind and the Punjab together will become one of the main granaries of the world when the Sukkur Barrage scheme is actually in operation. To talk of Sind in those circumstances as a deficit Province, not to be separated from Bombay even if the happiness and the welfare of the people require that separation, is, I venture to submit, an argument which ought not to appeal to anyone.

Now, coming to the main question, I admire the modesty of my friend Dr. Moonje. So far as his observations are concerned, I will deal with them in a couple of minutes, then he can go, and then I shall discuss the question independently of what he has said. I was going to say that I admire the modesty of my friend Dr. Moonje—

*Dr. Moonje:* I am a very modest man.

*Sir Muhammad Shafi:* When he said to us at the commencement of his observations that he was not in a position to express any opinion upon the administrative difficulties, as no Hindu representative of Sind is present here on this Committee. Well, Dr. Moonje knows, and we all know, that this question has been the subject matter of discussion in India for the last four or five years.

*Sir S. N. Bhutto:* 20 years.

*Sir Muhammad Shafi:* I mean the subject matter of discussion and controversy; that is what I mean.

*Sir G. Hussain Hidayatullah:* Yes.

*Sir Muhammad Shafi:* Although during the earlier years there was no controversy about it at all, as shown by my friend on the right, Hindus, Parsees, Europeans and Mussalmans, not only in Sind but outside Sind, were all agreed that it was an injustice to Sind to keep her tied down to the apron-strings of Bombay. It

is only during the last 4 or 5 years that, for certain reasons into which I will not go, this matter has become a subject matter of controversy; and My Lord, in that controversy my friend Dr. Moonje has been taking a leading part.

*Mr. Chintamani*: Has the controversy been financial and administrative, or communal?

*Sir Muhammad Shafi*: No, no; excuse me, Mr. Chintamani. You know me very well.

*Mr. Chintamani*: I want information.

*Sir Muhammad Shafi*: My point is this, that in that controversy, those who are opposed to the separation of Sind must have satisfied themselves by enquiry—whether rightly or wrongly is a different matter—whether all these difficulties exist.

*Mr. Chintamani*: You do not know whether they actually did satisfy themselves.

*Sir Muhammad Shafi*: And therefore must have knowledge of the conditions obtaining in Sind.

*Dr. Moonje*: May I inform you, Sir Muhammad Shafi, that this financial aspect was considered very carefully in the report of the Nehru Committee, and they found that financially Sind could not be self-supporting.

*Mr. Jinnah*: According to the Bombay Government, the extent to which it cannot be self-supporting is only sixty lakhs; that is all, and my friend has shown how that deficit of sixty lakhs came about. Until 1922 it was not a deficit province at all, but in 1922 capital expenditure was included amongst the ordinary expenditure of Sind without debiting against that capital expenditure the valuable assets which government had gained. But, apart from that, I have already placed my argument before you in view of the future prospects of Sind. The deficit, being only temporary, ought not to stand in the way of separation.

*Chairman*: I think 1946 is the date when profits are expected from the Barrage.

*Sir G. Hussain Hidayatullah*: We are selling land now.

*Mr. Jadhav*: But you are not realising the expected price. The programme will have to be extended for some years.

*Sir M. Shafi*: There is a temporary fall all over the country. You have seen that Sind has no geographical connection with Bombay at all. By sea it takes forty hours to reach Bombay from Karachi. On land you have Indian States intervening and other British territory intervening and it takes forty-eight hours to reach Bombay from Sind by train. Bombay has no geographical connection with Sind and it has no ethnographical connection with Sind at all. It has no connection of any kind.

*Dr. Moonje*: Yet the people do not want separation.

*Sir G. Hussain Hidayatullah*: Who do not want it?

*Dr. Moonje:* The people of Sind do not want it.

*Sir G. Hussain Hidayatullah:* The people of Sind do want it.

*Sir M. Shafi:* You know very well I can reply to your interruptions, but want to finish my argument. The overwhelming majority of the people in Sind want separation—not only the Muslims but the Hindus and the Parsees and Europeans and others. They all want separation.

It was a mere accident, Sir, that at the time when Sind was conquered the army in India was divided into three separate commands, the Bombay Command, the Madras Command and the Northern India Command. It was not under one command, as it is now, and it was the mere fact that it was the Bombay Army that took possession of Sind, being the nearest to it, that made Sind a part of Bombay; otherwise there was no reason whatever for its annexation to Bombay.

What has been the stepmotherly treatment that Bombay has extended to Sind? When I was in Sind one thing that struck me more than anything else was the fact that though Sind has been under the control of the Bombay Presidency for nearly a hundred years, even now no University has been established in Sind. Sind ought to have had a University of its own a long time ago. No Government College—engineering, medical, or even arts—has been established in Sind up to this time, with the result that the students from Sind who pass their matriculation examination and want to prosecute their studies further have to go to Bombay, a thousand miles away from their homes, in order to receive University education in Bombay and to obtain their University degrees.

*Mr. Jadhav:* Are not there two colleges in Karachi?

*Sir S. N. Bhutto:* They are private aided colleges.

*Sir M. Shafi:* I say there is no government college. The people of Sind may have been enterprising enough to establish a college or two in Karachi, but Sind is not Karachi; that is beside the point. What I am pointing out is this, that the Government of Bombay has done nothing whatever for Sind during the time—nearly a century—of Bombay rule in Sind. You have already seen that even road construction has not been undertaken. I myself drove a motor across those roads in the last three months, and I know that the roads in Sind are like.

*Mr. Jinnah:* Like a switchback railway?

*Sir M. Shafi:* Yes. The judicial system in Sind is absolutely independent of Bombay, and the executive system is really practically independent of Bombay. The Hon'ble the Commissioner in Sind is a local government for Sind.

*Sir G. Hussain Hidayatullah:* Responsible to himself only.

*Sir M. Shafi:* Therefore there is judicial separation from Bombay already and executive separation from Bombay already. For certain purposes only Sind is kept under the thumb of Bombay,



with the result that from an administrative point of view this enforced relationship between Bombay and Sind is in the highest degree detrimental to the province of Sind and is in the highest degree injurious to the people; instead of promoting the welfare of the people of Sind it has injuriously affected the welfare of Sind.

Separation will not in itself cost Sind much.

*Sir S. N. Bhutto*: It is going to be a Chief Court now.

*Sir M. Shafi*: That need not be given the status of a High Court on separation; when Sind becomes self-supporting, then will be the time for Sind to raise its status to that of a High Court. I think the Hon'ble the Commissioner of Sind—the only Commissioner who has that title—should become the Governor.

*Sir G. Hussain Hidayatullah*: He is responsible to himself only.

*Sir M. Shafi*: Yes. As a matter of fact, Sind is already separate; what we want is that that separation should be recognised and that Sind should be constituted into an independent province. Every department in Sind has got its own head. There is even a separate C.I.D. for Sind, whose operations I saw in connection with the case in which I was defending one of the leading landowners of Sind.

It seems to me that not only is the separation of Sind essential in the interests of Sind and for the sake of their welfare, but as a matter of fact Sind is already separate, and all that is required is a recognition of that separation by government. The argument relating to administrative difficulties, has, I submit, been clearly countered by my friend, who has shown that the administrative difficulties, if any, which Sind has to face are really a ground for the separation of Sind from the Bombay Presidency, instead of being a ground for continuing Sind as a part of that Presidency. I submit that this question really ought to be decided on its own merits, and that it ought to be looked at from the point of view of the happiness and contentment of the people of Sind. I therefore support the proposal made by my friend.

*Chairman*: The proposition in the form in which you submit it is a much easier one for me to accept in my mind, because you do not ask me to find yes or no whether it is true about the deficit but you say that even if there is a deficit—

*Sir M. Shafi*: I do not admit it.

*Chairman*: You say even if there is a deficit, separation is necessary on other grounds.

*Sir Muhammad Shafi*: I say it is essential.

*Chairman*: I understand. I am afraid we must adjourn now.

*Mr. Chintamani*: Before you adjourn, and before you call upon the next speaker, I must request you for a ruling on the proposition that we should make no recommendation about separation for Sind, but should recommend that a boundary commission

should be set up—whether we can take that course of whether we can only deal with the separation of Sind under our terms of reference. I ask for your ruling now on that point, because your ruling on it will greatly influence the course of the discussion.

*Chairman:* It is a little difficult to say. I am not quite sure that it is out of order to recommend that the matter be referred to a boundary commission, because it would amount to saying that we did not feel able to make a recommendation. I do not think it will be out of order, but I think it will be very undesirable, and I think it would be failing in the duty which the Conference is expecting of us.

*Mr. Chintamani:* If you think it is in order, it will be open to the majority of the Committee, if they are so minded, to say that not only the constitution of Sind as a separate Province but also the constitution of other Provinces should all go to a boundaries commission.

*Chairman:* That, I think, would be out of order.

*Mr. Chintamani:* Quite so. If, on the contrary, it were held that it may be for the Conference to decide such questions, we are a small body charged with a specific duty only with regard to Sind, and we are to confine ourselves to that, then no time need be wasted on the discussion of the bigger problem.

*Chairman:* I think it would be clearly out of order to discuss the bigger question of the separation of other Provinces.

*Mr. Chintamani:* I ask for your ruling as to whether it would be in order for this Committee to consider the recommendation regarding boundaries commission dealing with many things.

*Chairman:* No. I think not. It would be in order if you like to put in in the other form.

*Mr. Chintamani:* It is not that I want to put it. I should like a ruling, that is all.

*Chairman:* What did you actually move, Dr. Moonje?

*Dr. Moonje:* I moved in this way—that the question of Sind be considered as a part of the larger question of the redistribution of Provinces which are demanding separation.

*Chairman:* I think that would be clearly out of order here.

*Mr. Chintamani:* That is just what I wanted to get. I express no opinion. I wanted your ruling.

*(The sub-Committee adjourned at 1-35 p.m.)*

PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND MEETING OF SUB-COMMITTEE No. IX  
(SIND) HELD ON 13TH JANUARY, 1931.

*Chairman:* We might begin I think with this financial memorandum which I have had circulated. I think you have all got it. I want to point out one or two things on the first page. In paragraph 2 you notice it says the average deficit for 4 years up

to 1925 is 24 lakhs; and on the basis of the figures for 1927-1928 it is said to amount to 64 lakhs; and there is no reason to believe the deficit has since decreased. Then it goes on to say it will be swelled by creating two new administrative districts consequent on the irrigation, and that is estimated at 6 lakhs.

Then in paragraph 3 you will see the extra cost of maintaining Headquarter establishments in the Provinces is put at 9 lakhs. Then there is a mention of the debt of Bombay.

Paragraph 4 sums it up by saying "Thus it is likely that the Budget of a separated Sind would show an annual deficit amounting to between 50 and 90 lakhs of rupees."

Paragraph 5 points out that it will be 1936, nearly 20 years, before the Sukkur Barrage shows a profit. Then there is a note behind which goes more into detail about the figures and about the Barrage. It really shows the same thing but in rather more detail.

Then at the top of page 4 you will notice it says, "To meet this deficit, Sind has no greater prospect in the immediate future of additional revenue than has the rest of the Province".

Then lower down it says, "Apart from fresh taxation, Sind could therefore only rely on the general increase in such revenues as Excise and Stamps due to an advance in prosperity and population, and to the additional revenue expected from the Sukkur Barrage."

*Raja Narendra Nath:* Is this the new one?

*Chairman:* Yes, the one which has been last circulated.

Then at the end of that you have the figures in detail. We have a great many more figures besides these, but I think this includes the important ones. However, the point is that that may go to show that on any calculation which can reasonably be made it looks—and there is really no evidence to the contrary—as if Sind would be a deficit Province.

I do not suppose that the Committee will want to go into any minute examination of figures because, as I suggested to Mr. Jinnah yesterday, I do not see how we could profitably do that. But it does look, upon the evidence before us and before the figures we have been able to get, as though there will be a deficit of between 50 and 100 lakhs if Sind is a separate Province. That would be met at present by the general revenues of the Bombay Presidency. If Sind is separated, where is that to come from? Can you get that by increased taxation? If not, are you going to look to the Government of India for a subsidy—because that will put them in a difficulty. Then you have also to remember that if it is a deficit Province and the revenue is short of the expenditure it must naturally scribble all advance in education or social services or construction of roads or anything of that sort—the Province would be in a bad way. All that affects not merely finance but the administrative desirability of separating it, and

these really are the questions to which I should be glad if the Committee would address their minds.

*Mr. Isaac Foot:* Before the general question is gone into, I should like to mention a question of procedure. I assume that in the time at our disposal it would be impossible for us to make anything like an exhaustive examination of these figures. We are not here for a month, you see, and it is contemplated that the Conference will be coming to a close at the latest in the early part of the next week.

*Chairman:* Not only that, Mr. Foot, but we have not the information from the experts.

*Mr. Isaac Foot:* I can quite understand that Sir Abdul Qaiyum or Sir S. N. Bhutto will be able to give that they think would be the answer to several points that have been raised here; but speaking for those of us who are on this side of the world, I should find it very difficult to make up my mind upon the points here submitted without a very much more exhaustive enquiry than could be possible in the very short time at our disposal. I hope, therefore, we shall not be asked, in this short time at our disposal, to go into this matter so thoroughly that we could make up our minds on these financial questions. I am not speaking about the general question as to the advisability of separating Sind, looking at it academically; but I assume it would not be within the power of this Committee to go into this matter so exhaustively that an opinion could be expressed; we should not be able to do so unless longer time is given to it.

*Chairman:* That is what I was putting to the Committee, that I did not suppose that they would want to argue in detail about these figures; because argue as we may we cannot come to any conclusions as we have neither the time nor the details.

*Mr. Isaac Foot:* These papers would be simply received without prejudice—that is to say, by the receipt of these papers we do not commit ourselves either to their complete accuracy or otherwise.

*Chairman:* These papers here?

*Mr. Isaac Foot:* Yes. We simply receive them—that is all.

*Chairman:* I am not suggesting that upon an enquiry some of these figures might or might not be modified. This is all the information at our disposal at the moment. It is, of course, official information.

*Sir S. N. Bhutto:* Perhaps I may be permitted to submit to the British Indian Delegates as well as to the European Delegates that they will consider our case sympathetically. We are demanding the separation of Sind on the same principle as that on which the whole case of the British Indian Delegation is based, and on the very principles—if I may be permitted to mention it—on which you sacrificed so much during the late titanic War. The best flower of your manhood sacrificed their lives simply to help the weak in the principle of self-determination. In this case we

are comparatively very weak between the two powers—the Government of Bombay and the Government of India.

We do not believe for a moment that our Province is a deficit Province. No one could be more loyal to us than ourselves. If we knew that our Province was a deficit one and that we were going to be crippled by separation, would it be in our own interests that we should insist, or that the people could have made up their minds to insist—which they have done—upon it? Our people's cup of misery is full; they cannot wait any longer.

If we admit for the sake of argument—though we do not believe it—that Sind is a deficit Province, may we just consider that aspect for a moment? Why should Bombay Government be so anxious to retain us and be so interested in us when their own finances are in such a hopeless plight? It may be that the Meston Settlement is responsible to a very great extent for the financial plight of the Bombay Government, and some of their own ambitious adventures; but the fact is there that for the next 60 years the Bombay Government may continue to be in a hopeless state. We cannot expect any improvement whatever if we continue to remain part of the Bombay Government.

So far what has been done? We are grateful to the Indian Government to some extent. Our case is not like that of other provinces such as Baluchistan, N.-W. Frontier, Ajmere. But from the Province of Sind the Indian Government's revenue would be about 2 crores of rupees; and even in regard to the Lloyd Barrage scheme, whatever the effect of the Barrage may be, at least the Government of India is going to receive over 70 lakhs additional revenue from Sind. As we have been neglected by both Governments for 82 years, even if for the sake of argument I say our Province is a deficit Province, when the Government of India receives 2 crores from Customs, Telegraphs and Posts, Railways and Income Tax—all these are central subjects—if we could receive charity from the Bombay Government, why should not the Government of India come to our rescue for a very short period, say for about 10 years? It will not be of much assistance to extend temporary help.

It is a matter of history, Sir, that ever since Sind came into existence up to the advent of the British Raj it has preserved its individuality; but I am not going to repeat all the arguments that have been already advanced, and I have submitted a short note constituting the facts for the consideration of the Committee. But let us see what we have suffered. In the first instance the Government of India was very sympathetic to the case of Sind. A few years after the conquest by the British Government the Government of India addressed the Bombay Government in regard to the Land Revenue system in the Province of Sind, that the Sind claim was to be quite different from that of the Rayati system in Deccan; and that the case of Sind should be considered upon its own merits because we were the owners of the land—the system in Sind was not the same as that prevailing in the Presidency

proper. However, the Bombay Government took no notice of that and enforced the system of land revenue that they had in the Presidency by which we lost all our rights of ownership in regard to our properties. That was the first consequence of our being placed under the Bombay Government.

As a test case one of our educated Hindu zamindars took the matter to the Court and succeeded in getting his fallow-forfeited land back; and the Government had to amend the Land Revenue Act. That handicapped us by depriving us of our ownership permanently.

What has been the further consequence of the far distant land revenue system? The agriculturists are absolutely starving. This unfortunate class of His Majesty's subjects throughout India is in a very bad state, but in Sind particularly it is a problem of bread. It is not a question, as we say here, of one meal a day; because in England they get at least a cup of tea and at least they have a piece of mutton once a day; but out there they live on dry jwari bread once a day; they cannot afford even to have medical aid, they cannot afford to provide medicine for their children, and even when they or their near relatives die they cannot afford to provide coffins for them. That is the state of the agriculturists. The zamindari landlords are being reduced to absolute beggary; their lands are passing away; they cannot afford to pay to the Government the heavy assessment; there is no value left of the property; they are not sufficiently educated to enter into the Government service, and they have no money for business. There is no other remedy but to give them their own Government to avoid the calamity that is pending.

You, Sir, said that if we are immediately separated progress will be handicapped. Consider the position for a moment. During the last nearly a century that we have been under the Bombay Government, what progress have we made? Our irrigation is the old type of irrigation which returns to the Bombay Government about 12 or 13 or 14 per cent. Except for one canal—the Jamras—they have made absolutely no improvement. In spite of the fact that the Government of India issued an instruction to the Bombay Government in 1913 on the recommendation of the Committee they appointed, no notice was taken of those recommendations. The last important document you have available is the Hartog Committee's Report. That is the last valuable and reliable document you have got. If you will refer to that document you will see how even up to to-day the Bombay Government has treated our education. It was stated yesterday that we have not a single Government college in the Province of Sind, while they have so many colleges in the Presidency proper.

*Mr. Jadhav* : How many?

*Sir S. N. Bhutto* : Even a backward Province like Baluchistan can claim pukka roads, but we cannot claim a single pukka trunk road.

We have only Local Board dispensaries at a distance of 15 or 20 miles. Except at District Headquarters there is no Government dispensary.

We receive very meagre help, not even 10 per cent, from the Government of Bombay. Although the dispensaries under the Local Authorities are kept open they have on occasions no medicine to supply. Medical help, agriculture, irrigation, roads, education—everything is in a mess. It is a mystery to us on what the Bombay Government spend the money while we are proved to be a deficit Province. In these circumstances, if we were separated we should not be worse off than we are at present.

My feeling about the Bombay Government is that what they are afraid of is their prestige, and is Sind to be allowed to be penalised for the prestige of Bombay? If we are excluded from Bombay we may be reduced to a third-rate area, but Bombay will remain a Presidency even if it is reduced to Greater Bombay city for historic terms are most stubborn. But I submit that we should not be made to suffer on that account.

At present we have in Karachi the main air mail station in Sind. Mesopotamia is developing; there is a possibility of the Baghdad railway which will capture the whole business of Mesopotamia by land and sea. Then, again, we are two days nearer to England than Bombay. If we had our own Government surely we would insist on the development of our port—the P. & O. mail steamer would first come to Karachi and then to Bombay, and so on. Bombay is afraid that by means of these natural advantages Karachi may become the door of India. In a short time we shall have fast train service with Cawnpur and Delhi, and we could capture the whole of the business of the two Provinces of C.P. and U.P. The Punjab and N.W. Frontier are already served by Karachi Port, so that Sind will capture the whole of the business of Central India—including United Provinces and the Delhi Province.

The two biggest political organisations in India, as we submit—the Congress, the Muslim League—have supported our claim; the non-official and moderate Europeans, Hindus and Parsees support the separation of Sind. Non-official Europeans, headed by Sir Montagu Webb, have supported the separation of Sind, as have also European officials who have retired from the Service. Of course, when they are in service they have difficulties to face, although they are sympathetic to us. They feel for the Province of Sind, but, owing to official etiquette, they cannot commit themselves in this connection. In the last 17 years we have had three Commissioners, who have now retired, and I am sure that if they were called here to be examined they would give you the real history of Sind and tell you what they feel about it.

What is more, in the present circumstances there are no reforms for us. Unfortunately it is not possible for the Bombay Government to give us attention as their time is too much occupied in other directions; it is impossible for them to manage or to have

direct control of, or to take an interest in Sind from a distance of 1,000 miles by land.

The result is that the Commissioner in Sind is invested with most of the powers of Government. I admit that we have been very fortunate on occasion to have had very good Commissioners. We have got a very good Commissioner now, and we have had good ones in the past; but when we get a lazy, proud and wooden-headed Commissioner, we cry "O God, come to our aid."

*Chairman:* You have not told the Committee, supposing there is a deficit of 60 lakhs, where it is to come from.

*Sir S. N. Bhutto:* We do not object to your appointing an expert Committee. I am sure we shall get quite a large amount out of the Bombay Government if there is a fair and independent arbitrator appointed to look into the full and the real facts from 1842. If we are not able to support ourselves how could we ask for separation?

We shall be questioned by our people. The people have no money and they are already starving and cannot pay more taxes; but we know that we are not a deficit Province. That is the thing which puts us out very much.

We might have been part of the Punjab if the Punjab had then been British territory. We say that the principle has been already accepted by the Statutory Commission and the Government of India, who recommend a Committee to go into the finances and administrative difficulties. We have proved that there are no administrative difficulties and we ask you kindly to decide that Sind should be separated, subject to the adjustment of the finances. Otherwise, if we do not get justice and fairness at your hands, as the highest tribunal, we do not know where we shall be.

*Sir G. H. Hidayatullah:* I want now to explain to you about the deficit in one or two words. Yesterday, I praised my countrymen, my Hindu friends, by saying that they were very clever people, and I repeat that praise to-day.

The Government of Bombay's figure of deficit was 24 lakhs. Then comes in my friend, Professor Chablani, from Sind, who was a non-official but who had access to Government records. I never heard of such a thing, that a non-official should be allowed to inspect Government documents. However, he was allowed to do so and he found a deficit of 64 lakhs. The Government of Bombay, without examination, as is clear from Mr. Wiles's notes, say 64 lakhs in 1927-28. It says on page 2 of this document: "Professor Chablani was given access to the Accountant-General's records, and his statement will shortly be checked by official figures." They are not yet checked, yet we are told we have a deficit of 64 lakhs.

*Mr. Isaac Foot:* I take it that you are quoting from page 2 of the Chairman's memorandum?

*Chairman:* It is on the second page.



*Sir G. H. Hidayatullah:* Are we going to be treated like this—a non-official is allowed access to Government documents, *ex parte* he collected the figures, and the Government of Bombay quotes these figures and make this Committee believe these figures. My friends from Sind are too clever, and my friend Sir P. Sethna will bear me out. Mr. Shamdasani is concerned only with banking; what trouble he has created in the whole city of Bombay! Is it fair to us that an opponent of the scheme of separation should be allowed access to official records?

I will now take you to the 64 lakhs deficit. These are the figures as my friend Mr. Martin will bear me out. Our way of budgeting in Bombay is that we take the land revenue and general administration together. Sometimes they have been changing the budgeting. Now, Sir, you will see the ordinary expenditure for 1921-22—the expenditure on land revenue and general administration—land revenue is 23 lakhs, and general administration is 14 lakhs; that means 37 lakhs in all; and that is in 1921.

Now look at the jump. This in 1922 when a deputation of Hindus and Muhammadans waited on the Governor and were pressing for a separation. The expenditure becomes 60 lakhs. Where did the money go? Then in subsequent years it becomes 58 or 59 lakhs of rupees.

Now look at the other heads. Take an important head like Police—

*Mr. Isaac Foot:* Before you leave general administration. In 1923-24 and 1924-25 it jumps up from 19.6 to 44.8.

*Sir G. H. Hidayatullah:* This is the way of budgeting. They are budgeting separately, so that both are to be taken together. I must be fair to my own Government; they change the heads, therefore I am taking the totals.

*Mr. Isaac Foot:* I see.

*Sir G. H. Hidayatullah:* But you will see how rapidly the expenditure has gone up for the administration of the Revenue Department from 37 lakhs to 60, then to 59, and then to 58—that is increased by 21 lakhs of rupees.

Now take Police. That, on the contrary, has been reduced.

Take any other important head and you will see that the expenditure is reduced almost everywhere—take Excise, take Forests—everywhere.

However, within four years that expenditure to which I have referred has gone up by 21 lakhs of rupees.

Let us now take our Land Revenue side on the previous page. In 1921-22 it was 144.2, which includes a portion of the Land Revenue due to irrigation, which is shown in subsequent years under head XIII. So taking both V and XIII together, our Land Revenue has been about 145 lakhs.

Now you see how it is going down. In 1924-25 it has become one crore one lakh. That is a decrease of 40 lakhs. Then on the

administration of the Revenue Department we are spending 21 lakhs more within the four years. Is that fair?

*Dr. Shuja'at Ahmad Khan*: You mean as a result of your agitation.

*Sir G. H. Hidayatullah*: I do not know whether it is agitation or not. At any rate, I am taking the figures there. Would any business firm whose revenue was decreasing go on increasing the expenditure in its Departments?

*Sardar Sampuran Singh*: They must have increased their staff to attend to the land.

*Sir G. H. Hidayatullah*: No, that is a separate account altogether.

*Sir P. Sethna*: Was it not due to the rise in salaries?

*Sir G. H. Hidayatullah*: They have taken into consideration Police and Excise. Do you mean to say only one Department has increased?

*Chairman*: In that figure of Land Revenue, 144.2, there was included, so Mr. Martin tells me, 25 lakhs working expenses. That was taken off in subsequent years. It ought to be 144 less 25 really. There appears on the next page—Working Expenses 25 for that year.

*Sir G. H. Hidayatullah*: Then there is a deficit of 25 lakhs of rupees, and the expenditure has increased by 21 lakhs of rupees. I might make it clear to the Committee that land in Sind is worth nothing without irrigation.

Let us now see how much we have spent on irrigation in these four years. Capital Expenditure comes on the third page: five lakhs in 1921-22; 19 lakhs in 1922-23; 51 lakhs in 1923-24; 1 crore 24 lakhs in 1924-25. That means that more land must have come under cultivation and the revenue ought to have increased.

*Mr. Isaac Foot*: It will depend upon whether the works on which you have spent the capital are yet carrying out the purposes of irrigation.

*Sir G. H. Hidayatullah*: Already their money has been spent.

*Chairman*: These 1924 figures include expenditure on the Sukkur Barrage.

*Sir G. H. Hidayatullah*: That has nothing to do with this, Sir. Where it is construction of irrigation works they say so. That makes it very suspicious.

*Mr. Isaac Foot*: But do not you see, the point of your criticism is that you are raising questions upon which you ought to be in the position of examining the financial officer, and we or someone ought to hear your questions that are put and the answers that are given. There is no financial officer here in the box to answer the questions that are being put. Your criticism cannot be accepted finally in the absence of the answers of the financial officers of the Departments.

*Sir G. H. Hidayatullah*: Exactly as we are sitting in a Committee I am showing you that though Revenue is being reduced, the expenditure in the Departments is being increased. Is that a fair proposition?

*Mr. Isaac Foot*: A perfectly fair question; but you yourself will agree that it cannot be final in the minds of anyone who has to decide upon it, because—

*Sir G. H. Hidayatullah*: We can make that by increasing the establishment; everyone has a deficit in the Budget.

*Mr. Isaac Foot*: I do not dispute that at all.

*Sir G. H. Hidayatullah*: Would any business firm increase its expenditure, spend nearly 2 crores of capital expenditure in getting less revenue in?

*Dr. Shafa'at Ahmad Khan*: Inefficiency of the administration.

*Sir G. H. Hidayatullah*: Absolutely. Then about the 24 lakhs. Again, if we take the expenditure in 1921-22 it is 2 crores 10 lakhs—that is what the receipts are—and the expenditure is 2.44. In regard to the expenditure I might mention the way of budgeting in Bombay. About the time of the reforms we used to have all money out of the revenue on all expenditure except on the productive works; then we wanted to have loan money spent on works of public utility—

*Chairman*: I do not want to stop you, but you said you were going to be short.

*Sir G. H. Hidayatullah*: These figures require explanation. If you take 22 lakhs on civil works it is not a record of expenditure—

*Mr. Mody*: I want to know Mr. Chairman whether we are or are not going into the figures. I thought you raised the point that that was not competent for us to do. If we are going into the figures we should like to hear Sir G. H. Hidayatullah at some length, but the point is this, are we going into these matters?

*Chairman*: I do not say it is not competent for the Committee, but it would not be profitable because we cannot arrive at any conclusion. That is all I was endeavouring to point out.

*Sir G. H. Hidayatullah*: This is only money spent once in a way.

*Chairman*: I am only showing you what the figures say. We regard to Professor Chablaini's figures these were checked and the documents were submitted to the Simon Commission. I have a telegram from Bombay saying the figures for 1927-28 show a deficit of 62 lakhs.

*Sir G. H. Hidayatullah*: I doubt it. How can you talk about those figures without access to the records?

*Chairman*: I do not think we can go into that with advantage.

*Mr. Jadhav*: I must admit that I am not at all competent to speak upon financial matters because I have not studied that

question; but I find here that the representative of the Bombay Government is not going to represent the views of the Government of Bombay but has been insisting upon his views.

*Sir G. H. Hidayatullah*: You must know my position. I have been sent here to represent the Muhammadan interests, and not to represent the Government of Bombay.

*Mr. Jadhav*: I do not want to insinuate anything. I have known Sir G. H. Hidayatullah for the last nine years; we have been the best of friends and understand each other better than any other persons I should say.

*Sir G. H. Hidayatullah*: I might tell you that if the Bombay Government had told me they were sending me to represent them I should have declined, especially in the state of ill-health that I have come here. That is my reply to you. You can ask the Government of Bombay. I was appointed to represent the Muhammadan point of view here.

*Mr. Jadhav*: I did not know what the directions given to him were, therefore I beg Sir G. H. Hidayatullah's pardon if I misunderstood him.

I am no longer a member of the Government of Bombay and, therefore, I have no right to speak on their behalf.

I must, in the beginning, admit that I myself have not formed any opinion about the separation of Sind or about opposing that proposition, because the data that was placed before me was insufficient. In the first place, I have to admit that my acquaintance with Sind is very meagre. I made only two official visits to that province, and they extended over thirty days and fifteen days respectively, and I do not think that that gave me sufficient knowledge of that province; but one thing was quite plain to me—that the Hindus as a class, as a community, were opposed to separation, while the Mussulmans—those Mussulmans with whom I came in contact or at all events were leaders—were in favour of separation. I do not know what the feeling of the cultivating classes is, because I do not know their language and I had no opportunity of talking to them, but I think they are generally in the position of the horse in *Æsop's fables*. When its owner wanted it to run very fast so as to escape from his enemy, the horse asked the rider what the enemy would do if he were caught. The rider said he would be killed. The horse said, "What about me?" "Well," said the rider, "he will ride you." Then the horse said "Why should I trouble myself? If someone is to ride upon my back it would be much better for my comfort that I should remain where I am."

*Sir Abdul Qaiyum*: That is the case with all the agriculturists in India.

*Sir G. Hussam Hidayatullah*: They do not want Dominion status; why do you want it?

*Mr. Jadhav*: My own people are in the same condition.

*Sir S. N. Bhutto* : My 85 per cent. do not want it.

*Mr. Mody* : Let us not give our case away?

*Sir G. Hussain Hidayatullah* : You make us give away the case. There is yet time.

*Mr. Jadhav* : But what surprised me here was that the arguments for separation were mostly based on the stepmotherly treatment given by the Government of Bombay to the people of Sind. Might I ask, Sir, who the stepmother is? Up to 1920 the finances were the finances of the whole of India, and the local governments were given allotments, and money was spent by the Government, which was mostly in the hands of European officers, who cannot be charged with partiality for one province or for one community as against another community or as against another province; so if the stepmotherly treatment of Sind is to be attributed to anybody it ought to be attributed to the officers and to the British Government who conducted the affairs of India as a whole. This charge of stepmotherly treatment is sought to be proved by the want of communication and by the slow progress that education has been making and by the paucity of hospitals and dispensaries and such other things; but may I point out that the condition of the other provinces in India are not much better in all these respects except as regards the subject of road-communication. Educationally every division, every district is as backward as the Sind division. It is said that nearly a hundred years has passed since the conquest of Sind, but the education has not been pushed on, and therefore the Government ought to be charged with stepmotherly treatment, but may I point out, Sir, that even in the city of Poona and outside the Government has been there for more than 112 years, but still the condition of primary education is as bad as anywhere else, and that in the city of Bombay, which has been under British rule for more than 250 years, the condition of the poorer people, the labouring classes, is as bad as outside Bombay. So this stepmother is treating all her own children and the children of other provinces in the same niggardly manner, and I do not think any special charge should be preferred against her for treating any division specially badly.

As regards the communications, the province of Gujrat also has been charging the Government with favouring the Deccan and starving Gujrat, and in the matter of education the same complaint has been preferred by Sind; but may I point out the difference between Sind and Gujrat on the one hand and the Deccan on the other. Road metal can be had in the Deccan without any great additional cost, whereas in Sind and Gujrat road metal and road material are very costly, and to construct a mile of road, that is to say well-metalled road, is as costly as laying down a mile of railway; and that is one of the reasons, Sir, why the road communications are so unsatisfactory in these two provinces. But that is not all. The Mahratta country has been provided with roads, not for the simple reason that it is nearer Bombay or nearer Poona, not that it can provide at cheap cost metal and other road material,

but the advantage they have got is due to a great calamity to which they are always subject. Some of the places in the Deccan are liable to suffer from famine once in three years and sometimes twice in five years. Government has opened relief works for the purpose of relieving the starving population, which consisted especially of agriculturists and the weaver class, and road making was the only work that could be provided to thousands of people who flocked on the famine works. That is the reason why roads were made there because money had to be spent for saving the lives of the people and some return was to be expected, and that return was obtained in the shape of roads. It is to this misfortune, the liability to famine, that the roads of the Deccan are due, and not to any unfair or stepmotherly treatment by the Government of Bombay.

*Sir G. Hussain Hidayatullah* : Colleges also.

*Mr. Jadhav* : I am coming to that. As far as education is concerned, primary education has been suffering everywhere. The Presidency proper has got a college, a government college in Bombay, a government college in Poona, a government college at two other places. The government college in Bombay has got a history to which one cannot close his eyes. In order to perpetuate the memory of Sir Mountstuart Elphinstone a public subscription was raised, the Elphinstone Society was started, and that Society opened an institution called the Elphinstone Institution. That ultimately developed into a college and it had to be taken up by Government. The history of that institution has been such that it is very difficult for Government to stop that college, but that question has not been shelved completely, and in the days of stress of finance perhaps the Government college may suffer. The college in Poona was a development of an old institution which was started by the Peshwas before Poona came under British rule, and the provision of money set aside by the Peshwas for that purpose was diverted to English education, and therefore the Government is bound to continue it. When the Ferguson College was started in Poona, the question was discussed as to whether the Deccan college should be handed over to the Deccan Education Society, and the Law Officers were consulted, and I am told that the Law Officers said that Government was bound to continue that college according to the promises given, and therefore that college could not be abolished. Had it not been for this obstacle, the Government college in Poona would have been abolished long ago.

*Mr. Foot* : We have passed on to the Mahrattas, have we?

*Dr. Moonje* : His point is that all those institutions were rounded by private funds, and the Government only helped.

*Mr. Jadhav* : In Sind, for instance, a private society was formed, and that society has been conducted as a very successful college for many years, and Government has been liberally assisting that college. That society has again taken upon itself to start an engineering college, and Government also has been assisting that enterprise; so Sind has got an engineering college and

an arts college, and both of those are very efficient. An arts college at Hyderabad has been supported by Government and grants were made to it when the grants to new arts colleges in the Presidency proper were stopped. In the Presidency of Bombay proper, if any new arts colleges started, no grant is made to it. The Sangli College and the Nasik College were started after this rule was made and they do not get a single pie in the shape of grants from Government, but the Hyderabad College, although started after that date, has been given aid, because Sind wanted another college and therefore it was thought desirable to give that special grant to that college. I do not think that this is stepmotherly treatment.

With regard to medical relief, I may point out that each district has got a civil hospital, and the dispensaries in the whole of the Presidency, including Sind, have been managed by district local boards and municipalities, and Government paid the cost. The scale of these grants for Sind and for the Presidency proper is the same, and therefore I do not think that this charge of stepmotherly treatment will be applicable in respect of medical relief.

As for agriculture, Sir, I have found during the last two years that the needs of Sind were more attended to, and that more money was spent in the development of agriculture in Sind than was spent in the Presidency proper; and I do not think that that can be called stepmotherly treatment. Of course, the conditions of Sind are very peculiar in this respect, and as Minister of Agriculture I had to sanction those grants on account of those special circumstances. The Barrage will soon come into operation, and we must have the Sakrand farm and other farms there and the experiments carried on on a very large scale. Therefore special grants were wanted for the development of agriculture in the Province of Sind, and the Government did not hesitate to make those grants at the same time as it started the agricultural development of the Presidency proper.

It has been said, Sir, that irrigation in Sind is very paying and that Government gets possibly 14 per cent. or 15 per cent. on their investments, but the hollowness of this assertion has been demonstrated, and I need not take up the time of this sub-Committee by going over the same ground again.

The Report of the Hartog Committee certainly lays bare the deficiency in the advance of education, but I think it accuses want of progress in all the divisions, and not in any particular division.

*Sir S. N. Bhutto*: The question dealing with Sind is a very big chapter, and I do not want to take up the time of the sub-Committee unnecessarily, but the Report of the Hartog Committee is available if members would care to read it. I will read only one paragraph, which refers to the argument of my hon. friend, and the sub-Committee can then consider what weight they should give to the statement that my friend has just made. The passage which I want to read to you is as follows: "But in spite of these improvements, the claims of Sind appear to have been overshadowed by

those of more fortunate districts. We have been told that some of the Sind local boards were among the first to impose an education cess under the Compulsory Education Act and yet the number of new schools sanctioned for Sind was much smaller than the number in other divisions; and that while in 1926-27, as much as Rs. 1,17,000 was paid as grant towards the expansion of primary education to the District Board of Satara and Rs. 37,700 to the Board of East Khandesh, all the district boards of Sind together obtained only Rs. 18,000." Satara is my hon. friend's own district, and he himself was the Minister; he gave away Rs. 1,17,000 to his own district, while all the district boards of Sind together obtained only Rs. 18,000. The hon. Minister sanctioned Rs. 1,17,000 for his own district! Members may read for themselves the rest of the report and judge the position for themselves.

*Mr. Jadhav*: I am ready to reply to that.

*Sir S. N. Bhutto*: You say you are ready to reply, but here is the record.

*Mr. Jadhav*: I am very glad that this gives me an opportunity in dealing with the matter. I took over charge in 1924, and a year and a half was spent in making rules and regulations for the administration of the Act of 1923. Under that Act the further expansion of education was left to the local authorities. In the case of municipalities it was promised that any additional expenditure that was incurred for the advancement of education would be shared half and half by the local authority and Government; in the case of the district local boards, they were to provide one-third while Government promised two-thirds. Now, this district of Satara had seen ahead as soon as the Act was passed in 1923. They imposed an additional cess of one anna per rupee on the land revenue of that district, and they began to collect it in anticipation of the Act coming into force. Before the Act came into force they were ready with their money, and in 1926 they submitted their claim in connection with primary education. They said: "We want so many new schools and so many additional teachers; here is our one-third of the money; we want your two-thirds." That was the only district which was ready with the money, and which had its scheme prepared and came forward to Government with the money. Let my hon. friend Sir S. N. Bhutto say whether any district in Sind came forward with the money.

*Sir S. N. Bhutto*: Yes. This document says you referred it back and considered the scheme of your own district.

*Mr. Jadhav*: Government never referred back any scheme. The applications were considered by the District of Public Instruction, and had there been any glaring ill-treatment of one district or any such partiality or partial favour to one district, I do not think my hon. friends in the Council would have stood by and not moved a vote of censure.

*Sir S. N. Bhutto*: You were in a majority, and you begged us to spare you and we did so.



*Mr. Jadhav:* I am not at all against the aspirations of Sind. If Sind wants separation, Sind may be separated. I simply wanted to explain things and to deal with the charges brought against the Bombay Government for "stepmotherly behaviour." I have very good friends among the people of Sind, both Hindus and Muslims, and I have in my short visits formed a very high opinion of their integrity and of their trustworthiness. If they think they will prosper under separation I have no objection, but at the same time I must say that they ought to base their claim on facts and not on sentiment or on allegations that they are not properly treated by the Government of Bombay.

*Chairman:* Thank you.

*Sardar Sampuran Singh:* I fully sympathise with the ideas expressed by my friends, and as a matter of fact I fully appreciate the point of view that Sind cannot progress to the fullest extent until it is separated from Bombay, but the point we have to consider is whether Sind will be able to meet its expenses, its coming expenses. I assure you, having a little experience of the colonies in the Punjab, that to colonise Sind it is absolutely necessary that you should spend a very large amount of money on railways, pukka roads and other communications, so that the grain from the land may be able to reach the ports or the markets in that part of the country.

Unless you are sure about your financial position it will be almost suicidal to take any action for separation without making sure of the financial position. You may be perfectly correct when you say that to-day your financial position is very strong and that there is no deficit; you may be quite right when you say that the deficit which appears to-day is only an artificial deficit, and that when the figures are actually worked out it will be clear that there is really no deficit. You may be perfectly correct, but you are not sure about it yourselves; you cannot substantiate this viewpoint by any facts and figures at present. This inquiry has to be undertaken because you yourselves and we ourselves are not in a position to judge.

*Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah:* If you will accept the principle we will submit to the financial adjustment.

*Sardar Sampuran Singh:* After all, we know that this thing must eventually come about if it is financially sound. If you can pay the interest on all the loans raised for the Sukkur Barrage and if you have some capital to develop the colony it will be all right.

*Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah:* We can give guarantees.

*Sardar Sampuran Singh:* Any guarantee must be based on facts, and that enquiry will show whether you are really capable of that or not, and eventually having come to that conclusion the decision has to be arrived at whether Sind should be immediately separated or not. To establish it before hand that Sind must be separated is equivalent to saying that we do not care whether financially it can stand alone or not. If we are prepared to let you go down,

and you are prepared to sink financially like that, it is no use making that enquiry, for that enquiry will be absolutely useless.

You say you are sure that this is only a budget deficit and that the financial situation of Sind is all right, and I have learned that from other sources as well. I happened to meet other friends here who have served in the Civil Service in Sind, and who also think that financially Sind can stand on its own legs. I do not doubt that statement of yours, but anyhow we can only note that opinion; we cannot base our opinions on any definite, solid facts and figures. Until we are able to obtain facts and figures as a result of such an enquiry as has been suggested it will not be logical to decide anything about the separation of Sind; we cannot do it at this stage, and I think that as the circumstances show that anyhow this must be put off for some time, it does not matter if it is delayed six months or a year until this enquiry is made.

*Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah* : Then there will be a larger deficit and yet Bombay is prepared to go on paying our deficits! That is the wonderful thing about it.

*Sir S. N. Bhutto* : I have a telegram here which I should like to read to you, if I may.

*Chairman* : We have all had telegrams; I have had telegram against the separation of Sind.

*Sir S. N. Bhutto* : They have asked me to place this before you:—

“ Sind Muslim Conference Jacobabad ninth instant resolutions have emphatically demanded immediate unconditional Sind separation and without which no reforms will be acceptable to Sind people. Also passed that Simon Commission and Government of India have neglected the question of reforms in British Baluchistan in the next constitution and strongly urge upon the members of Round Table Conference to take up the case in right earnest.”

*Dr. Moonje* : May I also bring to your notice a cable I received this morning?

*Chairman* : It is probably the same as I received. I do not think we need read these telegrams; we all get them.

*Mr. Mody* : I think there are only two courses open to us. We can either pass a resolution for which the formula has been placed before us by Mr. Jinnah, which commits us definitely to the separation of Sind, or we can do nothing or next to nothing and say that all these matters must be investigated by a separate Committee, and leave it at that.

I submit neither of these courses should be adopted. In the first place, Sir, as regards the course suggested by Mr. Jinnah, namely that Sind should be separated, a course which has been so ably advocated by Sir Ghulam, I am sure we have listened to the arguments advanced in support of it with every sympathy and with great attention, and, speaking for myself, I am deeply

impressed by all they have said. If there is an overwhelming desire on the part of Sind to separate, no obstacles should be placed in the way of that unless there are overwhelming considerations to the contrary. The point is, however, that on the facts that are before us—facts which Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah has sought to explain—and on what we must take to be the present position, there is no material on which we can come to a decision.

Now, Sir, if you lay down that it is the business of this Committee to investigate the whole of the circumstances and to come to a definite decision, I am perfectly prepared to go on and to go very carefully into the financial ability of Sind. I have not the least objection. Whether that course is practicable or not it is for you and the Committee to decide; but if you come to the conclusion that Sind ought to be separated, at least that conclusion cannot be come to unless you have fully investigated the problem in all its merits.

I do not know that I interpret correctly your own wishes, but the next suggestion was that we should merely pass a resolution that a Committee be appointed which would go into the whole question and submit a report. I do not know, Sir, whether that is good enough for us. After all, we have been asked to examine this question, and it does not do merely for us to say that because there are so many difficulties in the way of the examination of the question, therefore all our recommendation amounts to is that some other Committee should examine that question.

My view would be that we should definitely say that if satisfactory administrative and financial adjustments can be made, and if it is found that Sind is capable of financing herself, then, assuming, of course, that there is a desire on the part of Sind to separate herself, the separation should be an accomplished fact; the proposition I would like to place before you would be based on those lines.

There is a difference between that and leaving it to another Committee; because in the one case there would be a definite expression of opinion that if satisfactory arrangements can be made, Sind should separate herself. In the other case, there is no such expression of opinion; you merely leave a Committee to discuss and investigate everything, and then come forward with recommendations of their own.

Therefore the proposition which I would like to place before the Committee is this. I have jotted it down very roughly: "That if satisfactory financial and administrative adjustments are made, and assurances are forthcoming with regard to the ability of Sind to finance herself, the sub-Committee are of opinion that Sind should be separated and constituted into a Province; that a Committee should be set up by the Government of India to examine the question and make an early report."

Now I should like to anticipate an objection which might be raised to this. I think it was suggested yesterday, that after all,

if Sind cannot finance herself, it is her funeral; why should we worry about it; and why should not Bombay be anxious to get rid of a Province which is a burden? But I would like to point out as an answer to it that that is not the correct reading of the situation; because, after all, there are two communities in Sind, the Hindu and the Muhammadan. Assuming for a moment that after separation an enormous financial burden is put upon the people of Sind, the Muhammadan community might well be pleased that that financial burden should be imposed, because they get something else, something very substantial, namely, a large Muhammadan Province, and power and privilege. But the Hindu community, or any other community, the non-Muhammadan communities might well say: "Well, what is the good of the separation to us who have had to bear this extraordinary amount of taxation"? Therefore it does not do merely to say that if Sind cannot finance herself, it is her look out, and that it does not matter to us here in the Committee or to the people in Bombay whether Sind can or cannot adequately carry her own burdens.

From all these points of view, I feel that, while we should go in every possible way to meet the desire of our friends in Sind, and express a definite opinion that Sind should be separated, it must be contingent upon two things, namely, equitable adjustments being made and her ability to finance herself being proved.

Now I would ask my friends not to object to these provisos for the simple reason that they themselves have made light of them. If you say equitable arrangements can be made, well and good. They also say that Sind is capable of financing herself; that if matters were thoroughly investigated, it would be found that the situation is by no means as hopeless as it is made out to be. Well and good; I do not think then they can object to an expression of opinion of this character, coupled with these two conditions which they think are easily satisfied.

*Dr. Moonje:* The real desire of the people is for separation.

*Mr. Mody:* That, of course, must be taken as the fundamental basis of this. This is what I should like to place before the Committee as an alternative to Mr. Jinnah's proposition, which proposes that Sind should be separated from the Bombay Presidency, and a Committee should be set up. My objection to his proposition is, as I told you, that it definitely separates Sind, even though it may turn out later on, when the Committee investigate, that the separation cannot be made effective without an enormous burden being put on the taxpayer in Sind. I would like to safeguard that position, and I would like to say that provided a Committee can satisfy us that Sind can bear her own burdens, and that she is quite prepared to come to an amicable understanding with the Bombay Presidency with regard to the burdens which she should bear, her share of the burdens, we are perfectly happy to allow Sind to be separated and constituted into a new Province. That is my proposition.

*Chairman:* May I just sound the Committee as to the general feeling now? Mr. Mody has expressed extraordinarily accurately what has been in my mind for some time. I do not want to repeat what he said, but I should like just to put it to the Committee, perhaps in my own words, but it is very much the same. I cannot help feeling, as I told the Committee and as I told Mr. Jinnah yesterday, that it is impossible for us round this table to come to the conclusion as to whether Sind would be a deficit Province or whether it would not. We have not got the material and we cannot come to that conclusion. Now if Sind is to be a deficit Province, there is not only the objection to which Mr. Mody has called attention, that is to say, that there would be a very heavy burden on the inhabitants, but there is also the objection, it seems to me, with regard to the social services and the development of Sind. Sind, after all, is part of what we hope will be a united India, and you want the whole of India to develop; you do not want to have a backward Province in the middle of it.

Therefore I am just putting this to the Committee. I myself should feel very reluctant to say: Oh yes, let Sind be a Province whether she can sink or swim, it does not matter. It does matter; it matters not only to Sind but to the whole of India. Sind is a part of India and we have to consider it in relation to India as a whole. I may say also I have been impressed, as I think probably all the Committee have been impressed, by the perfectly obvious reasons for the separation of Sind: The geographical reasons, the racial reasons, the reason of distance from Bombay, and the strong wish of the people of Sind. They are all matters of very great importance.

I do not know whether the Committee feels that perhaps the better course for us to take would be to express a view that it is desirable for Sind to be created a separate Province if it was found that she could stand on her own feet after an enquiry by a financial Committee. But I quite agree with Mr. Mody that I do not think it would be proper to refer the major question to that Financial Committee. That is, I think, very much a matter for the Round Table Conference, where we have all India represented. That is a matter of principle for us I think. But the Financial Committee can go properly into the finances and can tell us, or the Government of India, or whoever it is who is carrying out the wishes of the Conference, whether in truth and in fact Sind can stand on her own legs. The report then would be on the lines that, provided it was shown that Sind can stand on her own legs, Sind should be separated.

*Dr. Moonje:* Without fresh taxation?

*Raja Narendra Nath:* Yes.

*Chairman:* Not necessarily without fresh taxation, but without too great a burden. You must not, I think, say that they should never have additional taxes.

*Mr. Mody:* They may advance, and they may want more taxation.

*Sir G. Hussain Hidayatullah:* Are not the Government of Bombay going to introduce a 25 per cent. income tax, and is not that a tax? I do not understand how any country can go on without taxation.

*Chairman:* I am saying without an undue burden; but it must be possible if necessary to increase taxation. You have assets in Sind which after a certain time will be productive. It seems to be thought that it will be nearly 20 years before the Sukkur Barrage is productive, but it will be productive then and apparently very productive; that seems to be the general view. You have the port of Karachi which you all say you can make more productive. You have, therefore, possibly increasing sources of revenue, not immediately but in the future. I do not know whether it is the general view of the Committee that that would be a proper sort of conclusion for us to come to. If it is, I should be prepared to draw up a report on those lines. I should like to know the feeling of the Committee on that.

*Mr. Chintamani:* May I trouble you to read the terms of reference to the sub-Committee.

*Chairman:* The terms of reference were to consider the question of constituting Sind as a separate Province. That is the whole of the terms of reference.

*Sir Abdul Qaiyum:* We do not want to go into details.

*Chairman:* The sort of words I would suggest would be something like this, that before a final decision is taken a Committee should be constituted in India to examine the question of the separation of Sind in its financial aspect, and to report if they consider the separation to be financially practicable. That is the sort of limitation.

*Mr. Moonje:* With one addition: ascertaining the desire of the people for separation.

*Chairman:* Is that a proper matter for a purely financial Committee?

*Mr. Chintamani:* No, it is not necessarily for the Financial Committee.

*Dr. Moonje:* Just one minute, Sir. If it is not the real desire of the people to have separation, why should we force separation upon them?

*Chairman:* Of course in everything I said I assumed there was no question as to that.

*Dr. Moonje:* How are we to know, because we are getting contradictory wires; one set of people say they want separation and another set of people say they do not. How are we to say?

*Sir S. N. Bhutto:* Some people say they do not want any advance and they do not want Dominion Status. Are we to take any notice of those wires?

*Dr. Moonje:* May I finish? There is one other matter to be taken into consideration. If my information is correct, at the

present moment it seems that the Hindus pay a larger amount of revenue in proportion to the population to the Sind administration, and if it should be found that in the event of extra taxation the burden would be placed more upon the Hindus than upon the Mussulmans, the question would arise as to whether there is a real desire for separation. That is a matter which has to be ascertained.

*Sardar Sampuran Singh:* The Hindus pay income-tax while the Mussulmans pay land tax. Of course the Hindus may be paying more taxes if they are richer. The Muhammadans are mainly paying the land revenue. It is not the same kind of tax.

*Dr. Moonje:* The point is, if there is a possibility of extra taxation being imposed, whether the people really desire to have that burden of extra taxation for the sake of separation. That is the point.

*Sir Abdul Qaiyum:* I am not going into details; I will confine myself to the terms of reference.

*Mr. Mody:* May I suggest that we adjourn to-day and meet to-morrow, as there are so many members who desire to speak.

*Chairman:* I think we might get on as far as we can to-night if you do not mind.

*Sir Abdul Qaiyum:* Provided we are brief, we can finish. My point is simply this, that this question of the separation of Sind from Bombay is not novel; it has been before the public in India from time immemorial—I will say since the annexation, and has been fully discussed; whether Sind wants separation, or whether only the Mussalmans want separation. The facts have been fully discussed. The last and biggest public assembly which discussed it was the Congress, at which the different views were expressed, and the Hindu view especially was expressed. After full consideration of the pros and cons of the case, it was decided that if financially Sind could bear the cost of separation, it should be separated.

So, that decision having been arrived at after years and years of discussion by the whole of India practically, Hindus, Mussulmans and others, it must I think be taken as definite that the question of separation—whether one community likes it or whether it does not like it—is settled or should be settled here. From the public point of view it is settled. From the official point of view it ought to be settled now.

The question of finance remains. That condition was attacked by the Congress and that question is still before us. I am very sorry that, although we were coming to this Conference, and the Government both here and in India knew, and the Bombay Government knew, that this question was going to be laid before the Conference, no earlier opportunity was taken to take it up; no time was allowed for us to study the financial part of it with the facts and figures which are now being supplied to us at the eleventh hour.

I must say there are small matters which have been lost sight of, but there are others who will suspect perhaps that this question is going to be shelved again on this very point which should have been decided while we were there. We must, I think, decide at least that point, and put the provision that the financial situation should be gone into by a Committee and the necessary adjustment made. If we now raise that whole question of the feelings, it will be a very doubtful case if the whole question is put in the form of a condition providing that financially it is sound, even then it will become very doubtful. To my mind the separation has been clear for ages now, and it is not really the separation, but the recognition of a separate unit which already exists. As was so well put by Sir Ghulam Hussain the other day, it was always there, and we have simply to satisfy its separate existence. I do not know if the liabilities of Sind will be very great, due to this Barrage scheme. On the other hand, I believe that it is the possible or probable income of that Barrage that makes Sind so much coveted by Bombay. I believe that Bombay is looking forward to gain much out of it—either that or the opening up, as some gentlemen have said, of Mesopotamia or even of Persia with the new railway system as far as the Persian Gulf. Perhaps it is the prosperity of Sind which is really in the way—the future prosperity of Sind. Otherwise sound financiers like the Bombay people, Mr. Mody and others, would not care to be so very generous and charitable while their own people are starving as the result of one thing or another. No, it is the covetousness of getting something out of that development that is influencing Bombay Presidency.

*Mr. Mody*: I do not think that Sir Abdul is quite fair in saying that.

*Chairman*: You will not raise further discussion, will you, Sir Abdul, by making charges of that sort?

*Mr. Mody*: I think it is very unfair to us.

*Sir Abdul Qaiyum*: Well, I think it is really the gain that is counted really, not the loss.

*Chairman*: But may we consider the actual question before us, if you do not mind?

*Sir Abdul Qaiyum*: Well, I will not say anything more, because what I thought I would say would only raise that question which need not be discussed here, because on these figures that my friend Sir S. N. Bhutto referred to it is exactly the same position. We want further advance, and there are obstacles in the way.

*Raja Narendra Nath*: I should like to say a word or two. Reference has been made to the Nehru Report and to the recommendations of the Indian National Congress. The Indian National Congress once did espouse the Nehru Report, but the Nehru Report must be taken as a whole and not piecemeal. The way in which the Nehru Report solved the Minority question and the question



of Minority right is not the way now recommended by the Conference—at least, I do not know what the eventual form of minority rights will be, and the way in which the constitution will protect minority rights, but I invite particular attention to clause 6 and clause 13 at page 102 of the Nehru Report: “All citizens are equal before the law and possess equal civic rights. . . . No person shall by reason of his religion, caste or creed be prejudiced in any way in regard to public employment, office of power or honour and the exercise of any trade or calling.” This is not the fundamental rights which my friends will at all be willing to accept, so the two things ought not to be separated. What I want to say is this, that if reliance is placed upon the recommendations of the Congress or on the recommendations made in the Nehru Report, this part of the Nehru Report, the way in which the Nehru Report proposed to solve the minority question, should not be ignored. That is all I want to say.

*Sir Abdul Qaiyum*: Thank you; but I thought that the question was solved on its merits.

*Chairman*: Well, Sir Abdul, you have had your say.

*Dr. Shafa'at Ahmad Khan*: May I say one thing. I want to be perfectly clear that when we desire separation we also wish to safeguard the rights of the minority in Sind most adequately. Have as many safeguards as you like—more, even, than are granted to the minorities in other Provinces. So that so far as the minority question is concerned I do not think it should be used as an excuse for delaying separation. I think I shall be supported by those in Sind when I say that on this question there is virtually no difference of opinion between the Hindus and Muhammadans of Sind. Practically all communities agree on principle that Sind should be separated.

*Dr. Moonje*: I question that.

*Dr. Shafa'at Ahmad Khan*: There are, of course, a few persons here and there who are opposed to it; you are bound to find a few.

The second question with which I should like to deal is what is called the political question. In my humble opinion the sub-Committee must recommend the principle of separation. There are two questions involved, the principle of separation and the constitution of Sind as a separate Province, and it is the second question which is the financial question. If it is proposed to refer both these questions, the political and the financial, to one and the same Committee, which will conduct an investigation later, I must tell this sub-Committee that this question will not be solved. We must decide on the political question here and now; the financial question we must leave to an expert body. On the political question, I should say most members of the sub-Committee practically agree that Sind should be separated, provided, of course, the financial adjustments are made and so on.

*Raja Narendra Nath*: And provided minority rights are adequately safeguarded in the way the minority wants. It cannot be for Sind alone. The clauses I read were from the fundamental

rights of citizens, and that has not been adopted by the Conference; that clause defining the fundamental rights has not been adopted by the Conference.

*Dr. Shafa'at Ahmad Khan* : This question is going to be discussed to-morrow in the Minorities sub-Committee, and should not be brought in here with a view to preventing an impartial discussion of a question like that of the separation of Sind.

*Chairman* : We cannot have it here, I agree.

*Raja Narendra Nath* : The political question cannot be separated; you must give adequate safeguards to minorities.

*Chairman* : Yes, but the safeguarding of minorities, like the extension of the franchise, is a question which applies to all India and does not arise on this particular question.

*Dr. Shafa'at Ahmad Khan* : Whatever proposals are made about this need not be accepted by any member of the sub-Committee unless the safeguards for minorities are adequate.

*Sir Abdul Qaiyum* : On the lines of other Provinces.

*Raja Narendra Nath* : No; that is just the difficulty. Wherever my Muslim friends are in a minority they want certain rights, and where they are in a majority they want certain rights of a different kind, and so there is controversy.

*Chairman* : It is really a minority question that you are raising, and it is out of order.

*Raja Narendra Nath* : The political aspect of the case was discussed, and it was said that politically it is settled. That is why I raised this point.

*Dr. Shafa'at Ahmad Khan* : With regard to Mr. Mody's proposal, if you examine it closely you will find it is practically the same, with certain minor modifications, as the proposal of the Bombay Government and the proposal of the Simon Commission. There has been no advance, so far as I can gather, since that time, and you know that opinion in the Province, and I should say in the whole of India, has swung round to the view that Sind should be separated with the least possible delay.

*Chairman* : I do not think you should say it is no advance. Assuming this report becomes part of the report of the Round Table Conference, it is surely a considerable advance that the Round Table Conference has declared itself in favour of the separation of Sind.

*Dr. Shafa'at Ahmad Khan* : To that extent technically it would be an advance, but this has already been recommended by the Government of India and the Simon Commission. I know this is a very honourable body and will have greater weight. Of course, if the Round Table Conference puts its seal of approval on the proposal made by Mr. Mody it will be a great advance, but I am speaking of the proposal as such, and as such I submit it is practically the same as that of the Simon Commission and the Bombay Government.

*Chairman* . I should have said the exact opposite.

*Mr. Foot* : The Bombay Government was opposed to it. Do you mean the Government or India?

*Dr. Shafa'at Ahmad Khan :* My proposal is practically the same as that of Mr. Jinnah, namely that Sind should be separated from Bombay and that the question of finance should be decided by a separate expert Committee later on. The principle of separation should not be mixed up in that at all.

*Lord Zetland :* I am very much impressed with the arguments which have been put forward in favour of the creation of a new Province, and I notice that the Nehru Report suggested that even if this resulted in a deficit that should not be allowed to stand in the way of the self-determination of the people of that particular area, namely Sind. They went on to urge that the denial of the right of self-determination on purely financial grounds would be bound to lead to great dissatisfaction and to impede the progress of Sind. I do not want to go further into that, but that was the view expressed by the Nehru Committee.

I think that possibly we might go a little further than was suggested by Mr. Mody. I think his suggestion was a good one, but I should like to suggest that we might go a little further in this way. Could not we first of all say that on these general grounds we do consider it is desirable that a new Province should be created, but that considerable doubt has been thrown upon the financial capacity of Sind to bear the burdens of a new Province, and that on that point we cannot possibly express an opinion because we have not the necessary material; and that therefore we consider that an expert Committee must be set up to examine the financial position. Then could not we go on to say that if, as a result of that investigation, it was found that Sind would not be a deficit Province, then well and good; let the creation of the new Province be proceeded with. If on the other hand, the result of the investigation showed that there would be a deficit in the budget of the new Province, then the representatives of Sind should be invited to show how they would meet the deficit before a new Province was created. Could not it be done in that sort of way?

*Chairman :* Yes.

*Mr. Chintamani :* I entirely agree with the proposal of the noble Marquess. I wish only to add—and that is covered partly by the proposal which the noble Marquess had made—that after the financial position has been ascertained the Government of India should also take steps to ascertain the wishes of the people.

My precise meaning is this. After the expert financial enquiry is concluded, and the report is before the Government, at that stage the wishes of the people of Sind should be ascertained.

*Chairman :* How?

*Mr. Chintamani :* There are the voters for the Legislative Council, the district boards and so on.

*Chairman :* I see—representative associations?

*Mr. Chintamani :* Yes, representative associations. My reason is this. There will be many people who at the present moment are enthusiastically in support of separation, but whose enthusiasm may be somewhat cooled down if they find separation will involve them

in the payment of fresh taxes or in additional financial burdens. I think, therefore, it is only fair and business-like that their wishes should be ascertained after the financial investigation has been made and its results are known; it should not be taken for granted that all who are in favour of separation now will continue to be in favour, or that all who are against separation now will continue to be against after knowing exactly where they stand. That is one point which personally I should like to add to the proposal which the noble Marquess has made. The other thing is a proper financial adjustment between the Government of Bombay and the Government of Sind.

*Chairman* : That is of course understood.

*Dr. Shafa'at Ahmad Khan* : That is a detail. I should like to make a suggestion. The proposal which Lord Zetland has made needs some consideration, and we should be glad if this meeting could be adjourned until to-morrow for that reason.

*Chairman* : We have not any time to spare, and I should like, if possible, to have some sort of draft report before the sub-Committee to-morrow. May I take it the general sense of the sub-Committee would be in favour of the separation of Sind, subject to the financial enquiry either as Mr. Mody and I suggested it or going rather further as Lord Zetland suggested it? I will try to draw up a report which will incorporate both those views, if possible, or adjust them, and if I may I will draw up a report on those lines.

*Sir P. Sethna* : Will you add Mr. Chintamani's proposal?

*Chairman* : It is rather a dangerous proposal.

*The sub-Committee adjourned at 6-50 p.m.)*

PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRD MEETING OF SUB-COMMITTEE No. IX  
(SIND) HELD ON 14TH JANUARY, 1931.

*(Draft Report.)*

1. The members of the sub-Committee, over which I presided, were:—

Lord Russell ( <i>Chairman</i> ).	Dr. Shafa'at Ahmad Khan.
Lord Zetland.	Sardar Sampuran Singh.
Lord Reading (for whom Mr. Foot acted as substitute..	Dr. Moonje.
H.H. the Aga Khan.	Mr. Jayakar.
Mr. Jinnah.	Raja Narendra Nath.
Sir S. N. Bhutto.	Mr. Chintamani.
Sir G. Hussain Hidayatullah.	Mr. Jadhav.
Sir Abdul Qaiyum.	Sir P. Sethna.
Sir M. Shafi.	Mr. Mody.
	Sir H. Carr.

The terms of reference were to consider "the question of constituting Sind as a separate Province."

The sub-Committee sat on 12th and 13th January, and has authorised me to present this report.

2. The sub-Committee did not enter in their discussions into the wider question of the redistribution of the provinces in India.

3. They consider that the racial, religious, and linguistic differences between the majority of the inhabitants of Sind and the majority of the inhabitants of the Presidency of Bombay proper; the geographical isolation of Sind from Bombay the difficulties of communication between the two and the insistency with which separation has been advocated provide an impressive case for the division of Sind from the Bombay Presidency and the creation of a separate provincial Government there.

4. They observe that the Government of Bombay have pointed out certain administrative difficulties in the way of the separation of Sind. They consider that these difficulties are real, but they do not believe them to be insuperable.

5. They note that no detailed examination of the financial consequences of separation has yet been made. On the figures available to them they are unable to say whether the separation of Sind is financially practicable. It appears that separation would involve an annual deficit in the budget of the provincial Government of Sind. If the Sukkur Irrigation Scheme is financially successful this deficit should in time disappear, but it is estimated that the scheme would not begin to increase the ordinary annual revenue of Sind until about 1946. Meanwhile, there might be no money available for the construction of fresh irrigation works nor of the roads and railways, which will be required when the Sukkur scheme bears fruit. Nor would it be possible to carry out any development of the nation-building services. The sub-Committee therefore consider that the creation of a new Province of Sind is on the whole desirable, but that before a decision is taken a committee should be constituted in India to examine the question of the separation of Sind in its financial aspect and, if the result of their investigation should be that separation is financially practicable, to make recommendations on the means by which the financial stability of a separated Sind could be ensured, and the financial adjustments which would be necessary and equitable upon such separation.

St. James's Palace,

14th January, 1931.

#### *Discussion.*

*Chairman:* I am sorry that we have not been able to circulate a draft report to the sub-Committee so far, but I think one will be ready in about a quarter of an hour. Until it comes perhaps we might continue talking about the financial position and any possible reservations that we might make on that point.

I ought to tell the sub-Committee that personally I am nervous about the financial position of a separated Sind. I am by no means

satisfied that it would be able to be self-supporting, and that there would not be quite a considerable deficit—half a crore at least, and probably more. The figure given is something like 90 lakhs, which is very nearly a crore. I am nervous about it, and I feel some difficulty myself in pronouncing a final decision on the separation here, or in suggesting a final decision on the separation, in the absence of better knowledge than we have got.

Lord Zetland is not as frightened as I am, and he is much more familiar with India, so that I am inclined to defer to his opinion; but I should like to hear what the sub-Committee says about that.

Personally, I feel a little inclined to accept the principle of separation, but to leave the final decision until some independent and impartial finance committee in India has reported on what the result of separation would be, because I am a little nervous that a separated Sind would be a deficit Province, which means, as I said yesterday, bad administration and a deficit which has got to be borne by somebody—I suppose by the Government of India.

*Dr. Shafa'at Ahmad Khan*: If you leave the principle of separation to be settled in India by a committee, then the whole question will have to be gone into over again in India.

*Chairman*: It was not my idea, to leave the principle of separation to be settled by some other committee; this further committee which is suggested would simply report on the financial results of separation, and, when it was seen what the financial results would be, the principle of separation would be settled, I suppose, by the Government of India and the Government of this country in the light of the decisions of that committee. I did not suggest that that committee should settle the principle of separation; that was not my idea.

*Mr. Mody*: My proposal was somewhat different.

*Dr. Shafa'at Ahmad Khan*: Yes.

*Sir P. Sethna*: As was also that of Lord Zetland.

*Mr. Mody*: I thought you agreed in the main with my suggestion, that we should pronounce an opinion in favour of separation provided that it was found, on examination by an independent committee, that adequate financial and administrative adjustments could be made and that Sind was capable of financing herself.

*Mr. Chintamani*: May I know what is involved by the acceptance. Sir, of what you call the principle of separation?

*Chairman*: I think that is a little difficult to say, but I cannot help feeling that if the Round Table Conference accepted the principle of separation it would probably be more difficult for anybody to go back on it afterwards, notwithstanding a small deficit.

*Mr. Chintamani*: Would it be like accepting the principle of Dominion Status for India, leaving everything for future consideration?

*Chairman*: I do not want to be dragged into that!

*Mr. Chintamani*: I do not want to drag you into anything, Sir, but I do want to know to what I am committing myself if I accept the principle of separation. I am entirely in accord with the principle that the wishes of the majority of the population must be carried into effect if it is at all practicable to do so. The wishes of the majority of the people, however, should not be merely in vague and abstract terms which may be incapable of application in practice; those wishes must be stated and must be ascertained when it is known that a certain proposition is feasible administratively, financially and in other ways. For instance, we can all raise our hands in support of the proposal that Sind be separated, leaving everything else to be determined in the future, in such a manner that what we have voted for may never be fulfilled; but that would be of no practical value. Once it is seen that Sind can be a self-supporting Province, then the acceptance of the principle and the direction that that principle be carried into practice are thoroughly intelligible; but if, without knowing whether that is a practicable proposition or not, we say we accept the principle of separation, and then it is found that without additional taxation which the people are not able or are not willing to pay it cannot be given effect to, I see no good in accepting the principle.

*Chairman*: Surely there is this virtue in it, is not there? It means we have been impressed, as I think all of us have, by the case for separation. That is my own feeling.

*Mr. Chintamani*: I will at once subscribe to a principle worded as you have just put it, namely, that we are impressed by the arguments in favour of separation. I am not in the least hostile to the principle or to the proposal; all I want is that we should not be parties to the creation of a Province which may not be able to maintain itself in an efficient condition; we should not incur that responsibility. Secondly, we should not be parties to a proposition which may not be acceptable to the people themselves. I have no doubt whatever that the people of Sind by a large majority want separation now, but I want that to be made clear after they know to what they are committing themselves by becoming an independent Province, and after they realise that an independent Provincial administration may cost them a great deal more. I am not speaking in a hostile spirit.

*Mr. Foot*: As you know, Lord Reading was a member of this sub-Committee on the understanding that I should take his place if he could not attend. He wishes me to express his regret that, owing to the pressure of other sub-Committees, he cannot attend. I have been in consultation with him, however, after each sitting of this sub-Committee, and I am in general agreement with the views expressed by Lord Zetland yesterday. Those are also the views of Lord Reading who, of course, speaks from his own knowledge of India. Before the sub-Committee sat I read what had been said on the subject by the several Commissions and other bodies which have dealt with it, and particularly what was said in Chapter 10 of the memorandum submitted by the Government of Bombay to

the Statutory Commission, which is the memorandum, I think, in which the particulars and facts are more fully set out.

Speaking academically, I think that the case for separation has been made out. Leaving out the financial considerations for a moment, I think the geographical separation—the very considerable difference from the rest of the Presidency—does justify the claim that has been made. I think, too, that the evidence we have before us shows that at present there would be an overwhelming majority of the Sind people in favour of separation.

*Mr. Chintamani:* At present, certainly.

*Mr. Foot:* Yes, at present; I quite agree with Mr. Chintamani that that may be all. That being so, I think that this sub-Committee would be entitled to come to the conclusion that they approve the demand that is made for the separation; the only question that arises, I think, is as to the financial terms, the possibility of Sind becoming a self-supporting Province, and also the point which has been raised by Mr. Chintamani as to whether or not there should be a further consultation of the opinion of the people when the financial terms have been more definitely ascertained. I should like Mr. Chintamani, if he would, to make clear what he requires on that. Does he suggest something like a plebiscite?

*Mr. Chintamani:* No, my suggestion is much more modest. I would ascertain the opinion of the people in the manner which is familiar to every Government in India, namely by taking the opinion of the elected members from Sind in the Bombay Legislative Council and the opinion of the district boards and other local bodies in Sind, the Landholders' Association, the Muslim League, the Hindu bodies, the Chambers of Commerce and so on; that is all.

*Mr. Foot:* I think, Lord Russell, that there is substance in Mr. Chintamani's argument on that point, if I may say so with all respect. It may be that in general terms the people of Sind strongly approve separation at the present time by a substantial majority, but it is possible that when the financial facts have been definitely ascertained that opinion may change, and the people may say "There has been put before us a prospect of such financial burdens that we would rather bear the ills we have than fly to others that we know not of."

*Mr. Chintamani:* That is a possibility.

*Mr. Foot:* I should imagine that if the special committee or commission that will go into the question of the separation of Sind gives detailed and impartial consideration to all these financial facts, it would itself suggest such a safeguard; it would itself suggest that after the facts have been ascertained by an impartial tribunal—I think that is what Lord Zetland himself suggested—there should be some means then secured for ascertaining what the opinion of the people of Sind is in the light of the new facts.

I think Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto, who spoke yesterday, and Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah would themselves agree that the



criticism they made of the Government of Bombay's figures is a criticism that we are not able to accept, because obviously that should be a matter of close examination and cross-examination of the several witnesses that are brought forward.

On those general lines, Lord Russell, I would express my agreement with what I believe to be the opinion of the majority of the members of this sub-Committee. I think that those safeguards—I do not like the word “safeguards,” we have heard it, perhaps, too frequently in the last two or three weeks; I will say those provisos—should be made, for we do not want to create in India a semi-bankrupt Province that will be a source of weakness to the whole community. With that proviso I could support the general proposal.

*Chairman:* It seems to me we are all in general agreement. I want to make my own feeling perfectly clear. My view is much the same as that of Mr. Chitamani and does not differ much from that of Lord Zetland. I should like to be able to find, quite simply, that it is desirable that Sind should be separated. That is what I should prefer to be able to do, but I cannot help being a little frightened by the figures which have been produced. I cannot help feeling that if the new Province would have a heavy deficit I should be taking rather a rash responsibility in the interests of good government if I made that recommendation, and that I want, in some way or other, to safeguard the situation. I think we are all agreed on that; the only question is as to the best way of safeguarding the situation with regard to a possible or probable deficit afterwards. Is not that all we want to do?

*Mr. Foot:* I think so, yes.

*Mr. Chintamani:* If I may make a respectful suggestion, it should not be very difficult for us to put our thoughts in this form: that we are impressed by the case for separation on general grounds, but that we can recommend separation only when it is made clear that Sind can be financially a self-contained Province and that the people will be willing to bear such additional burdens as the creation of a separate Province may entail on them. We have no material before us to enable us to pronounce on that question, and therefore we recommend the constitution of a committee to report on the financial position, and then, when the Government make sure that the people will have separation on those terms, they should act accordingly. They should treat the question of the separation of Sind not as an abstract proposition for the future but as a matter of immediate importance, and they should make no unavoidable delay in setting up this committee and taking the further consequential steps.

*Sir Abdul Qaiyum:* May I ask one question to remove my doubts? I should like to ask Mr. Chintamani this. You know that this question of a deficit is before the people of Sind, both Hindus and Mussalmans, and in spite of that they have been sending telegrams and howling for separation. Do you think that, even if a deficit is proved, the sentimental aspect of the case, the geographical

aspect and the other conveniences that will follow from the separation of Sind will be subordinated to that deficit?

*Mr. Chintamani*: I cannot say.

*Sir Abdul Qaiyum*: You see, this question of a deficit has been before the people of Sind for years and years now.

*Mr. Chintamani*: But they deny that there will be a deficit.

*Sir Abdul Qaiyum*: What I want to know is this. Do you think that if this deficit of Rs. 60,000 which is now put before us—

*Sardar Sampuran Singh*: 60 lakhs.

*Sir Abdul Qaiyum*: Do you think that if this deficit of 60 lakhs that is now put before us is proved, that will subdue the sentiment of the people of Sind in favour of separation? Has it not been before those people who are crying for separation, and who want separation on other and more important considerations?

*Mr. Chintamani*: Have I your permission, Sir, to give a brief reply to that?

*Chairman*: Yes, certainly.

*Sir M. Shafi*: When Mr. Chintamani is replying to my friend's question, may I also invite his attention to this fact, so that when replying he can have it in mind. The formula suggested by Mr. Jinnah in the proposal he put forward yesterday contemplated in clear language that after separation Sind would bear its administrative expenses itself.

*Sir P. Sethna*: And if it cannot, Sir Muhammad, you do not want separation?

*Sir M. Shafi*: Why should it be assumed it cannot?

*Sir P. Sethna*: I am sorry you were not here yesterday or during the earlier part of our meeting this morning. That is what we are considering: supposing it cannot, what then?

*Sir M. Shafi*: Sind must cut its coat according to its cloth. I am not prepared to assume it cannot. If it cannot by reducing expenditure or by additional taxation balance the budget—well, I cannot, with the experience I have had of preparing budgets, really assume such a possibility. I think Sind ought to be able to meet its expenses.

*Sir P. Sethna*: That is not an answer to the question.

*Mr. Chintamani*: My reply to Sir Abdul is this. If he will pardon me for saying so, in the whole of the discussions during the last half dozen years on the question of the separation of Sind, the one aspect which has been brought forward by the advocates of separation as well as by the opponents of separation has been the communal aspect. I am very glad that that aspect has been very much in the background in the discussions in this Committee. It is not the financial and economic aspects of the problem that have been before the public. I think this statement of mine must be admitted as a mere matter of fact. There are many cases where

many people wish to have many things, but their enthusiasm is cooled when they know what the cost is of obtaining those things. I do not say that the enthusiasm of the people of Sind will cool down; I do not say that in the least; but we must give them a chance of knowing exactly where they will stand when they are a separate Province if Sind is made a separate Province. Instead of committing ourselves or other irrevocably to a proposition the full consequences of which are not at present clearly before us, we should recommend the appointment of a Committee. I think that is a merely prudent and business-like attitude. It is not that I am in the least hostile to the separation of Sind. I am prepared to accede to the proposition on ground of geography and on administrative grounds that Sind, as an outlying part of the Bombay Presidency, is at a considerable disadvantage, and should have an opportunity of shaping her own destiny. All that we, as a sub-Committee should do is this. We should make a recommendation which will enable the people of Sind to know what will be the cost of this separate existence, and then if they say, "We are ready to bear the cost," then there is no reason why they should not become a separate Province.

*Chairman* : I was going to say the same thing in different words. I was going to point out that you cannot run a Province on sentiment and my cold, practical British mind is trying to find how this Province will be run afterwards if it is separated.

*Lord Zetland* : Might I intervene there? Would not the suggestion I made meet most of these points? My suggestion was that the Expert Committee which it is proposed should be set up should be strictly limited in its terms of reference to ascertain the financial position as it would be if a new Province was created. If, as a result of the investigations of that Committee, it was shown that Sind would not be a deficit Province, so much the better: then the creation of the new Province could go ahead without further consideration. But, on the other hand, if the investigations of the Expert Committee showed that Sind would be a deficit Province, my suggestion was then that the representatives of Sind—shall we say the representatives of Sind in the Bombay Legislative Council—should be asked how they propose that the deficit should be met if the separate Province was created. Now, that would give everybody in Sind an opportunity of understanding exactly what the position would be. The representatives of Sind would then have to put forward perfectly definite proposals for meeting the deficit, and they would have to show that those proposals were practicable.

*Mr. Foot* : And acceptable to their people.

*Lord Zetland* : And, if you like, acceptable to the people of Sind. If they were not in a position to do that, then clearly the formation of a new Province would not be practicable. But I assume, from what has been said by the members of the sub-Committee on this side of the table that they have no apprehensions of that kind. In the first place, they think that Sind would not be shown to be a deficit Province. In the second place, they think

that even if it was shown to be a small deficit Province they would have no difficulty in putting forward proposals which would satisfactorily meet the deficit.

*Sir S. N. Bhutto*: For argument's sake, Sir, even if it is conceded that our Province is a deficit Province, why are we expected to have a luxurious administration such as Bombay is maintaining.

*Mr. Foot*: You mean that you would not be a deficit Province.

*Sir S. N. Bhutto*: Therefore that is the only thing that we can consent to—the investigation of finance. No other obstacle should be put in our way, because we have suffered enough and we cannot afford to suffer any more.

*Mr. Foot*: I think we are agreed upon that.

*Lord Zetland*: Do you agree to the proposal which I put forward?

*Sir Muhammad Shafi*: If some formula could be devised which would embody a recommendation of this sub-Committee in favour of the separation of Sind, with a proviso that a Committee should be appointed to consider the financial aspect of the matter, then on the receipt of a Report from that Committee, if upon investigation it is found that Sind is not a deficit Province or can be made self-supporting by the adoption of certain means, separation shall be given effect to, I think that would be all right.

*Sir S. N. Bhutto*: That is the same as what the Noble Lord has suggested.

*Chairman*: There is another thing. When the deficit is ascertained, supposing Sind is found to be a deficit Province by the finance committee, if it is not a large deficit, it might be that the Government of India would think it worth while to bear that deficit for a number of years in order to enable the separation of Sind to be proceeded with.

*Sir S. N. Bhutto*: Why shouldn't they, when they would get 3 crores out of the Province without giving anything in return?

*Chairman*: That, at the proper time, you will fight out with the Government of India.

*Sir S. N. Bhutto*: Then why have we come here? Why not have stayed in India and fought out everything with the Government of India?

*Mr. Foot*: How can we decide that, Sir?

*Sir Abdul Quyum*: We are simply shifting the burden of certain decisions to others and delaying the matter. That is my humble opinion. Otherwise the expenses can be cut down, further taxation can be imposed, adjustment can be arrived at. Put that condition that the adjustment must be made.

*Sir S. N. Bhutto*: We do not want any financial help.

*Sir Muhammad Shafi*: There is a great deal in what Sir S. N. Bhutto has said about the expensive character of the administration as it is carried on at present. The average which he has pointed

out per head in Bombay and Madras clearly shows that this supposed deficit of 60 lakhs, even if it does exist, is capable of easy adjustment by reduction of expenditure, and, if necessary, by imposing additional taxation to the tune of 10 or 15 lakhs in order to make up the budget. Therefore I venture to submit that, bearing in mind the *a priori* grounds, which I submit are absolutely irrefutable, in favour of the separation of Sind, the sub-Committee ought to pronounce its judgment in favour of separation and direct that a Committee be appointed to make the necessary financial adjustments.

*Chairman* : May I bring the thing nearer to a head by reading the draft Report which you will all have before you in a minute or two when the copies arrive, and then we can discuss it on those lines and see whether it meets the point. The fourth paragraph deals with a different matter, but I think I ought to read it :

“ They observe that the Government of Bombay have pointed out certain administrative difficulties in the way of the separation of Sind. They consider that these difficulties are real but they do not believe them to be insuperable.” That disposes of the administrative point. Then this is paragraph 5 :

“ They note that no detailed examination of the financial consequences of separation has yet been made. On the figures available to them they are unable to say whether the separation of Sind is financially practicable. It appears that separation would involve an annual deficit in the budget of the provincial Government of Sind. If the Sukkur Irrigation Scheme is financially successful this deficit should in time disappear, but it is estimated that the scheme would not begin to increase the ordinary annual revenue of Sind until about 1946. Meanwhile there might be no money available for the construction of fresh irrigation works nor of the roads and railways which will be required when the Sukkur Scheme bears fruit. Nor would it be possible to carry out any development of the nation-building services. The sub-Committee therefore consider that the creation of a new Province of Sind is on the whole desirable but that, before a decision is taken, a Committee should be constituted in India to examine the question of the separation of Sind in its financial aspect and, if the result of their investigation should be that separation is financially practicable, to make recommendations on the means by which the financial stability of a separated Sind could be ensured, and the financial adjustments which would be necessary and equitable upon such separation.”

*Sir S. N. Bhutto* : We are not convinced of all these difficulties.

*Sir Abdul Qayyum* : I do not believe that the difficulties are real, other than the financial difficulties.

*Sir Muhammad Shafi* : And there are no administrative difficulties at all, really.

*Dr. Moonje* : Without considering from the general point of view whether Sind should or should not be separated, I take strong objection to the manner in which the question has been brought up

before the public and also before this sub-Committee. We have already had separate electorates in our country, and that system has created a division between Muslims and non-Muslims in India. I do not like to give my support to a principle which will divide India into a Muslim and non-Muslim India. Therefore, on the larger question, on the question of principle, I am opposed. I am, however, not opposed to, or rather I would welcome, the idea of a reorganisation of Provinces from the administrative point of view, and if in that scheme of a reorganisation of Provinces Sind is found to be a good proposition for separation it should be considered. In the scheme of reorganisation it may be found that perhaps it should be joined on the Punjab. That also is a problem to be considered. Therefore on the principle I am opposed to the manner in which the question is being brought before this sub-Committee.

There are two points on which I should like to say something. Mr. Jinnah has said, and the question has been very much emphasised, that even if Sind is a deficit Province the Government of India should provide the money for creating Sind into a separate Province. I cannot subscribe to that principle, that for the mere luxury of a separate Province—

*Mr. Jinnah :* Sir, I did not say that.

*Chairman :* Mr. Jinnah did not say that. He said that in spite of that the sub-Committee ought to conclude that it should be separated.

*Mr. Jinnah :* Yes, and that the Bombay Presidency should be relieved from its perpetual white elephant.

*Mr. Moonje :* If I have not understood Mr. Jinnah, then of course it is a different thing. If he says that the deficit is found the Government of India should come to its help, then my objection stands.

Then his second point is that it is for the good of the people. That is exactly what I want to know. Therefore I support the point of Mr. Chintamani, that really an enquiry should be made as to whether it is for the good of the people that Sind should be separated and that whether the people really desire the separation of Sind. As for the increase of taxation, the increase of burden, I do not think it would be right to decide upon the meeting of the deficit by increase of taxation without first ascertaining the real wishes of the people of the place. Now, much prominence has been given to the question of race, to the question of language, to the question of ethnological differences in arguing for the separation of Sind.

*Chairman :* And geography.

*Dr. Moonje :* And geography in arguing for the separation of Sind. If the same considerations are applied to the Bombay Presidency, let us see how it stands. Linguistically its people speak Gujarati—an entirely different language—Maharatti—an entirely different language—Karnatak—an entirely different language. A

part of them are an entirely different people linguistically and racially. I am only taking it for the sake of argument, because I believe that we are all racially one people really; but that is an entirely different thing. I will take it for granted, for argument's sake, that we are racially different. Then the Bombay Presidency is composed of one race, the Gujerati, a second race the Mahratta, a third race Karnatak, and a fourth race of the Mangalore district which is entirely different from the Belgaum Karnatak people; and if that principle is going to prevail, then perhaps the Bombay Presidency is to be broken up into three or four provinces. Therefore I do not think that that principle could be taken as a safe ground for deciding upon the separation of Sind.

The best course, in the circumstances, would be that a Boundary Commission may be appointed, and that the Boundaries Commission may go into the question of Sind, and according to its recommendations the action would be taken. I am therefore opposed to the manner in which this question has been brought before the sub-Committee, and the principle of separation which will divide India into a Mussalman India and a non-Mussalman India, and which may act as a vicious principle leaving other people to make demands in the same way. Perhaps a time may come when Eastern Bengal, having a larger population of one community, may be separated from Western Bengal because that has a majority of another community. It may lead the Sikhs to say in the Central portion of the Punjab that, because they are in a majority, therefore the Central portion of the Punjab should be separated, and made a single Province. This is a principle which is a vicious principle, just as the system of separate electorates is a vicious system, and I think, as we are now experiencing the vicious evil effects of separate electorates through having promised them, let us not commit the same mistake over again and introduce another principle which, instead of uniting India into a whole, will be a fruitful source of disintegrating India into small groups unable to stand with each other. There is also another point, Sir, that whatever scheme about the separation of Sind may be decided upon it is very necessary that the wishes of the people should be consulted first. The creation of any new Province primarily or solely with a view to increasing the number of Provinces in which a particular community happens to be in a majority is fraught with danger to the growth of sound patriotism in the country, and will contribute to the growth of a sentiment favourable to the division of India into a lot of separate groups. I am therefore opposed in principle to the manner in which this question has been brought before the sub-Committee, although I am quite willing to consider the larger question of the redistribution of Provinces in India.

*Mr. Mody:* I do not propose to follow Dr. Moonje into the contentious points he has raised. I am not criticising Dr. Moonje or the point of view that he has placed before us, but I think we have had enough of this communal business and I think it ought not to be allowed to obtrude itself before every aspect of the deliberations

of the Conference. I should like to confine myself to the draft that you have just placed before us.

I am not in agreement with the draft for the reason that it goes much beyond the proposition which I placed before the sub-Committee yesterday. My proposition was this—that this sub-Committee, basing its recommendations on the assumption that there is an overwhelming demand for separation on the part of the people of Sind, should pronounce itself in favour of the principle of separation, but that, as we have not got sufficient facts and figures before us, this sub-Committee recommends that an enquiry be set up in India immediately with a view to ascertaining the financial capacity of Sind and with a view also of finding out whether any political adjustments can be made between Sind and the Bombay Presidency proper. If the findings of the Committee are that Sind is capable of financing herself, as our Muhammadan friends who have asked for the separation of Sind have tried to make out, then the separation automatically comes into effect.

What you have placed before us is in the nature of a series of objections, and I think they are capable of damning the principle of separation if put in that form. I therefore am not able to subscribe to the draft which you have placed before us. Let us not talk of the difficulties; let us not quote them in the way in which the draft has quoted them; because if all these things go out, then naturally the principle of separation becomes absolutely impossible.

I therefore would again repeat the proposition which I placed before you yesterday, and which, with a little amendment, was supported by Lord Zetland: that is that, on general grounds, assuming that there is an overwhelming demand for the separation of Sind, we should support the principle of separation, but that a Committee should be set up to examine the financial aspect of the question, the Committee to have no power to look into the principle of separation but to confine itself to finding out how the financial liability would be met.

*Chairman*: Now that we have the Report before us, I think we had better take it paragraph by paragraph. But before doing that, I would like to read two suggestions here. One is a draft of my own; one is Mr. Chintamani's draft, and we can consider them when we come to that part in the Report, but I might read them now.

This is what I drafted this morning: "The sub-Committee are so impressed by the strength of the arguments in favour of separation that they have come to the conclusion that the principle of separation should be accepted. Some members are, however, doubtful as to the financial stability of Sind as a separate Province; the sub-Committee therefore recommend that an impartial Committee in India should examine carefully the probable revenues and expenditure of a separated Sind, including the debt on the Sukkur Barrage, and should also make an equitable adjustment of the financial commitments for which Sind may properly be considered liable." Those last words I take from you, Mr. Jinnah. "If the report of



the Financial Committee shows that a separation would impose a financial burden upon Sind, the decision for separation should be liable to reconsideration."

This is Mr Chintamani's: "The sub-Committee have been impressed with the arguments in favour of the separation of Sind from the Presidency of Bombay, and would recommend on general grounds that it is advisable to make Sind a separate Governor's Province. They deem it necessary further to recommend that a competent enquiry into the financial aspect of this matter should be held, such enquiry to be instituted without any loss of time, and the result of the enquiry published for general information. If the Government of India are then satisfied that the people of Sind want separation, it should be carried into effect, subject to an equitable adjustment of the financial claims of Bombay, and the provision of suitable safeguards for legitimate minority interests."

It is obvious we are all aiming at the same thing; it is a question of how to get there. Now may we have the Report paragraph by paragraph. Paragraph 1 is of course formal.

*Mr Chintamani*: If you do not mind, before you do so I should like to say a word, in order that the opinion of Dr Moonje on the various questions which he has raised in his speech should not be deemed to be the opinion of the Hindus generally on this question. I do not want the question of Sind to be thrown into the melting-pot by being considered with the case of all other Provinces, or other claims for separate Provinces. The case of Sind does deserve special consideration and also urgent consideration.

Never mind what has been said outside the Conference. I am particularly sorry that while the advocates of the separation of Sind have taken the most scrupulous care in presenting their case before this sub-Committee on general grounds and not in the least on communal grounds, the communal aspect should have been brought to the fore by Dr Moonje. If the advocates of separation had done that here, then it would have been the duty of Dr Moonje to have replied to that. But he it said to their credit that they have not done so. I have heard every one of their speeches during the last two days, and I must say, as I have already said, gladly and gratefully, that they have not uttered one single word of a communal character in the presentation of their case. So that I wish that my friends over there should not be under the impression that, whatever doubts and difficulties we may have in going with them the full length with regard to immediate separation, those doubts and difficulties are based upon communal grounds. They are not based upon communal grounds; they are based upon non-communal grounds. Our views are represented by Mr Modv and by the draft I have submitted to you.

*Sir Muhammad Shafi*: We gratefully acknowledge the fact that the proposal put forward by Mr Chintamani is a proposal based not on any communal grounds but on grounds which appear to him to be substantial. As regards his proposal, we shall discuss that later on.

*Dr. Moonje*: May I say a word, Sir?

*Chairman*: No, Dr. Moonje. Must you?

*Dr. Moonje*: Only one word. I do not say that I represent the entire Hindu feeling; I do not say that; I have never claimed it; but India knows which opinion will be accepted, and the Hindus of India will know which opinion will be accepted. That is all; I have nothing more to say.

*Chairman*: Now may we take the Report? I take it that paragraph 1 is formal and is agreed to. Paragraph 2 really deals with what I think Dr. Moonje was partly raising: "The sub-Committee did not enter in their discussions into the wider question of the redistribution of the Provinces in India."

*Mr. Chintamani*: Is that necessary? The terms of reference preclude such consideration.

*Mr. Mody*: Why should it be said at all?

*Mr. Chintamani*: If we had attempted to do so, you would have ruled us out of order.

*Chairman*: I do not know that it is necessary to say it; it is merely a statement of fact.

*Sir Muhammad Shafi*: Why should we say this at all?

*Lord Zetland*: I think we ought to leave it out.

*Chairman*: Very well, we will leave it out; I do not know that there is any point in it.

*Lord Zetland*: It is outside the terms of reference.

*Sir Muhammad Shafi*: It is outside the terms of reference.

*Chairman*: "3. They consider that the racial, religious, and linguistic differences between the majority of the inhabitants of Sind and the majority of the inhabitants of the Presidency of Bombay proper, the geographical isolation of Sind from Bombay, the difficulties of communication between the two and the insistency with which separation has been advocated, provide an impressive case for the division of Sind from the Bombay Presidency and the creation of a separate Provincial Government there."

*Sir S. N. Bhutto*: Why "majority," Sir?

*Chairman*: What do you want to say instead?

*Sir Muhammad Shafi*: What my friend means is this. The words are "differences" between the majority of the inhabitants of Sind and the majority of the inhabitants of the Presidency of Bombay proper." He suggests that the word "majority" should be struck out there.

*Dr. Shafa'at Ahmad Khan*: It is redundant.

*Sir Muhammad Shafi*: It is not a case of majority; the two people are quite different.

*Sir S. N. Bhutto*: Quite different.

*Mr. Chintamani*: I have to move an amendment that covers that.

*Chairman* : Of course, there may be some dissentients in either case.

*Sir Muhammad Shafi* : There is no question of dissentients.

*Mr. Chintamani* : I move that all this be deleted, namely " racial, religious, and linguistic differences between the majority of the inhabitants of Sind and the majority of the inhabitants of the Presidency of Bombay proper." Differences exist inside the Bombay Presidency excluding Sind; they are found in every single Province. I doubt if there is any single Province in which there is only one language, only one religion, and only one race. It is not special to the case of Bombay and Sind, and therefore there is no reason why emphasis should be given to it as is done here. The omission of this does not detract from the merits of the case for separation such as they may be.

*Chairman* : I thought we were told in the first speech that was made here by Sir G. H. Hidayatullah that the difference in their races and their customs did make a difference in the sort of administration they desired.

*Mr. Chintamani* : But even if Sind were excluded, there would be similar differences within the Presidency of Bombay proper; for instance, there are Kanarese, and so on.

*Sir Muhammad Shafi* : I think the word " differences " there is out of place and should be struck out.

*Mr. Jinnah* : Would you accept this: They consider that the people of Sind are different from the people of Bombay proper linguistically, geographically and ethnologically.

*Lord Zetland* : I do not think that quite meets it. What do you mean when you say a people are different geographically?

*Mr. Jinnah* : Geographically there is no connection.

*Lord Zetland* : The whole point is geographical isolation.

*Mr. Chintamani* : Are the Mussalmans of Sind racially or ethnologically different from the Mussalmans of the Bombay Presidency?

*Sir Muhammad Shafi* : Yes, they are quite different.

*Sir S. N. Bhutto* : Yes. In Bombay almost all are converts.

*Lord Zetland* : Would not the sub-Committee agree to this: They consider that the racial and linguistic differences between the inhabitants of Sind and of the Presidency of Bombay proper—

*Chairman* : Yes.

*Dr. Shafa'at Ahmad Khan* : Yes, that is quite all right.

*Sir Muhammad Shafi* : Yes, that is right.

*Chairman* : They consider that the racial and linguistic differences between the inhabitants of Sind and of the Presidency of Bombay proper—. Yes, that will shorten it.

*Mr. Jinnah* : And then you can say: and the geographical isolation of Sind from Bombay.

*Chairman*: "And the geographical isolation of Sind from Bombay, the difficulties of communication between the two and the insistency with which separation has been advocated provide an impressive case for the division of Sind from the Bombay Presidency and the creation of a separate Provincial Government there."

*Sir Muhammad Shafi*: I am satisfied.

*Chairman*: Does that satisfy the sub-Committee now?

*Mr. Chintamani*: Sir, in paragraph 3, page 2, line 2: "the insistency with which separation has been advocated." I suggest the addition of the words "by a majority of the people."

*Chairman*: But you have just taken out "majority" in the first place.

*Sir Muhammad Shafi*: No, that is with regard to racial differences. Mr. Chintamani's point is with regard to the insistency with which separation has been advocated.

*Mr. Chintamani*: That would be strictly correct and would not detract from the merits of the case.

*Chairman*: Well, if you think it necessary. Do you think it necessary?

*Lord Zetland*: Do you agree with that, Sir Muhammad Shafi?

*Mr. Jinnah*: I should say we leave it there, because as it stands it cannot be taken to mean that it is unanimous.

*Mr. Chintamani*: I think what I have proposed would be a far more correct statement of the position.

*Mr. Jinnah*: The words are "and the insistency with which separation has been advocated." That means there is a very strong insistence; that is all.

*Mr. Chintamani*: "The insistency with which separation has been advocated" is capable of the interpretation that it has been advocated by all; that there is no difference of opinion at all.

*Sir S. N. Bhutto*: If you say: by the Mussalmans, the moderate Hindus, Parsees and Europeans.

*Mr. Chintamani*: I am not bringing in either the word "Hindu" or the word "Muhammadan." I agree that the case for separation has been pressed with insistence; I entirely agree with that.

*Mr. Jinnah*: Then leave it there.

*Mr. Chintamani*: But that means the whole of them; I suggest: "the insistency with which separation has been advocated by a majority of the people."

*Mr. Jinnah*: Can this be understood to mean the entire body of the people?

*Sir S. N. Bhutto*: We have 95 per cent. with us.

*Mr. Chintamani*: I do not press it.

*Chairman*: Yes; I think it is really not worth while.

*Sir Muhammad Shafi*: Leave it as it is.

*Mr. Chintamani*: Yes.

*Chairman*: May I take it paragraph 3 is agreed?

*Lord Zetland*: Yes, as amended.

*Chairman*: "4. They observe that the Government of Bombay have pointed out certain administrative difficulties in the way of the separation of Sind. They consider that these difficulties are real, but they do not believe them to be insuperable."

*Sir Muhammad Shafi*: We do not agree with this. Really it was pointed out that in fact the administrative difficulties, such as they are, lead to the conclusion that Sind ought to be separated.

*Sardar Sampuran Singh*: It is only a statement of fact.

*Sir S. N. Bhutto*: Yes, that you may say.

*Sardar Sampuran Singh*: We do not say we consider it to be so.

*Chairman*: Yes, we do say that.

*Lord Zetland*: Yes.

*Mr. Jinnah*: Simply say: "They observe that the Government of Bombay have pointed out certain administrative difficulties in the way of the separation of Sind, but they do not believe them to be insuperable." We do not say that the difficulties are real.

*H.H. The Aga Khan*: They are not negligible.

*Mr. Jinnah*: But they are not insuperable.

*Sir S. N. Bhutto*: I do not think the Government of Bombay will be able to show more than one per cent. cases where their heads in the Presidency have differed from the opinion given by the heads in Sind; they only confirm it.

*Mr. Chintamani*: My opinion is that this paragraph should be deleted, because in every operation of this description there are bound to be some difficulties of a routine nature.

*Sir Muhammad Shafi*: Then drop the whole of it.

*Dr. Shafa'at Ahmad Khan*: Yes, drop the whole of it.

*Mr. Chintamani*: But mention should also be made of administrative advantages; undoubtedly it will be more advantageous to Sind to be mistress in her own household than to be attached to the Presidency of Bombay.

*Chairman*: I confess that for my own part in everything I have heard in this sub-Committee I have not been impressed by administrative difficulties in separation; I was rather impressed by the point of view that they might have less administrative difficulties.

*Mr. Chintamani*: I therefore move the deletion of this paragraph of the Report.

*Chairman*: I think we ought to mention it, as it is mentioned in the report of the Bombay Presidency, but we might change the words.

*Mr. Jinnah:* Very well. I suggest we should drop the words: "They consider that these difficulties are real," merely saying that "they do not believe them to be insuperable."

*Chairman:* "They observe that the Government of Bombay have pointed out certain administrative difficulties in the way of the separation of Sind, but they do not believe them to be insuperable." That is one sentence. Is that right?

*Mr. Jinnah:* Yes.

*Mr. Chintamani:* Well, if it satisfied them; but it does not satisfy me.

*Chairman:* "5. They note that no detailed examination of the financial consequences of separation has yet been made. On the figures available to them they are unable to say whether the separation of Sind is financially practicable." You have this before you, and you have various other suggestions. I understood a general objection was taken to raising these details of objection: the Sukkur Irrigation scheme, the money for fresh works, and the development of nation-building services.

*Sir Muhammad Shafi:* That is quite unnecessary.

*Mr. Mody:* I would suggest you leave the first two sentences of paragraph 5. Then delete the others, and come to this: "The sub-Committee therefore consider that the creation of a new Province of Sind is on the whole desirable but that before a decision is taken, a Committee should be constituted," etc. We will alter the wording later on, but all these intermediate sentences should go. We should leave these statements of facts that no detailed examination of the financial consequences has been made, and that on the figures available this sub-Committee is unable to say whether separation is financially practicable.

*Mr. Chintamani:* That on the material available the sub-Committee is unable to say what the financial consequences of separation will be.

*Chairman:* Look at sentence No. 3, which begins "It appears —." Do not you think we should say that on the figures presented to us it would appear that separation would involve an annual deficit?

*Mr. Mody:* I would not like to say that, because that statement has been challenged, and we do not want to enter into any controversial aspect of it. We do not want even to suggest anything which would go to the question of separation. Leave it as a statement of facts.

*Sir Muhammad Shafi:* "They note that no detailed examination of the financial consequences of separation has yet been made." Stop there; strike out the following words down to "nation-building services."

*Mr. Foot:* Mr. Mody suggests the next paragraph: "On the figures available to them—."

*Mr. Mody*: That is also a statement of facts and it ought to stay. That does not prejudice you at all.

*Chairman*: That I think is a very material statement, that we are unable to say that. That affects my mind very much.

*Mr. Mody*: If we were able to say that, we would say yes at once. Therefore it is only a statement of facts and I do not think it prejudices anybody. The second sentence should also stay.

*Mr. Jinnah*: I do not follow; I thought you suggested that only two sentences should stand?

*Mr. Mody*: Yes, the first two.

*Mr. Jinnah*: "They note that no detailed examination of the financial consequences of separation has yet been made." That is a fact.

*Mr. Mody*: Yes.

*Mr. Jinnah*: After having noted that, what do you propose to say?

*Chairman*: "On the figures available to them they are unable to say whether the separation of Sind is financially practicable." I think we must say that, because that is what is at the back of our minds; otherwise we should advocate separation at once and have done with it.

*Mr. Chintamani*: Instead of "practicable" I would suggest the word "sound."

*Chairman*: "Practicable" is all right, I think.

*Sir P. Sethna*: "Sound" is suggested.

*Chairman*: We say we cannot come to a decision on that point. That is the real excuse for setting up a financial committee.

*Mr. Jinnah*: That is true, Sir, but again you are giving importance to those figures; you seem to indicate that you feel it is not practicable.

*Chairman*: No, I am not saying that; I am saying that on the figures available we cannot say whether it is or not.

*Mr. Jinnah*: There we do not agree.

*Mr. Foot*: Others take a different view.

*Mr. Mody*: I suggest you might put this in a more colourless form and say "On the figures available to them they are unable to pronounce a judgment on the financial question." That should meet Mr. Jinnah's objections.

*Dr. Shafa'at Ahmad Khan*: Yes, may we have that again?

*Mr. Mody*: "On the figures available to them they are unable to pronounce an opinion on the financial aspect of the question."

*Mr. Jinnah*: Quite right.

*Dr. Shafa'at Ahmad Khan*: That will do.

*Chairman*: That will satisfy me.

*H.H. The Aga Khan*: That is all we can say.

*Lord Zetland*: I suggest we say "are unable to express an opinion" instead of using the word "pronounce."

*Dr. Shafa'at Ahmad Khan*: Yes.

*Mr. Mody*: All right.

*Mr. Jinnah*: "On the figures available to them they are unable to express an opinion on the financial aspects of the question."

*Chairman*: Very well. Does the sub-Committee agree to that? (*Agreed.*)

Now we come to the really material part, namely, what form of words—we can settle the actual words afterwards—the sub-Committee feels inclined to adopt here. I read out mine and I have read out Mr. Chintamani's and we have also had Lord Zetland's.

*Mr. Jinnah*: I was not present when Lord Zetland's was read.

*Chairman*: I will read them out again. What Lord Zetland suggested yesterday was that after speaking of the setting up of a Committee, and so on, we should say: "If, on the other hand, investigation shows that separation would leave the new Province with a deficit, we think the representatives from Sind should be asked to show how the deficit would be met by the new Province." The words I suggested were: "The sub-Committee are so impressed by the strength of the arguments in favour of separation that they have come to the conclusion that the principle of separation should be accepted. A number of our members are very doubtful as to the financial stability of Sind as a separate Province. The sub-Committee therefore recommend that an impartial Committee should examine carefully the probable revenue and expenditure of a separated Sind and the security of the debt on the Sukkur Barrage, and should also make an equitable adjustment of the financial commitments for which Sind may properly be considered liable. If the report of the financial committee shows that separation would impose an undue burden upon Sind or the Government of India, the decision for separation should be liable to reconsideration."

Mr. Chintamani's words are these: "The sub-Committee have been impressed by the arguments in support of the separation of Sind from the Presidency of Bombay, and would recommend on general grounds that it is advisable to make Sind a separate Governor's Province; but they deem it necessary further to recommend that a competent inquiry into the financial aspects of this matter should be held. Such an inquiry should be instituted without any avoidable loss of time, and the results of the inquiry published for general information. If the Government of India are then satisfied that the people of Sind want separation it should be carried into effect, subject to an equitable adjustment of the financial claims of Bombay and the provision of suitable safeguards for legitimate minority interests."



*Mr. Mody:* My suggestion would be to confine ourselves to the draft which we have.

*Lord Zetland:* My proposal is only an addition to come at the end of paragraph 5.

*Mr. Mody:* My suggestion is that we first of all confine ourselves to the draft which is before us, and I would recommend that the next three sentences should be deleted—from “It appears” down to “nation-building services.” Those sentences should be deleted. Let us go on with the draft and see what alterations we can make.

*Mr. Jinnah:* We have come to that now.

*Mr. Mody:* No, we have not.

*Chairman:* The elimination of these sentences has not yet been agreed to. What does the sub-Committee feel about it?

*Mr. Jinnah:* I thought we had already got as far as paragraph 5. We had got as far as “services”; the intervening sentences were struck out.

*Chairman:* No, not yet. So far we have only got down to “aspects of the question.”

*Mr. Jinnah:* Let us finish that.

*Chairman:* The suggestion now is that the words from “it appears” down to “nation-building services” should be struck out.

*Mr. Mody:* That is my suggestion.

*Chairman:* I do not know what the sub-Committee feels about it.

*Lord Zetland:* I agree.

*Dr. Shafa'at Ahmad Khan:* I think so.

*Sardar Sampuran Singh:* Do not you think these two opinions do exist? There are two opinions. There is the opinion that it would be a deficit province and there is the opinion that it would not be a deficit province. If it were not for the fact that we thought it might be a deficit province there would be no question of establishing a committee of inquiry.

*Lord Zetland:* Yes, but we have just said we can express no opinion on the financial aspect of the question. It is rather illogical, having just said that, to go on and put forward a lot of sentences which specifically deal with the financial aspect of the question.

*Sir M. Shafi:* The sub-Committee is not in a position to express an opinion on this question, because two views have been expressed and there is not sufficient material before the sub-Committee to express a decision on them. If the sub-Committee goes on to add what follows here it is really inconsistent.

*Sardar Sampuran Singh:* No, because this starts off with the words “It appears.”

*Mr. Mody:* The point is we must not say anything which appears like prejudging the issue. The independent committee will

deal with this matter; let them come to any conclusion they like. Why should we say anything about the question being very difficult, or that we do not think it practicable? Leave it to the committee.

*Mr. Jinnah:* When you have this note, that no detailed examination of the consequences of separation—the financial consequences—has yet been made, and if then we say that on the figures available we are unable to express an opinion on the financial aspect of the question, then we should stop at that; let us express no opinion. It will be for the committee to be appointed to go into this.

*Sir M. Shafi:* Into the whole thing.

*Mr. Jinnah:* Yes.

*Chairman:* I rather agree; I think that is logically correct. These next sentences deal with subjects which will be referred to the financial committee for consideration.

*Dr. Shafa'at Ahmad Khan:* We are appointing the committee for this purpose.

*Chairman:* Do the sub-Committee agree to take these sentences out?

*Mr. Jinnah:* So far we agree.

*Chairman:* I want to be sure. Do the sub-Committee agree to take this out? (*Agreed.*)

*Mr. Jinnah:* Then we come to this: "The sub-Committee therefore consider that the creation of a new Province . . . ." and so on.

*Sir M. Shafi:* I suggest here the elimination of all these words—"The sub-Committee therefore consider that . . . a committee should be constituted."

*Mr. Jinnah:* One moment, please; we must get at the principle. Let us see what principle we are going to lay down; we must lay down some principle. That is why I was trying to apply my mind to Lord Zetland's draft, to which I had not the opportunity of listening.

*Chairman:* Would you like to see these other two also? (*Papers handed to Mr. Jinnah.*)

*Mr. Mody:* My feeling is that instead of considering new drafts we should see if a little alteration of this will not serve our purpose.

*Chairman:* Well, we will see.

*Sir H. Carr:* That is the right line to take: stick to this draft.

*Mr. Mody:* All you need to do is to make it more definite, if our friends do not think it is definite enough. If this draft can be improved and can be made acceptable, we need not consider fresh drafts.

*Mr. Jinnah:* The only part of your draft which seems to me unnecessary is the last part. Personally, and, of course, subject to what other members may say—I am speaking for myself just

now on the spur of the moment—my view is this. You say “The sub-Committee are so impressed by the strength of the arguments in favour of separation that they have come to the conclusion that the principle of separation should be accepted.” So far I see no objection.

*Chairman*: No, you would not, Mr. Jinnah, so far.

*Mr. Jinnah*: Then you say “A number of our members,”—I should prefer to say “Some of our members,” not “A number.”

*Chairman*: I did say “some” first of all; “A number” was somebody else’s correction.

*Mr. Jinnah*: I would prefer “some.” May I take the liberty of altering that?

*Chairman*: As far as I am concerned you may; that is what I put originally.

*Mr. Jinnah*: “Some members are very doubtful as to the financial stability of Sind as a separate Province.” That is quite correct.

*Lord Zetland*: Now we are in conflict with what we have just said—that we cannot express an opinion on the financial aspect of the question. May I suggest the draft in the Report, with some modification, is really the best.

*Chairman*: Perhaps we could take the draft in the Report, and work on that.

*Mr. Jinnah*: If you will allow me to say so, I would prefer the first part that has been read out from the draft instead of what you have here; “The sub-Committee therefore consider that the creation of a new Province of Sind is on the whole desirable.”

*Lord Zetland*: I would leave out the words “on the whole.”

*Dr. Shafa'at Ahmad Khan*: What is “on the whole” for?

*Sir M. Shafi*: I think paragraph 3, which we have already approved, is quite sufficient for that purpose, and there is no need to repeat the same thing in paragraph 4.

*Mr. Jinnah*: The other is merely a recital; this is the operative part.

*Chairman* Paragraph 3 only says that it is an impressive case.

*Mr. Jinnah*: Will you allow me to finish? When the drafts are placed before us at the last moment like this it is very difficult.

*Chairman*: I agree.

*Mr. Jinnah*: We must have the operative part in.

*Chairman*: Yes.

*Mr. Jinnah*: And that is what I am endeavouring to do. The operative part is paragraph 5. I agree with Lord Zetland; I do not mind if these words are dropped—“Some members are very doubtful as to the financial stability of Sind as a separate Province.” I quite agree they are superfluous, and I am willing that they

should be dropped, because we have already said we have not the materials before us. We say "The sub-Committee therefore recommend" and this is our recommendation; after having endorsed the principle we make a recommendation. We say "The sub-Committee therefore recommend"—instead of "an impartial committee" I would say "an expert committee"; committees are always impartial.

*Chairman*: Quite true.

*Mr. Jinnah*: We can assume we shall have an impartial committee. "An expert committee in India should examine carefully the probable revenue and expenditure of a separated Sind and the security of the debt on the Sukkur Barrage, and should also make an equitable adjustment of the financial commitments for which Sind may properly be considered liable." Up to that point I endorse it. Then you contemplate another stage, and it is this to which I object. "If the report of the financial committee shows that separation would impose an undue burden upon Sind or the Government of India, the decision for separation should be liable to reconsideration." Now, when the Government of India gets the report, and the report shows that it is impossible for Sind to bear the expenditure itself, and that it is impossible to induce anybody else to bear that expenditure except the poor Bombay Presidency, they may say "We cannot do anything"; but why do you contemplate that now. Do I make myself clear?

*Chairman*: Quite.

*Mr. Jinnah*: I say, therefore, that the last part is superfluous and unnecessary.

*Chairman*: Surely not? What is to happen if the committee reports that Sind cannot possibly be separated?

*Mr. Jinnah*: The Government will decide, on the basis of the report, what should be done.

*Chairman*: The last sentence shows that in spite of our approving the principle we still leave that open.

*Mr. Jinnah*: Suppose it is impossible; you do not contemplate an impossibility!

*Sardar Sampuran Singh*: It only makes the thing clear.

*Mr. Jinnah*: The decision, of course, will be the decision of the Government of India or of the British Government; the committee will only make a report.

*Mr. Chintamani*: What precisely is your proposal?

*Mr. Jinnah*: My proposal is this. I accept the Chairman's draft subject to these last words being left out.

*Mr. Chintamani*: What would you substitute for them?

*Mr. Modj*: Might I suggest, first of all, that the two sentences read out by Mr. Jinnah should in the first instance be accepted, and we should then take a decision on the contentious part

*Mr. Jinnah* : I agree. There are three sentences.

*Mr. Mody* : No, two; one has been deleted.

*Chairman* : "The sub-Committee are so impressed by the strength of the arguments in favour of separation that they have come to the conclusion that the principle of separation should be accepted." You want to take out my doubts about the financial stability?

*Mr. Mody* : Yes.

*Mr. Chintamani* : That sentence is not in this draft Report.

*Sr H. Carr* : It is in the Chairman's draft.

*Chairman* : It is in the draft I made this morning; it is not in the Report. "The sub-Committee therefore recommend that an expert committee in India should examine carefully the probable revenue and expenditure of a separated Sind and the security of the debt on the Sukkur Barrage, and should also make an equitable adjustment of the financial commitments for which Sind may properly be considered liable."

*Sir P. Sethna* : You want to stop there, Mr. Jinnah?

*Mr. Jinnah* : Yes.

*Chairman* : Mr. Mody suggests we should accept that first, and then consider what we should do afterwards

*Mr. Mody* : Yes.

*Chairman* : I think we had better take it as a whole. The reason for going on to the last sentence is clearly this. We have accepted the principle of separation; that is to say, we have said we think it desirable; and that may be held to conclude the matter no matter what this expert committee finds. I think we ought, in the same document, to point out that if the expert committee finds the thing is impracticable, the question must still be regarded as open. I think we should go as far as that.

*Lord Zetland* : Then I prefer my addition. If that does happen—if the investigation of an expert financial committee shows that there will be a certain deficit if a new Province is created—I prefer my suggestion.

*Mr. Jinnah* : I agree with that.

*Lord Zetland* : I think it is up to the representatives of the proposed new Province to show how they suggest the deficit should be met.

*H.H. The Aga Khan* : By taxing themselves.

*Mr. Jinnah* : I agree.

*Dr. Shafa'at Ahmad Khan* : May I suggest that we should say "expert finance committee" and not simply "expert committee."

*Sir P. Sethna* : Does not the word "expert" cover that?

*Sardar Sampuran Singh* : Both "impartial" and "expert" are implied.

*Mr. Jinnah:* The committee will be appointed for the purpose of considering the financial question; that is all.

*Dr. Shafa'at Ahmad Khan:* And therefore will confine itself to finance.

*Mr. Jinnah:* The draft says they will examine the question in its financial aspect.

*Lord Zetland:* I am inclined to think the original draft is the best—"The sub-Committee therefore consider that the creation of a new Province of Sind is desirable but that before a decision is taken——."

*Several Members:* No.

*Mr. Jinnah:* Let us stick to the other one.

*Lord Zetland:* We might leave out "before a decision is taken" and say "but that an expert financial committee should be constituted in India to examine the question of the separation of Sind in its financial aspect and, if the result of their investigation should be that separation is financially practicable, to make recommendations on the means by which the financial stability of a separated Sind could be ensured, and the financial adjustments which would be necessary and equitable upon such separation."

*Mr. Jinnah:* I agree with the Chairman's draft with the addition suggested by Lord Zetland. Your last sentence can go in this draft. Instead of those three sentences you might put that.

*Mr. Foot:* Mr. Jinnah's point is that comparing the Chairman's draft with the draft that has been submitted to the sub-Committee, the operative parts in the addendum are much more definite than in the original.

*Mr. Jinnah:* Quite; that is the point.

*Mr. Foot:* But he is still desirous that the proviso of Lord Zetland should be appended to that.

*Chairman:* What would this proviso be?

*Mr. Jinnah:* The top one.

*Chairman:* "If, on the other hand, investigation shows that separation would leave the new Province with a deficit, we think that the representatives of Sind should be asked to show how the deficit would be met by the new Province."

*Mr. Jinnah:* That is right. I agree.

*Mr. Foot:* Instead of "If, on the other hand," you will have to put, "If, however".

*Chairman:* No, "If, on the other hand" is all right.

*Lord Zetland:* Well, that was drafted to follow on the other.

*Chairman:* It will follow on in the same way.

*Lord Zetland:* It does not follow on yours.

*Chairman:* Oh, on mine, no, perhaps not; if you are adopting this, you mean. No, it would not follow on that.

*Mr. Foot:* Will you read the two paragraphs as in your amended draft, followed by Lord Zetland's and then we can see how it goes.

*Chairman:* Before I do that I would just point out that, of course, Lord Zetland's draft does say that the question will be left open, but it does not say so clearly: "the representatives of Sind should be asked to show how the deficit would be met." Well, if they do not show it, what then?

*Mr. Jinnah:* Then if they do not show it the Government will have to decide. It leaves it open.

*Chairman:* I agree, by implication; but I would rather not have had it by implication.

*Mr. Jinnah:* It leaves it open.

*H.H. The Aga Khan:* It necessarily means that. That is the plain English of it.

*Chairman:* Would the sub-Committee prefer to have Lord Zetland's sentence at the end?

*Mr. Foot:* Would you read them all together?

*Chairman:* I will read them all together if it is the desire of the sub-Committee: "The sub-Committee are so impressed by the strength of the arguments in favour of separation that they have come to the conclusion that the principle of separation should be accepted. The sub-Committee, therefore, recommend that an Expert Committee in India should examine carefully the probable revenue and expenditure of a separated Sind and the security of the debt on the Sukkur Barrage and should also make an equitable adjustment of the financial commitments for which Sind may properly be considered liable. If the investigation shows that separation would leave the new Province with a deficit, the sub-Committee think that the representatives of Sind should be asked to show the deficit would be met by the new Province"

*Mr. Jinnah:* That is right.

*Mr. Mody:* Would it not be better to say that the representatives of Sind shall make an investigation?

*Sir P. Sethna:* That decision will be taken by the Government. That is very vague.

*Sardar Sampuran Singh:* If there is no objection, why should there be any objection to making this clear.

*Mr. Jinnah:* I have no objection if you want to express it in that way. The ultimate decision must rest with the Government. Put it in that way if you like.

*Chairman:* Yes, if you would say, after "would be met," "the ultimate decision resting with the Government of India," that would meet me.

*Mr. Jinnah:* "The ultimate decision to rest with the Government"—whether it is the Government of India or whatever it may be; "the Government."

*Lord Zetland*: My original words, which somebody has altered, I think, would have met that point. I do not know who altered that. My original wording, at the end of my draft, was "should be asked to show how the deficit should be met before the new Province is set up."

*Chairman*: That will meet me entirely.

*Mr. Mody*: That is better.

*Sardar Sampuran Singh*: If you put such words here, then the final action by the Government of India will depend upon this Report.

*Sir Muhammad Shafi*: "Before the new Province is set up" includes everything.

*Sardar Sampuran Singh*: What I am afraid of is that in the enthusiasm words may be misconstrued afterwards, so I want to make it very clear from the beginning instead of there being a quarrel about words.

*Chairman*: But I do think that this addition of Lord Zetland's really does make it perfectly clear. I am quite prepared to accept that.

*Mr. Chintamani*: I would prefer also that that sentence should be put in. I prefer Mr. Jinnah's form.

*Mr. Jinnah*: "Before the Government sets up the new Province."

*Chairman*: Surely Mr. Jinnah's words cover the thing exactly. It means that the new Province will not be set up unless these difficulties are removed. That is all I ask. That is surely all that any of us can ask, is it not?

*Mr. Chintamani*: To come back to the beginning of the statement, I must say that I prefer the language of this typed draft to the new draft which you are substituting for it.

*Chairman*: Well, naturally, so do I, because I drew it; but I am quite prepared to accept Mr. Jinnah's as meeting my point. Won't you do that, too, Mr. Chintamani? Shall I read them all again once more just to see that we have got it clear? "The sub-Committee are so impressed by the strength of the arguments in favour of separation that they have come to the conclusion that the principle of separation should be accepted. The sub-Committee, therefore, recommend that an Expert Committee in India should examine carefully the probable revenue and expenditure of a separated Sind and the security of the debt on the Sukkur Barrage and should also make an equitable adjustment of the financial commitments for which Sind may properly be considered liable. If the investigation shows that separation would leave the new Province with a deficit, the sub-Committee think that the representatives from Sind should be asked to show how the deficit would be met before the new Province is set up."



*Mr. Chintamani:* If this new draft is to prevail, instead of saying "The sub-Committee are so impressed that they recommend," I would say that "the sub-Committee are impressed and they recommend."

*Chairman:* We have passed those words already.

*Mr. Chintamani:* In view of the important financial reservation, I think that the first draft more correctly represents the position; but as the latter draft is preferred I would ask you to substitute the words that I have mentioned.

*Mr. Jinnah:* I am quite willing that the word "so" should go out.

*Mr. Chintamani:* "And they recommend."

*Sardar Sampuran Singh:* There is one big omission in this. We say that we are impressed, we say that an enquiry committee should be established, and we say that the representatives of Sind should be asked how they will make up the deficit, and no separate Province, before that is done, will be created—no separate Province of Sind—but we never say, we never even give an inkling, that there is another alternative also, that if there is no explanation, and if it is a deficit province, if that is the result of the enquiry committee, there will be another thing also—that we also desire that there should not be a separate Province.

*Dr. Shafa'at Ahmad Khan:* It is all implied.

*Sardar Sampuran Singh:* It is there by implication, but the whole burden of this draft is that anyhow it must be separated and some way must be found out of it for making it a separate Province.

*Sir Abdul Qaiyum:* And then, on the other hand, if you leave it to the Committee, then you do not decide on the principle; you leave even the principle uncertain.

*Sardar Sampuran Singh:* What I want to make definite is this—that if the financial committee finds that this is a deficit province, and no ways and means are found so that it will not be a deficit province, then in that case we should make it perfectly clear that there should not be a separate Province. We are leaving that aspect altogether.

*Sir Muhammad Shafi:* But the words "before the new Province is set up" clearly mean that.

*Sir Phiraze Sethna:* No, I think that is very vague. If we say "before that decision is taken" it is all right. What do you say here—that members be asked whether they will be able to contribute towards the extra taxation. It has been pointed out that the taxpayers in the Bombay Presidency pay Rs. 6: 8: per head. Well, that makes the case worse; but if this contention is correct that there is a deficit of a crore of rupees and the population is 33 lakhs, it means that the tax will increase by a further Rs. 3—that is instead of Rs. 6: 8: the Sind taxpayer will have to pay Rs. 9: 8: How is he to pay, and where from? According to Sir Shah Nawaz

Bhutto the peasant there and everybody there is so very poor that they cannot afford it.

*Mr. Jinnah:* Sir Phiroze Sethna, why do you assume that the representatives cannot show a practical way of bearing the burden? If they cannot show it, then the Province cannot be set up as a separate Province.

*Sir Phiroze Sethna:* Yes, but may this Committee take it for granted that if the representatives cannot show the ways and means whereby the taxation can be paid by themselves, Sind is not to be separated?

*Mr. Jinnah:* Excuse me. After all, the Government cannot divorce themselves of the responsibility. Supposing the representatives of Sind are so stupid as to say "We are willing to pay 14 annas in the rupee tax for the purpose of separating Sind," the Government will say, "You are mad." That is all.

*Sir Muhammad Shafi:* Sir Phiroze, your argument is based on the assumption that the incidence per head of the expenditure of the new Province will continue to be Rs. 6: 8: as it is now, and will import some addition. Your argument is based on that assumption. What we are saying is that your machinery is unnecessarily expensive, the Bombay machinery is unnecessarily expensive as compared with other Provinces, that in the new Province which will be set up that expensive machinery need not be maintained, and that the Province should be run on more economical lines than your Presidency is run at present.

*Sir Phiroze Sethna:* All I want to point out is that we are all for the separation of Sind, but Sind must stand on its own legs.

*Sir S. N. Bhutto:* That is right.

*Sir Phiroze Sethna:* Then if not, what is the recommendation of this sub-Committee? We must not be vague on that point.

*Chairman:* I will tell you, in view of the last words Mr. Jinnah accepted, what the recommendation of this sub-Committee is. The recommendation of this sub-Committee is that if Sind cannot show that it can stand successfully on its own legs the separation does not take place.

*Sir Phiroze Sethna:* If you can bring that out in the Report, that is all right.

*Chairman:* I think those words make it quite clear

*Sir Phiroze Sethna:* That is all we want.

*Chairman:* I am satisfied about that now. When Mr. Jinnah accepted those last words he solved my difficulty.

*Sir S. N. Bhutto:* Probably you will only create further agitation.

*Sir Phiroze Sethna:* Is it better to use the word "deficit" or "recurring deficit?" What do you think?

*Dr. Shafa'at Ahmad Khan:* "Deficit" is all right.

*Chairman*: We must surely leave that to the intelligence of the financial Committee of the Government of India.

*Sir Phiroze Sethna*: I am trying to meet the point, because it is possible in a particular year you may say there is no deficit, but the question is whether there is going to be a recurring deficit. I am trying to meet that point.

*Chairman*: The financial committee of the Government of India will consider the point, of course.

*Raja Narendra Nath*: There is one thing to which I want to draw your attention. Would it not be better if you stuck to the facts—that the majority of the sub-Committee are in favour of separation?

*Chairman*: Well, I will say that if you wish it.

*Dr. Moonje*: I think it would be much better.

*Chairman*: Is there anybody who is not impressed by the strength of the arguments?

*Sir Phiroze Sethna*: In that case I think you might say the great majority, or the overwhelming majority.

*Sir Muhammad Shafi*: The overwhelming majority—the sub-Committee with the exception of Dr. Moonje and any other gentleman who is not impressed by the strength of the arguments.

*Dr. Moonje*: Let the facts be there.

*Sir Muhammad Shafi*: Or you might say “with two dissentients.” There are only two dissentients.

*Chairman*: May I say “The sub-Committee, with two dissentients?”

*Dr. Shafa'at Ahmad Khan*: Mention the names.

*Chairman*: Do you want the names?

*Mr. Jinnah*: I do not want to be taken as a dissentient.

*Dr. Moonje*: I should prefer “majority.”

*Sir Muhammad Shafi*: No, no; it is not a question of a majority, it is a question of the sub-Committee with two dissentients.

*Mr. Jinnah*: And mention their names, because I do not want to be misunderstood.

*Mr. Foot*: Mr. Jinnah is very anxious to see that Dr. Moonje should not miss any kudos.

*Raja Narendra Nath*: It is not necessary to mention the names.

*Chairman*: “The sub-Committee, with two dissentients.”

*Dr. Shafa'at Ahmad Khan*: Dr. Moonje and Raja Narendra Nath.

*Raja Narendra Nath*: I do not want names to be put in.

*Sir Muhammad Shafi*: Let him dissent if he likes.

*Chairman*: “The sub-Committee, with two dissentients.”

*Sir Muhammad Shafi*: No, no; one.

*Chairman*: I am told that there are two.

*Mr. Jinnah*: Then mention the names.

*Chairman*: Do you want the names put in?

*Lord Zetland*: Mr. Jinnah is afraid that he may be thought to be one of the dissentients.

*Chairman*: Who are the dissentients—Dr. Moonje and Raja Narendra Nath?

*Sir Muhammad Shafi*: I thought that Raja Narendra Nath did not want to have his name mentioned.

*Raja Narendra Nath*: I do, because we have not arrived at any solution of the minorities question.

*Chairman*: Very well: "The sub-Committee, with two dissentients"—and I have put their names in—"are impressed by the strength of the arguments in favour of separation, and they have come to the conclusion that the principle of separation should be accepted. They therefore recommend that an expert Committee in India should examine carefully the probable revenue and expenditure of a separated Sind and the security of the debt on the Sukkur Barrage and should also recommend an equitable adjustment of the financial commitments for which Sind may properly be considered liable. If the investigation shows that separation would leave the new Province with a deficit, the sub-Committee think that the representatives of Sind should be asked to show how the deficit should be met before the new Province is set up."

*Sir S. N. Bhutto*: That is complete now.

*Mr. Jadhav*: May I suggest that the word "satisfactorily" be inserted before "show"? Then I think the further thing will not be required.

*Sir Muhammad Shafi*: I have no objection to that.

*Mr. Jinnah*: I think that is understood really, but I do not mind.

*Chairman*: What is the suggestion?

*Mr. Jadhav*: Instead of "show," say "satisfactorily show."

*Chairman*: But that makes no difference. "Show" means "show to the satisfaction of the Government of India."

*Sardar Sampuran Singh*: That does not make any difference.

*Sir Phiroze Sethna*: If that does not make any difference I suggest that "a decision be taken" be inserted before "the new Province is set up."

*Mr. Mody*: I think there is no harm in putting in the word "satisfactorily."

*Chairman*: I am not going to split my infinitive—"to show satisfactorily." I am a purist in these matters. Now may I take it that, as altered now, the Report is agreed to?

*Sir Phiroze Sethna* : Did I understand Lord Zetland to say “ to the satisfaction of the Government of India? ”

*Chairman* : No, there is nothing about “ to the satisfaction of the Government of India.”

*Mr. Chintamani* : What word did Your Lordship add?

*Chairman* : “ Satisfactorily.” Are you all agreed? (*Agreed.*)

*Chairman* : That concludes our business.

*(The proceedings then terminated.)*

## Sub-Committee No. IX (Sind).

REPORT PRESENTED AT THE MEETING OF THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE CONFERENCE, HELD ON 16TH JANUARY, 1931.

## 1. The members of the sub-Committee were:—

Lord Russell ( <i>Chairman</i> ).	Sir M. Shafi.
Lord Zetland.	Dr. Shafa'at Ahmad Khan.
Lord Reading (for whom Mr. Foot acted as sub- stitute).	Sardar Sampuran Singh.
H.H. The Aga Khan.	Dr. Moonje.
Mr. Jinnah.	Mr. Jayakar.
Sir S. N. Bhutto.	Raja Narendra Nath.
Sir G. Hussain Hida- yatullah.	Mr. Chintamani.
Sir Abdul Qaiyum.	Mr. Jadhav.
	Sir P. Sethna.
	Mr. Mody.
	Sir H. Carr.

The terms of reference were to consider—

“The question of constituting Sind as a separate Province.”

The sub-Committee sat on 12th, 13th and 14th January, and have authorised me to present this Report.

2. They consider that the racial and linguistic differences between the inhabitants of Sind and those of the Presidency of Bombay proper, the geographical isolation of Sind from Bombay, the difficulties of communication between the two, and the insistency with which separation has been advocated, provide an impressive case for the division of Sind from the Bombay Presidency and the creation of a separate Provincial Government there.

3. They observe that the Government of Bombay have pointed out certain administrative difficulties in the way of the separation of Sind, but they do not believe them to be insuperable.

4. They note that no detailed examination of the financial consequences of separation has yet been made. On the figures available to them they are unable to express an opinion on the financial aspects of the question.

The sub-Committee with two dissentients (Dr. Moonje and Raja Narendra Nath) are impressed by the strength of the arguments in favour of separation, and they have come to the conclusion that the principle of separation should be accepted. They therefore recommend that an expert Committee in India should examine carefully the probable revenue and expenditure of a separated Sind and the security of the debt on the Sukkur Barrage, and should also recommend an equitable adjustment of the financial commitments for which Sind may properly be considered liable. If the

investigation shows that separation would leave the new Province with a deficit, the sub-Committee think that the representatives of Sind should be asked to show satisfactorily how the deficit would be met before the new Province is set up.

Signed on behalf of the sub-Committee,

*RUSSELL.*

St. James's Palace, London,

14th January, 1931.

## APPENDIX I.

## Sub-Committee No. IX (Sind).

## NOTE ON THE FINANCIAL ASPECT OF THE PROPOSED ESTABLISHMENT OF A SEPARATE PROVINCE OF SIND.

*(Circulated to the sub-Committee by Direction of the Chairman—The Earl Russell.)*

1. There is very little detailed information available upon which there might be based an estimate of the resources which a separate provincial government in Sind would have. The Statutory Commission recommended that if it is held that the time is ripe for the separation of Sind to be seriously considered, there would have to be a close and detailed enquiry into the financial consequences which would follow from such a step before a decision could be taken. The Government of India have advised that such an enquiry should be set on foot at the earliest possible date. In the Memorandum which the Government of Bombay presented to the Statutory Commission they said that they had not yet been able to examine thoroughly the financial aspect of the question. Subsequently a short note dated 15th October, 1928, was drawn up in the Finance Department of the Government of Bombay. A copy of this note is attached. The estimates contained in it were based on the figures of revenue and expenditure for the four years 1921-25 and the year 1927-28. The Government of Bombay were asked to furnish estimates based on more recent figures for the purposes of this sub-Committee, but as Sind has no separate accounts, no late figures are available.

2. At present the Government of Bombay incurs a deficit in respect of its administration of Sind. The average deficit for the four years 1921-25 was Rs. 24·8 lakhs. On the basis of the figures for 1927-28 it amounted in that year to Rs. 64 lakhs, and the Government of Bombay report that there is no reason to believe that the deficit has since decreased and the revenue from Stamps and Excise has seriously diminished. It will be further swelled by the creation of two new administrative districts consequent upon the development resulting from the Sukkur irrigation scheme. The annual cost of this is estimated at Rs. 6 lakhs.

3. The extra cost of the establishment of a separate provincial headquarters is likely at a conservative estimate to amount to Rs. 9 lakhs. Sind would also have to bear a proportion of the public debt of Bombay. It is arguable what proportion this should be and how it should be calculated.

4. Thus it is likely that the budget of a separated Sind would show an annual deficit amounting to between Rs. 50 lakhs and Rs. 90 lakhs. It is difficult to see how any appreciable portion of this sum could be met by increased or fresh taxation in Sind. Until the success of the Sukkur irrigation scheme is assured it would be financially unsound for a separate Government in Sind to incur further debt for the unproductive purpose of meeting an annual recurring deficit. The Government of India would have to make a grant to the Government of Sind and it is questionable whether in the present condition of its finances the Government of India would be in a position to make such a grant. Moreover, while the deficit existed



there would be no funds available for the necessary development of railways and irrigation nor for the improvement of public health and education.

5. On the other hand, if the Sukkur scheme proves to be a success, Sind can look forward to greater prosperity. In the course of time the deficit will disappear. But the first charge upon the profits of the scheme must be the payment of the interest and sinking fund charges upon the money borrowed to finance it. It is estimated that in 1946, if all goes well, the profits will be sufficiently large to meet the whole of the annual charges on capital and they would begin to contribute something to the ordinary revenue of the province. Some further period must necessarily elapse before the surplus profits would remove the whole of the estimated deficit.

NOTE ON THE FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF THE PROPOSED SEPARATION OF SIND BY MR. G. WILES, C.I.E., SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF BOMBAY, FINANCE DEPARTMENT, DATED 15TH OCTOBER, 1928.

This note deals solely with the financial aspect of the question, and neglects consideration of the difficulty of administering so small a unit in the matters of recruitment of establishments, sudden falls of revenue, high overhead charges and the like, and any political considerations.

The accounts of Sind are not kept separately. But so far as provincial revenue and expenditure are concerned, it is known that Sind had always been a deficit province before the Reforms. The actual figures of receipts and disbursements made in Sind have been gathered for the years 1921-25, and this note is based on those. Up-to-date figures are being collected and will be submitted in continuation of this note. There is reason to believe that they will not modify the conclusions arrived at.

2. The statements attached to this note show that since the introduction of the Reforms, Sind has failed to pay its way, the average deficit being some 25 lakhs. This figure excludes any contribution on account of the cost of the administration other than that of officers stationed in Sind. The statements are made up simply of the receipts and disbursements of the Sind treasuries as modified by certain annual adjustments. In considering the financial effect of the separation of Sind, therefore, the full cost of headquarter staffs must be added to the cost of administration.

3. There is reason to believe that the deficit on the administration of Sind is larger to-day than it was in 1925. Net Land Revenue (including Irrigation), Stamps and Excise, which are the chief sources of Revenue in Sind, have shown no increase since that year; on the other hand, the remission of the Provincial Contribution and the reduction of the Famine Assignment have set free for expenditure a sum of about a crore. Sind has not only had a subsidy from revenues of 10 lakhs a year towards the construction costs of the Barrage, but has also had its share in this expansion, and it is clear, therefore, that the excess of expenditure over receipts must have increased. The *prima facie* conclusion is confirmed by figures published by Prof. Chablani, a copy of which is attached. Prof. Chablani was given access to the Accountant-General's records, and his statement will shortly be checked by official figures. His total of revenue for 1927-28 is 174 lakhs and of expenditure (debited to revenue) 238 lakhs, making a deficit of 64 lakhs. There is no reason to doubt that a separated Sind will have to start off with a deficit of approximately this amount.

4. The additional cost of maintaining headquarter establishments cannot be easily ascertained. If we follow the Assam precedent, we may put it at about 9 lakhs. This figure may be roughly confirmed by the method of expenditure ratio. On the proportion of expenditure in the Presidency to Sind, a sum of about 6 lakhs would be required for a Governor's Staff, Legislative Council and Secretariat. To this must be added the cost of heads of Departments—Registration and Settlement, Forests, Agriculture, Excise, Jails, Medical, and so on. Moreover, the proportionate cost of administering a small province must inevitably be somewhat greater. Nine lakhs then may be taken as a conservative estimate.

5. No consideration has yet been taken of Sind's share in the capital commitments of the Presidency. Professor Chabiani has argued that Sind cannot in equity refuse to take over its share of the public debt of the Presidency. This is a contentious point with which I need not deal in this note. I will include only interest on capital expenditure made in Sind. Interest on irrigation debt (excluding the Barrage) is included already in the figures of expenditure under the head "14 Interest." There remains, therefore, capital expenditure on other purposes, viz., Civil Works, Public Health, and other works. This has amounted since 1921 to the sum of 107 lakhs; the interest charges on which are 5.85 lakhs; and some provision would be required for the repayment of principal (over a 30 years' period).

6. Sind would also have to take its share in the pre-reform debt on account of the Provincial loan account. At the end of the year the outstanding Provincial debt will be about 102 lakhs and the interest charges are at 4½ per cent. In the absence of details we may assume that one-fourth of the debt is on account of Sind. The debt is being repaid (under the Devolution Rules) by annual instalments of 29 lakhs. This means a payment from Sind of roughly 8 lakhs for 3½ years.

7. The introduction of perennial irrigation into Sind by means of the Sukkur Barrage is necessitating the creation of two new administrative districts in the immediate future. The cost has been roughly estimated at Rs. 6 lakhs recurring and Rs. 10 lakhs non-recurring.

8. A separated Sind then must suffer under the initial heavy handicap of a deficit, which, based on figures of the years 1921-25, cannot well be less than 50 lakhs, and, based on more recent figures, is expected to be as large as 80 to 90 lakhs. To meet this deficit, Sind has no greater prospect in the immediate future of additional revenue than has the rest of the Province. That is to say, any help from a revision of the Provincial settlement must depend on future surpluses of the Government of India. Sind is not an industrial province, and could not, therefore, benefit to any extent from the revision that we hope for in favour of the industrial provinces. Apart from fresh taxation, Sind could therefore, only rely on the general increase in such revenues as Excise and Stamps due to an advance in prosperity and population, and to the additional revenue expected from the Sukkur Barrage. Now the receipts from sales of land and the additional land revenue estimated from the supply of water are fully mortgaged for many years to meet the debt being incurred in the construction of the barrage. It must under the most favourable circumstances be at least twenty years before any surplus receipts can be available for the general purposes of the administration.

9. The conclusion which this enquiry must, therefore, arrive at is this, that not for a generation at least could a separated Sind financially stand on its own legs.

**STATEMENT OF PROVINCIAL RECEIPTS IN SIND FOR THE YEARS  
1921-22 TO 1924-25.**

(Figures in lakhs of rupees.)

	1921-22	1922-23	1923-24.	1924-25.
V.—Land Revenue . . . . .	*144.2	83.5	72.1	62.0
VI.—Excise . . . . .	31.0	35.5	40.3	39.1
VII.—Stamps . . . . .	16.0	19.4	20.2	19.8
VIII.—Forests . . . . .	8.0	6.2	6.3	6.9
IX.—Registration . . . . .	1.8	1.6	1.5	1.5
IXa.—Scheduled Taxes . . . . .	—	—	0.2	0.6
XIII.—Works for which Capital Accounts are kept . . . . .	1.1	36.5	39.3	39.2
XIV.—Works for which no Capital Ac- counts are kept . . . . .	0.5	0.5	0.1	0.1
XVI.—Interest . . . . .	1.7	3.6	2.7	1.8
XVII.—Administration of Justice . . . . .	1.5	2.1	1.9	1.8
XVIII.—Jails and Convict Settlements . . . . .	0.8	0.8	1.0	1.2
XIX.—Police . . . . .	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.4
XXI.—Education . . . . .	0.7	1.0	1.0	1.5
XXII.—Medical . . . . .	0.2	0.4	0.4	0.3
XXIII.—Public Health . . . . .	—	0.1	0.1	0.2
XXIV.—Agriculture . . . . .	0.4	0.4	0.7	0.7
XXVI.—Miscellaneous Departments . . . . .	0.1	—	0.1	0.1
XXX.—Civil Works . . . . .	0.5	0.9	0.7	0.9
XXXIII.—Receipts in aid of Superannuation . . . . .	1.4	1.7	2.1	2.0
XXXIV.—Stationery and Printing . . . . .	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3
XXXV.—Miscellaneous . . . . .	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3
<b>Total . . . . .</b>	<b>210.5</b>	<b>195.5</b>	<b>192.0</b>	<b>180.7</b>

\* Inclusive of "Portion of Land Revenue due to 'Irrigation,' " which is shown in subsequent years under head "XIII."

**STATEMENT OF PROVINCIAL EXPENDITURE IN SIND FOR THE  
YEARS 1921-22 TO 1924-25.**

(Figures in lakhs of rupees.)

Major Heads,	1921-22.	1922-23	1923-24.	1924-25
<i>Ordinary Expenditure.</i>				
5—Land Revenue . . . . .	23.0	40.1	39.2	18.8
6—Excise . . . . .	2.5	1.3	1.3	1.9
7—Stamps . . . . .	0.7	0.9	0.8	0.7
8—Forest . . . . .	4.2	3.5	3.6	4.1
9—Registration . . . . .	0.8	1.0	0.9	0.9
14—Works for which Capital Accounts are kept—Interest on debt . . . . .	11.4	12.9	16.2	21.5
15—Miscellaneous Irrigation Expenditure . . . . .	33.2	23.1	13.5	23.1
22—General Administration . . . . .	14.3	20.7	19.6	44.8
24—Administration of Justice . . . . .	10.0	9.6	10.0	11.5

**STATEMENT OF PROVINCIAL EXPENDITURE IN SIND FOR THE  
YEARS 1921-22 TO 1924-25—contd.**

(Figures in lakhs of rupees.)

Major Heads.	1921-22.	1922-23.	1923-24.	1924-25.
<i>Ordinary Expenditure—contd.</i>				
25—Jails and Convict Settlements . . . . .	6·3	5·9	5·2	5·9
26—Police . . . . .	40·8	36·1	35·1	36·0
27—Ports and Pilotage . . . . .	0·1	0·1	0·1	0·3
31—Education . . . . .	23·4	23·0	26·6	23·8
32—Medical . . . . .	5·9	4·6	5·3	5·3
33—Public Health . . . . .	3·1	3·5	2·9	2·9
34—Agriculture . . . . .	3·5	3·3	3·3	3·4
37—Miscellaneous Departments . . . . .	0·3	0·3	0·3	0·3
41—Civil Works . . . . .	22·2	10·4	6·5	8·0
45—Superannuation Allowances and Pensions . . . . .	5·9	6·1	6·9	7·1
46—Stationery and Printing . . . . .	1·2	1·3	0·9	1·0
47—Miscellaneous . . . . .	1·5	1·3	4·0	5·2
<b>Totals</b>	<b>244·4</b>	<b>209·0</b>	<b>202·2</b>	<b>221·5</b>
<i>Capital Expenditure.</i>				
55—Construction of Irrigation Works . . . . .	5·6	19·1	51·5	124·0
6A—Capital Outlay on Improvement in Public Health . . . . .	—	5·3	0·5	—
60—Civil Works not charged to Revenue . . . . .	—	7·1	5·5	12·2
<b>Grand totals</b>	<b>250·0</b>	<b>240·5</b>	<b>259·7</b>	<b>357·7</b>

**RECEIPTS IN SIND.**

(Figures in lakhs of rupees.)

V.—Land Revenue . . . . .	67·1
VI.—Excise . . . . .	38·7
VII.—Stamps . . . . .	19·2
VIII.—Forests . . . . .	7·1
IX.—Registration . . . . .	1·6
IXA.—Scheduled Taxes . . . . .	0·5
XIII.—Works for which Capital Accounts are kept . . . . .	28·1
XIV.—Works for which no Capital Accounts are kept . . . . .	0·3
XVI.—Interest . . . . .	1·3
XVII.—Administration of Justice . . . . .	2·1
XVIII.—Jails and Convict Settlements . . . . .	0·8
XIX.—Police . . . . .	0·6
XXI.—Education . . . . .	1·3
XXII.—Medical . . . . .	1·2
XXIII.—Public Health . . . . .	0·1
XXIV.—Agriculture . . . . .	0·5
XXVI.—Miscellaneous Departments . . . . .	0·1
XXX.—Civil Works . . . . .	0·9
XXXIII.—Receipts in aid of Superannuation . . . . .	1·9
XXV.—Miscellaneous . . . . .	0·5
<b>Total</b>	<b>174·3</b>

## EXPENDITURE IN SIND.

(Figures in lakhs of rupees.)

5—Land Revenue . . . . .	14.03
6—Excise . . . . .	3.30
7—Stamps . . . . .	0.70
8—Forests . . . . .	3.90
8A—Forests . . . . .	0.03
9—Registration . . . . .	0.88
13—Irrigation: Working Expenses . . . . .	—
14—Works for which Capital Accounts are kept— Interest on Debt (excluding on Sukkur Barrage) . . . . .	15.46
15—Miscellaneous Irrigation Expenditure . . . . .	24.00
22—General Administration . . . . .	44.56
24—Administration of Justice . . . . .	11.57
25—Jails and Convict Settlements . . . . .	6.23
26—Police . . . . .	36.06
27—Ports and Pilotage . . . . .	0.12
31—Education . . . . .	27.70
32—Medical . . . . .	6.73
33—Public Health . . . . .	2.30
34—Agriculture . . . . .	4.70
37—Miscellaneous Departments . . . . .	0.30
41—Civil Works . . . . .	11.10
43—Famine Relief . . . . .	2.31
45—Superannuation Allowances and Pensions . . . . .	7.60
46—Stationery and Printing . . . . .	0.96
47—Miscellaneous . . . . .	4.15
55—Construction of Irrigation Works . . . . .	234.00
16—Financed from Famine Insurance Grant	
toward Interest on Barrage . . . . .	10.00
*Sukkur Barrage . . . . .	221.73
Other Irrigation Productive Works . . . . .	1.50
Other Irrigation Unproductive Works . . . . .	0.77
60—Civil Works not charged to Revenue . . . . .	6.63
60B—Commutation of Pensions . . . . .	0.87
Total . . . . .	470.19

\* NOTE.—Includes 25 lakhs Interest on Barrage Capital.

## APPENDIX II.

## Sub-Committee No. IX (Sind).

## A BRIEF NOTE ON THE SEPARATION OF SIND.

*(Circulated to the sub-Committee at the request of Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto.)*

Sind is a unit totally distinct from Bombay to which it was added for administrative purposes by pure accident and with a total absence of policy aforethought. Geographically, ethnologically and linguistically, too, Sind is totally different from the Presidency.

Through all the ages of recorded history up to the British Raj, Sind has been a distinct administrative unit. Even after the advent of the British, Sind remained for a long time a separate province under a Governor. But for the great controversy between Sir Charles Napier (the Governor) and Major Outram, and the party spirit it created among the then administrators and the civilians, Sind would have continued to remain till to-day a separate province. With the abolition of the Governorship, Sind was nominally linked with Bombay; but for all practical purposes it was left to be governed as quite a separate unit of administration by the Commissioner in Sind. And that is the form of administration we have even now in Sind.

Geographically, Sind is cut off from the Presidency by a huge belt of non-British Indian territory. It is 1,000 miles away by land and 500 miles away by sea. The physical features of the two areas are widely divergent in nature, and the main occupation in Sind—agriculture—is run on a system totally different from that of the Presidency. As a result thereof, even the system of land revenue administration is different.

The peoples of Sind are of an ethnological stock totally alien to that of the Presidency. Their culture, habits, manners and customs are consequently quite different. Sind also has its own distinctive language—Sindhi—which is not native to any other part of the Presidency.

All these differences constitute so many handicaps against a Sind that is administratively united to the Presidency. Its geographic distinctiveness operates harshly both ways. On the one hand, Government headquarters at Bombay is too far off for expeditious issue of orders. On the other, it necessitates the devolution of several of the powers of Government on the head of the administration in Sind, the Commissioner in Sind, who tends thus to be an autocratic ruler. Owing to their ethnological and linguistic distinctiveness, the Sindhi members in the Bombay Council find themselves a lone group, and get very little sympathy and understanding from the Presidency members. Moreover, the problems of Sind are so different from those of the Presidency that it is difficult to bring them into line, or to arouse in the peoples of Bombay any sympathy and understanding for those problems.

As a net result, Sind is neglected both by the Government of Bombay and by the chosen representatives of the peoples of the Presidency. The latter do not understand the problems of Sind—and they can hardly be expected to understand them—and so take little or no interest in the affairs of Sind, except to oppose all schemes for expenditure on the development of Sind. With a backing of this nature, Government, too, neglect Sind. They are most unsympathetic in the administration of their land revenue policy in Sind. Education, roads and communications, medical aid, in fact, all the nation-building departments in Sind are starved.

Moreover, Sind's jointure with Bombay affects Sind prejudicially in respect of development of matters under the control of the Government of

India, like the development of railways in Sind and the development of the port of Karachi, as in all these matters they have to go through the Government of Bombay, which is hardly as satisfactory as it would be if Sind could go directly to the Government of India.

Sind laboured long and patiently under these disabilities, but began at length to realise that its salvation lay in its developing itself as a distinct province separated from Bombay. The point was first publicly mooted by the late Hon. Mr. Harchandrai, C.I.E., in 1913, in his address as Chairman of the Reception Committee of the Indian National Congress at Karachi. The matter was pressed further by the deputation of the Sind Provincial Conference which waited on the late Mr. Montagu and Lord Chelmsford at the time the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms were on the anvil. The resolution on the subject of linguistic provinces passed by the Indian National Congress in 1927 concluded with the expression of opinion that a beginning be made by constituting Sind into a separate province. The All-India Muslim League then gave the demand for the separation of Sind its enthusiastic support and by this time the question became an All-India one. It was one of the items in the Delhi Muslim Proposals. The All-Parties Conference gave the principle of the separation of Sind their support and so did the Nehru Report. On the 17th of July, 1928, the Sind Hindu-Muslim Pact was arrived at, and one of the provisions thereof was the separation of Sind. And the All-India Muslim Conference, Delhi, of 1928-29 resolved in favour of the separation of Sind.

The matter had now become a live issue. The Statutory Commission had begun its enquiry. The Sind Mahomedan Association in its representation to the Commission pressed very keenly for the separation of Sind. The pros and cons of the case were being examined. The Government of Bombay (one Executive Councillor and one Minister dissenting) decided at first against the separation. The Bombay Provincial Committee which assisted the Statutory Commission expressed full sympathy with the desire for the separation of Sind, and invited further enquiry; one member of the Committee, Syed Miran Mahomed Shah, wrote an exhaustive minute of dissent devoted solely to the support of the case for the separation. The Indian Central Committee, however, recommended that Sind should be separated. The Statutory Commission expressed great sympathy with the claim of Sind for separation but proposed that the matter be referred to a Boundaries Commission. The Government of India in their review of the Statutory Commission's Report, state in regard to the separation of Sind that the claim has become increasingly prominent in recent years, and that while they are not yet in a position to tender final advice, they urge that enquiries be set on foot at the earliest possible date. And, as against their objection at first to the separation of Sind, the Government of Bombay accept, in their review of the Statutory Commission's Report, the proposal for the appointment of a Boundaries Commission.

The position to-day therefore appears to be this, that the principle of the separation of Sind is accepted by the powers that be. And all that therefore remains is to meet the more important objections that have been urged against the separation. These may be classified under three main heads:—

- (a) Administrative difficulties,
- (b) financial difficulties, and
- (c) the communal apprehensions of the Hindus.

Of these, the third may be taken up first and disposed of as it contains the least substance. The Hindu apprehensions take the form of the feeling that separated Sind will be another Muslim-majority province. It may be pointed out that the demand for the separation of Sind is not so much a Muslim demand as a Sindhi demand. It was first put forward by the late Hon. Mr. Harchandrai, a very prominent Hindu. The demand was pressed by the Sind Hindus in the deputation to the late Mr. Montagu and Lord

Chelmsford when the current reforms were on the anvil. The Indian National Congress resolution of 1927 demanding the separation of Sind was moved by Pundit Madan Mohan Malaviya, the Arch High-Priest of the Hindu Mahasabha. Then there was the Sind Hindu-Muslim Pact of the 17th July, 1928. These are some of the prominent instances in which the claim for the separation of Sind was supported publicly by Hindus of position and responsibility. They must have had good reasons for doing so, and indeed it is indisputable that one of the immediate effects of the separation will be the accretion of more power in the hands of Sind Hindus.

The objections on administrative and financial grounds are, however, more serious, not because they are more real, but because the non-official has not sufficient material to prove what he knows to be a fact, that the objections are groundless. But even on the available material it can be seen that there is not much in these objections.

The administrative difficulties are raised under three heads:—

- (i) that the area and population of Sind is not large enough for the formation of a distinct province;
- (ii) that there will not be enough work for a Governor and "at least" three ministers, and
- (iii) that separated Sind will be deprived of the advice of the "experts" of the Bombay Government.

As regards area and population, apart from the fact that in no case have area and population been the criteria for the formation of a distinct administration, the following figures will show that there are very successful administrations in British India, not to speak of the innumerable tiny distinct Indian States, side by side with which, the area and population of Sind compare very favourably.

Province.	Population.	Area.
Ajmer Merwara . . . . .	420,000	2,711
Assam . . . . .	6,700,000	53,013
N. W. F. Province . . . . .	2,500,000	13,418
Sind . . . . .	3,270,000	47,000

The proposition that there will not be enough work for the heads of a distinct government starts on the assumption that there must be "at least" three Ministers and a Governor. If three Ministers are not required, Sind may have only two. And if they have not enough routine work, so much the better; they can better attend to the needs of the people, and to the development of Sind. Besides work will grow.

As regards the "experts" of the Bombay Government, their services to Sind are practically nil. The problems of Sind are peculiar to it. It is best studied by and known to such heads of departments as are in Sind, whose opinion is invariably endorsed by the experts of the Bombay Government. In effect, therefore, the experts for the purposes of Sind are already there, and they will be there in a separated Sind.

We now come to the last but not the least of the objections—the financial objections, which are raised in regard to, on the one hand, the cost of Sind administration and, on the other, the responsibility of Bombay for the cost of the Sukkur Barrage.

To deal with the second first, it may be pointed out that Bombay has no real responsibility or burden in respect of the Barrage. The cost has been loaned by the Government of India in approval of a self-supporting scheme under which the entire cost is to come forth from Sind; Bombay has no real burden in respect of it—it is only to be a post-office, taking the money from the Government of India and spending it on the Barrage, and recovering the money from Sind and repaying it to the Government of India. The sale proceeds of the lands repay the interest, and the land



assessment increments and assessment on new lands brought under cultivation repays the loan.

As regards the cost of administration, it must in the first place be observed that it has yet to be proved that Sind is a deficit province. Actual, correct and definite figures have never been supplied by the Bombay Government despite several requests therefor. All sorts of figures of revenue and expenditure have from time to time been supplied, all different in their results but never the actual information required. In reply to a Council question the following figures were given on the floor of the House, and may be treated as the most recent:—

Years.	1922-23.	1923-24.	1924-25.
Revenue . . . .	195.0	192.0	180.7
Expenditure . . . .	209.0	202.2	221.5

An analysis, however, of the details which go to make up these figures of expenditure shows that it includes—

- (a) cost of irrigation works for which capital accounts;
- (b) miscellaneous irrigation expenditure, and
- (c) expenditure on civil works.

These items cannot be classed as ordinary expenditure. Deducting the expenditure on items (a) and (c) and a reasonable portion, say 50 per cent., of the expenditure on item (b) as being spent on capital works, the revised figures of expenditure for the three given years would be:—

174.1, 172.7, and 180.4.

It will be obvious from this that after meeting ordinary expenditure, Sind shows an annual average surplus of Rs. 18.5 lakhs. And even according to the extravagant estimate of the Bombay Government, the increased cost of administration of separated Sind is not expected to exceed Rs. 10 lakhs annually. But there is no reason why Sind should have, at least in the beginning, as luxurious an administration as the Presidency has. The following table shows the expenditure per head in the other Provinces:—

Province.	Population.	Current Expenditure	Expenditure per Head.
			Rs. A.
Assam . . . .	6,700,000	28,163,000	4 0
Bengal . . . .	46,000,000	111,079,000	2 8
Bihar and Orissa . .	39,400,000	60,045,000	1 8
Bombay . . . .	26,200,000	160,151,000	6 8
Burma . . . .	12,500,000	95,092,500	7 8
Central Provinces . .	15,700,000	58,836,463	4 0
Madras . . . .	44,300,000	151,660,000	3 8
Punjab . . . .	25,000,000	125,214,000	5 0

With a population of nearly 33 lakhs, and with an average revenue of 190 lakhs, Sind has a capacity to spend over Rs. 5 per head, and this compares very favourably with the cost per head shown in the foregoing table.

All these calculations have made no provision for possibilities of economy and retrenchment, for increase in revenue by natural growth of prosperity, and lastly for additional taxation which the Sind peoples have agreed to bear if necessary.

It will, therefore, be seen that the formation of a separated Sind presents no insurmountable difficulties. Add to this the determination of the peoples of Sind that they must be separated, and the case is complete.

